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ABSTRACT 
 
The Perfect Stranger: 
Resource Access and the Evolution of Out-Group Relationships 
 
by 
 
Anne Catherine Pisor 
 
Unlike non-human primates, humans are highly tolerant of out-group strangers, as 
evidenced by the ethnographic and archaeological records; however, very little 
research has addressed when and why people build relationships with out-group 
individuals. What selection pressures might have favored inter-group relationship 
building in humans? As reducing temporal variation in resource access has been 
crucial in the human foraging ecology, I suggest that relationships with out-group 
members may provide access to non-local resources and buffer resource shortfalls 
striking entire communities. The relevance of out-group relationships is not limited to 
small-scale or prehistoric contexts either, as out-group members can also provide 
access to difficult-to-access resources like market items. My research program is 
focused on the above question; in my dissertation, I address three components of it: 
Which social and ecological factors favor out-group relationships? What do people 
look for when picking partners from out-groups? When people value out-group 
members, will they avoid behavior that would inflict costs on these individuals?  
xi 
 
Among three populations of horticulturalists in Bolivia, I measured valuation 
for out-group members using a non-anonymous economic game in which 
participants could be generous to in-group and out-group strangers. I found that 
participants were highly generous to both in-group and out-group strangers. 
Participants invest more in out-group relationships when they have less non-local 
(i.e., market) resource access, as proxied by their subjective socioeconomic status 
relative to others in their community. As has been demonstrated in the literature on 
in-group partner choice, participants prefer strangers perceived to be “good people” 
(a term associated with cooperative qualities in the Bolivian context). I also expected 
that out-group partner choice would track opportunities for resource access; indeed, 
participants also give more to strangers from out-groups perceived to have more 
market or political resource access. That said, the effect of resource access on out-
group valuation and out-group partner choice varied by proxy. 
 In a 55-country sample, I found that participants were less likely to condone 
corrupt acts, which generate costs for others, when they identified with larger groups 
of individuals, a proxy for valuation of these individuals. However, there was a 
caveat: participants with local identities were as opposed to corrupt acts as those 
with country, continent, or world identities, while those with regional identities were 
the most willing to condone corrupt acts. Consistent with my suggestion that out-
group members buffer actors against variation in resource access, participants 
experiencing the greatest degree of resource shortfalls were more likely to not find 
corruption permissible; however, this was also true of those experiencing the least 
amount of shortfall. 
xii 
 
 In sum, valuation for out-group partnerships does track resource access in 
three populations of horticulturalists and a sample from 55 counties, but the effect 
varies by measure in instructive ways. For example, the negative relationship 
between market items owned and out-group valuation in one population may reflect 
experiences of discrimination in market contexts, rather than a lack of utility for out-
group relationships per se. As discussed in the conclusion, my ongoing and future 
work capitalizes on these variable effects as it delves further into the nature of out-
group relationships in the Bolivian context. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans are highly inter-group tolerant relative to other primates. While inter-group 
tolerance is rare among non-human primates, individuals are most tolerant of out-
groups when resources are abundant (e.g., Isbell, 1991; Grueter and Van Schaik, 
2010) or when they may transfer into these groups (e.g., Saito et al., 1998). 
Conversely, evidence of human inter-group tolerance, and even inter-group 
relationship building, is prevalent in the ethnographic and archaeological records. 
This is a fact often overlooked by evolutionary-minded researchers, including 
Darwin himself, who focused on inter-group warfare as a primary selection pressure 
in The Descent of Man (1871). What selection pressures might have favored inter-
group relationship building in humans? How do social and ecological factors, 
including contemporary integration into regional, national, and global markets, 
influence inter-group relationships? Does partner choice among out-group members 
follow similar criteria as those for in-group members? When an individual values 
out-group members, is she likely to avoid generating costs that would harm them? 
 My dissertation addresses the above questions in the context of three 
horticultural populations from the Bolivian Amazon currently undergoing market 
integration and a sample of 55 countries from the World Values Survey and 
European Values Study. This introduction presents my theoretical approach in the 
context of human ecology, the resulting predictions to be investigated, and the utility 
of investigating these predictions among three market-integrating horticultural 
populations in contemporary Bolivia. 
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1.1 MUTUALISM, RECIPROCITY, AND INTER-GROUP RELATIONSHIPS IN HUMANS 
 
Intra-specific mutualism, or behavior generating benefits for two individuals 
simultaneously, is widespread in nature (Clutton-Brock, 2009). For example, 
members of various species rely on divisions of labor according to differential skill 
sets or access to resources (Noe and Hammerstein, 1994). Reciprocity, or the 
delayed exchange of benefits between two individuals (Trivers, 1971), is rare in 
nature – including among non-human primates – but highly prevalent in humans 
(Van Schaik and Kappeler, 2006; Jaeggi and Gurven, 2013). In humans, mutualism 
provides the basis of human warfare, common-pool resources, and trade (Van 
Schaik and Kappeler, 2006), while reciprocity is highly visible in human friendships 
(Silk, 2003; Hruschka, 2010). 
 The prevalence of reciprocity and mutualism in humans is likely due to the 
selective pressures present in our ancestral foraging niche, which was characterized 
by a high degree of variation in resource acquisition (Kaplan and Hill, 1985; Tooby 
and DeVore, 1987; Kaplan et al., 2012). In hominins, this foraging niche may have 
first favored a mutualistic division of labor between pair-bonded males and females 
(Chapais, 2008; Gurven et al., 2009). This division of labor required tolerance for 
other individuals in the context of food, a trait absent in many non-human primates; 
once tolerance was present, the potential for economies of scale in hunting may 
have favored mutualistic collaboration (Tomasello et al., 2012). Living in proximity to 
their collaborative partners would have allowed the evolution of mental record-
keeping of freeriding among foraging partners, a necessary pre-requisite adaptation 
for the evolution of reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; see also Delton et al., 2012).   
 3 
 
With increased involvement in such a high-risk foraging niche, brains became 
bigger and required more calories and scarce nutrients; reciprocity between adults 
outside of pair bonds and across generations would have become mandatory to 
avoid starvation (Hill and Hurtado, 2009; Kaplan et al., 2009). With this strong 
selection pressure in play, partner choice may have increased in importance. Actors 
who violated mutualistic or reciprocal relationships likely faced consequences, 
perhaps in the forms of ended partnerships, gossip, and social exclusion (Boehm, 
1999; Barclay, 2013). Extrapolating from historically documented hunter-gatherers, 
individuals may have lived in fission-fusion bands with a median size of 30 members 
(Marlowe, 2005), including numerous non-kin (e.g., 25% of the band among pre-
contact Ache and the Ju/’hoansi; Hill et al., 2011). Within such a group structure, 
individuals could afford to be selective in picking their band mates, avoiding those 
who were less cooperative (Barclay, 2013). In turn, the existence of a market for 
social partners may have favored actors’ willingness to generate benefits for others 
as a signal of their quality as a social partner (Van Vugt et al., 2007; Barclay, 2013; 
Baumard et al., 2013). Selection may have also favored actors sensitive to the 
convergence of their own interests with those of their prospective social partners 
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1996). 
While within-group social partnerships were crucial for smoothing resource 
access, resource shortfalls did occasionally occur on scales that included the 
foraging ranges of an entire band (Kelly, 1995). For example, when a !Kung San 
band lost access to a water source due to inadequate rains, individuals from that 
band would disperse, calling on friends from bands up to 150 or 200 km away 
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(Wiessner, 1982). In such circumstances, when resources were patchy and shortfall 
could strike an entire community (e.g., Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007), individuals 
may have sought to build relationships across communities as a "safety net" 
(Whallon, 2006). The archaeological (Gamble, 1999; Jochim, 2006; Whallon, 2006; 
Bouzouggar et al., 2007) and ethnographic literatures (Malinowski, 1922; Barth, 
1969; Ensminger, 1992; Bourque, 1994; Cashdan, 2001; Wiessner, 2001; Ross and 
Atkinson, 2016) provide numerous examples of such safety nets. Like the weak ties 
of the social network literature (Granovetter, 1973), members of these safety nets 
were not called upon for everyday needs, but for periodic ones. Out-group networks 
also provided individuals with access to non-local resources (Baugh and Ericson, 
1994), such as pottery (Solway and Lee, 1990), salt (Nordenskiöld, 1915), or 
ornamentation (d’Errico et al., 2009). For example, archaeological, ethnohistoric, 
and oral history data suggest that the San selectively maintained relationships with 
their Kgalagadi and Goma neighbors, through which they had access to hunting 
dogs and iron tools, among other goods (Solway and Lee, 1990). In small-scale 
societies, gift exchanges (Wiessner, 2001), marriage exchanges (Chapais, 2008), 
and seasonal aggregations (Kelly, 1995) exposed actors to 1,000 individuals or 
more with whom to build expanded networks (Dunbar, 2008; Hill et al., 2014). 
Despite the importance of between-group relationships, humans are often 
characterized as parochial, that is, as cooperating with in-group members to engage 
in inter-group competition. We should expect modern humans to be strategically 
parochial, building connections with out-group members when the expected benefits 
outweigh the expected costs of these relationships (Hruschka and Henrich, 2013; 
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e.g., Fessler et al., 2015). When the expected net benefits are positive, we predict 
that actors should exhibit initial generosity toward strangers (Delton et al., 2011; 
Raihani and Bshary, 2015), communicating cooperative intent and opening the door 
for a potential reciprocal or mutualistic relationship. 
Before we introduce the specifics of our predictions, let us define the terms 
“cooperation,” “group,” and “valuation.” 
Cooperation refers to behaviors that benefit recipients at a cost to the actor, that 
have been favored by natural selection because of the benefit they provide to the 
recipient (West et al., 2007). For example, by this definition, a benefit generated for 
one individual as a byproduct of another’s behavior is not cooperation (e.g., Clutton-
Brock, 2009). Generosity toward strangers may be cooperative, for example, 
because it opens the door for a potentially-beneficial reciprocal relationships by 
signaling the donor’s cooperative intent to the recipient, or to an audience of 
onlookers (Delton et al., 2011; Barclay, 2013; Raihani and Bshary, 2015). 
Cooperation is different from the term prosociality, which does not necessarily 
connote behaviors naturally selected because they provide benefits (e.g., Gurven 
and Winking, 2008; Silk and House, 2011). Both mutualism and reciprocity can be 
forms of cooperation (West et al., 2007). 
Groups are networks of individuals (Barth, 2000; Brewer and Caporeal, 2006) that 
are not necessarily temporally or spatially bounded (Appadurai, 1996). They are 
defined through delineations of in-group and out-group drawn by individuals who 
consider themselves members (Tajfel, 1982; Cohen, 2000). Importantly, these 
delineations may exist in an actor’s mind rather than being collectively recognized 
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by multiple individuals (Turner et al., 1987; Tooby and Cosmides, 2010). Humans 
are prone to cognizing groups as interdependent sets of people, jointly buffering 
resource access or engaging in collective action, because of the importance of 
groups in serving these functions during our evolutionary history (Brewer and 
Caporeal, 2006; Tooby et al., 2006). That said, whether or not a particular set of 
individuals is cognized as a group may also differ across cultures and across 
situations. For example, social categories, such as town of residence, are not salient 
as the basis of groups in Japan (Yuki and Schug, 2012), and ethnic markers are not 
salient for delineating groups in Quechua-Aymara areas of the Peruvian altiplano 
(Moya and Boyd, 2015); one way to make markers (Kurzban et al., 2001) and social 
categories less salient is to encourage collective action across marker and category 
boundaries (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2001).  
Valuation refers to the amount which an actor values another individual as a 
potential cooperative partner. Valuation is an internal regulatory variable that weighs 
the expected cooperative benefits a candidate partner will provide and adjusts the 
actor’s behavior accordingly (Tooby et al., 2008; Hackman et al., 2015; Delton and 
Robertson, 2016). Traits that are associated with cooperative behavior should 
increase valuation for candidate partners with these traits, such as a reputation for 
generosity (Gurven et al., 2000; Barclay, 2013; Baumard et al., 2013) or 
competence in food production (Eisenbruch et al., 2016). Conditions that may 
decrease valuation include existing cooperative networks that are sufficient to fill an 
actor’s needs. The aspects of our psychology that enable valuation were likely 
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naturally selected because of the fitness benefits of smoothing resource access via 
cooperative networks (Tooby et al., 2008; Hackman et al., 2015). 
 To re-frame our point about strategic (lack of) parochialism, we suggest that 
actors should have higher valuation for prospective out-group partners when the 
expected net gains to cooperation are higher. An actor need not consciously 
calculate the expected benefits and costs of a cooperative relationship, but must 
have a psychology sensitive to cues associated with expected benefits and costs, 
which in turn adjusts her behavior – her initial generosity toward an out-group 
stranger, for example – accordingly (Kiyonari et al., 2000; Cosmides and Tooby, 
2005). What are the relevant social and ecological factors that affect out-group 
valuation? Is out-group partner choice based on the same traits as those on which 
in-group partner choice is based? Do actors avoid generating costs when 
prospective out-group partners, or the actor’s reputation among out-group members, 
may be harmed? 
1.2 PREDICTIONS 
 
In the following chapters, we investigate the factors that may boost valuation of out-
group members, explore whether partner choice among out-group individuals 
operates by the same criteria as partner choice among in-group members, and 
examine one potential policy implication of out-group valuation. We predict that 
actors will exhibit valuation for out-group individuals when the expected benefits of 
cooperation with those individuals exceed the expected costs. Here we outline what 
we predict are the relevant benefits and costs, which will be addressed in the 
coming chapters. 
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When should an actor invest in out-group relationships? Out-group 
relationships are safety nets that may be called upon infrequently, when in-group 
networks cannot buffer wide-reaching shortfalls (e.g., loss of a water source) or 
provide access to a particular resource (e.g., salt). We predict that an actor’s 
valuation of potential out-group cooperative partners, but not her valuation of 
potential in-group cooperative partners, should track her opportunities for non-local 
resource access. Her current degree of need and quality of her existing network 
connections may not differentially affect her out-group and in-group valuation: If her 
need is low and her existing connections are supportive, valuation for both may be 
lower (if her anticipated future need is satisficed) or higher (if she anticipates future 
need but currently can afford the cost of establishing a new relationship). We 
measure valuation toward out-group and in-group strangers using a non-anonymous 
economic game, designed such that participants can be generous toward 
prospective cooperative partners and have their decisions made known to these 
recipients. 
What qualities should an actor seek in a candidate out-group 
cooperative partner? If out-groups are a source of resource access, an actor’s 
partner choice among out-group individuals should reflect both individual 
characteristics and group characteristics, as the latter may be accessed through a 
partner from that group. The same individual characteristics that predict partner 
choice among in-group members, such as qualities associated with resource access 
or cooperative intent, should apply to out-group partner choice. However, we predict 
that out-group partner choice should also track group resource access, group 
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status, and an actor’s existing information about out-group members. We measure 
partner choice as differences in valuation, as proxied by the non-anonymous 
economic game described above. 
How might out-group valuation curb the generation of externalities? 
Under social and ecological conditions favoring out-group valuation, like those 
outlined above, valuation should affect both an actor’s generosity toward 
prospective cooperative partners and her willingness to avoid generating costs 
impacting them. For example, she should be less likely to engage in corrupt acts if 
they will negatively affect out-group members who may be future cooperative 
partners, or damage her reputation with these prospective partners by harming 
others they value. An actor should especially avoid corrupt acts when she stands to 
gain from new cooperative partnerships – that is, when she is in a state of need, 
which may increase valuation for both in-group and out-group partners (as stated 
above). Consistent with this logic, actors with a larger scope of valued potential 
partners should be less likely to condone corrupt acts. We test this using self-report 
data from 55 countries via the World Values Survey and European Values Study. 
  While the selective environment that may have favored out-group valuation 
was different from the environments encountered by humans today, contemporary 
populations still offer tests of the above predictions. Small-scale horticulturalists, for 
example, tend to be less dependent on inter-household resource buffering than 
hunter-gatherer or pastoralist households because of the lower variability in the 
foods they acquire (Godoy et al., 2005; Kaplan et al., 2009; Gurven et al., 2010). On 
average, horticulturalists may thus be less likely to value relationships with out-
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group members, as the expected net benefits of out-group relationships are 
probably lower among these populations. Further, the integration of small-scale 
societies to national societies and markets provides quasi-natural experiments in 
which the expected benefits and costs of out-group relationships may change. 
 
1.3 HOW MIGHT OUT-GROUP VALUATION CHANGE WITH MARKET INTEGRATION? 
 
As actors integrate to national society and national markets, exposure to out-group 
members increases through a number of avenues. First, market transactions and 
visits to market towns boost the likelihood of interacting with or seeing out-group 
members (e.g., Gurven, 2004; Henrich et al., 2010). Second, social and market 
integration increase mobility, exposing actors to out-group members in the course of 
migration or travel (e.g., Berry, 2006; Ward, 2008). Third, watching TV or movies 
can increase passive exposure to out-group members (Buchan et al., 2009), which 
can boost empathy for out-groups (Roudometof, 2005). This is not an exhaustive 
list; other sources of exposure are also likely with increases in social and market 
integration. 
 Connections made with out-group members through markets may provide 
resource access or buffering not available via local cooperative partners. Out-group 
interactions may be required to access certain market items, such as radios, 
bicycles (Godoy et al., 2005), cloth, metal tools (Reeve, 1993), and firearms 
(Murphy and Steward, 1956). Further, local communities may stop producing certain 
goods if markets provide substitutes, such as fuel for fires, making out-group 
interactions mandatory (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006). Market integration itself may 
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also shift an actor’s focus to out-group relationships as in-group relationships 
become difficult to maintain. For example, actors may invest less in local 
cooperative relationships as they market integrate (e.g., Kasper and Mulder, 2015) 
because traditional patterns of demand sharing often extend to market items 
(Fessler, 2002; Peterson, 2013). 
 While social and market integration can enable us to study the relationship 
between exposure to out-groups, changes in the net benefits or costs of out-group 
interactions, and subsequent shifts in out-group valuation, issues with self-selection 
remain. First, actors with more existing social support may be the first to market 
integrate, as these networks can buffer some of the risks of interacting with out-
group members. Second, the potential for accruing status locally by having access 
to non-local resources can increase incentives for market integration (e.g., von 
Rueden et al., 2008). Third, more outgoing or generous individuals may be more 
likely to form relationships with out-group members (Nettle, 2006; Ashton and Lee, 
2007). The following papers directly address these mediating factors, where 
possible; all are discussed again in the conclusion. 
 
1.4 STUDY POPULATIONS 
 
The Tsimane’, the Mosetén, and the community with the pseudonym “Intercultural” 
are three populations of horticulturalists living in the Bolivian Amazon. While all 
three rely on the same mode of food production and live within 40 miles of each 
other, these populations have different degrees of involvement in Bolivian society 
and the market economy. For example, the Tsimane’ earn a median of $47 a month, 
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the Mosetén $134, and the Interculturales $182 per month. For comparison, 2% of 
the Tsimane', 19% of the Mosetén, and 21% of the Interculturales interviewed make 
more than the national private sector median of $560 a month (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, 2014). 
 The Tsimane’ and the Mosetén were once part of a single intermarrying 
population. The two groups speak different dialects of the same linguistic isolate, 
Mosetenan (Sakel, 2007), and mtDNA data suggest that they are more closely 
related to one another than to neighboring groups (Bert et al., 2001; Corella et al., 
2007). The Tsimane’ do have a long history of interaction with neighboring groups, 
however (Molina et al., 2009): they were first contacted by missionaries in the 16th 
century (Huanca, 2006), encountered Trinitarios from the eastern lowlands by the 
19th century (Lehm, 1998), and were regionally known as salt traders in the early 
20th century (Nordenskiöld, 1915). However, except for the Trinitarios and other 
indigenous lowland groups, the Tsimane’ tended to move away from outsiders, 
including Catholics who entered Tsimane’ territory via the Mosetén (Huanca, 2006). 
Only in the 1950s did the New Tribes Mission (Molina et al., 2009) and Catholic 
Redemptorists (Huanca, 2006) begin to missionize in Tsimane’ territory. By the early 
1980s, some Tsimane’ were involved in wage labor (Castillo, 1988). By 1990, the 
Tsimane’ were involved in national politics (Araoz et al., 1993; Molina et al., 2009), 
making and selling jatata, palm roof panels that continue to be a major source of 
income today, and buying market goods, including mosquito nets and alcohol 
(Araoz et al., 1993).  
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Despite some social and economic integration, the Tsimane’ remain relatively 
isolated from national markets and society by choice and due to poverty and lack of 
transportation infrastructure. Households are often dispersed, located on garden 
plots. Inter-household sharing is largely kin-biased and dominated by sharing of 
meat or labor (Jaeggi et al., 2014). Roads in Tsimane’ territory are few and poorly 
maintained; many Tsimane’ still rely on river travel, although with the recent advent 
of accessibly-priced outboard motors known as pequi pequis, river transport has 
become cheaper and faster. At the time of research, focal communities had high 
schools (grades 1-12), a community well, some access to medicines via community 
liaisons, and were visited by Aymara or Quechua vendors of commercial goods 
about once a week. Proficiency in Spanish, the most common language in Bolivia, 
remains low: only 14% of study participants interviewed could speak fluent Spanish. 
Ethnic exogamy is also rare and occurs primarily with indigenous lowland groups 
such as the Mosetén and Trinitarios. Among participants in the present sample, only 
4% had one non-Tsimane’ parent. Household incomes are primarily generated by 
cash crops and wage labor: jatata is the primary product produced.  Participants’ 
households had engaged in a median of 14 days of wage labor in the last month. 
 The Mosetén were missionized by the Catholic Church starting in 1805 
(Mamani et al., 2010). By 1845 a Catholic mission was founded in the area where 
the present research was conducted (32 miles from the Tsimane’ focal communities; 
see Figure 1). Prior to missionization, the Mosetén had lived as Tsimane’ do today: 
in dispersed households on their garden plots. The Catholic clergy created 
community centers by constructing adobe houses at the missions. By the mid-20th 
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century, the Mosetén were attending schools taught in Spanish by the Catholic 
clergy and were growing quina (genus Cinchona) as a cash crop. As of the 1960s, 
they began to intermarry with highlanders, who were moved to the area by 
relocation plans headed by the central government (Pareja, 1999; Mamani et al., 
2010), and with Trinitarios, who had arrived from the East in search of “the sacred 
land” (la loma santa). Population growth forced families to move away from the 
dense populations at the missions and start new communities in areas with more 
land but less infrastructure. The Mosetén relied primarily on river travel and travel on 
foot until the 1970s, when roads began to reach some communities. With the arrival 
of the roads, illegal logging skyrocketed. By 1990, the Mosetén had formed a tribal 
government, were cash cropping cacao and rice, and had exhausted much of the 
wood near the mission (Davalos, 1990).  
 Today the Mosetén are more mobile and market integrated than the 
Tsimane’. In the district where the majority of the present research was conducted, 
community members have access to a paved road, with shared taxis departing daily 
to the market town; electricity, running (non-potable) water, a high school (grades K-
12), and a health outpost staffed 24 hours a day; ~10 stores selling dry goods, 
meat, and soda; satellite television; and spotty cellular service. Inter-household food 
sharing is rare, although if one arrives at someone’s house and they are eating, they 
must invite one to eat – a custom also present among the Tsimane’. Participants 
reported relying on kin-biased networks to help with childcare and to borrow money. 
Spanish is universally spoken and exogamous marriage is the norm: 57% of the 
present sample had at least one non-Mosetén parent. The primary product in the 
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area is plantain; participants’ households had spent a median of 10 days of the last 
month engaged in wage labor. 
 The district called “Intercultural” is located at the border of the Mosetén 
territory. The Mosetén resided in the Intercultural area, but in the mid-20th century 
were displaced by a wave of immigrants searching for work in the quina industry 
(Llojlla Roca, 2011). In the late 1960s, government relocation programs moved a 
number of Aymara families to the Intercultural area. By 1975, these families had 
organized and had obtained the funds for a road to the local market town – although 
the road was not paved and often impassable – and had established a small school. 
With the arrival of the road, the rate of immigration to Intercultural increased: 
immigrants came for the temperate, productive growing climate or the logging 
industry. The majority of immigrants were themselves children of Aymara and 
Quechua immigrants who moved from the highlands to the lowlands. In 1991, the 
road to the market town was paved and a high school (grades K-12) was 
established (Llojlla Roca, 2011). 
 Today Intercultural has the greatest access to markets and Bolivian society of 
the three populations. At least five shared taxis travel to the market town daily; 
households have access to electricity, (non-potable) running water, and a mini-
hospital staffed 24 hours a day; ~5 stores sell dry goods and fresh vegetables; there 
are 2 butcheries and ~6 restaurants; and there is satellite television and spotty 
cellular service. Inter-household food sharing is essentially nonexistent, although 
participants did report relying on both kin and non-kin networks for help with 
childcare and to borrow money. The word “intercultural” in Bolivia refers to 
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communities of highland ancestry, an apt designation for this district: 59% of 
participants were Aymara and 18% Quechua. Almost all residents of Intercultural 
speak Spanish, except a few recently immigrated Quechua women. Participants’ 
households spent a median of 9 days in the past month working in wage labor. 
Thirty-one percent of participants primarily produced cacao, but 20% primarily 
produced plantain and 12% primarily produced timber. Fifty-four percent also had 
other sources of income, including driving taxis (14%) and vending (15%), whether 
via a store, a restaurant, or a vending cart. In fact, 10% of participants did not have 
gardens or work in logging, but relied entirely on wage labor, taxi driving, and/or 
vending. 
 
1.5 THE NATURE OF GROUPS IN BOLIVIA 
 
In the Bolivian context, categorical group memberships are salient and relevant. 
They are the basis of organization for collective action in the labor and political 
spheres, and ethnic identity is a central feature of the national discourse. Bolivia has 
a larger indigenous population than the majority of countries in Latin America, with 
36 nationally-recognized indigenous groups. Until the revolution of 1952, when 
campesinismo (the peasantry) and sindicalismo (labor unions) became important to 
the political sphere, indigeneity was at the forefront of colonial and national politics 
(Postero 2013); it returned to the forefront in the early 1980s when increasing 
disillusionment led to the foundation of organizations representing indigenous rights, 
such as the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (Confederation of 
Bolivian Indigenous Communities) in the lowlands. In the 1990s, indigenous 
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movements gathered steam as different ethnic groups increasingly coordinated to 
protest and demonstrate against government policies. Finally, in 2009, Bolivia 
ratified a new constitution which recognizes the right of Bolivian indigenous groups 
to self-govern by their own usos y costumbres (customary laws). The state began to 
preferentially invest support in “indigenous native peasants,” or rural indigenous 
individuals living on tribal lands (Albro, 2010; Fontana, 2014). 
The new government’s efforts to support Bolivian indigenous groups has had 
mixed consequences for ethnic identity. Identification with an ethnic group pays off 
in political contexts but often carries little weight in everyday life (Canessa, 2007; 
Hippert, 2011; Weber, 2013). Whereas indigenous groups banded together for 
common causes in the 1990s and early 2000s, groups now must compete for 
resource access in some contexts (Hippert, 2011). For individuals who do not meet 
the criteria for government support – those who are mestizo, live in urban sectors, or 
live in mixed communities – labor unions and work cooperatives provide alternative 
avenues for government resource access (e.g., Conzelman, 2007). These 
alternative means are relevant for communities like Intercultural, for example, as 
they are not on tribal land and thus feel they receive fewer resources than the 
Mosetén. 
 While there is a diverse menu of Christian churches in Bolivia, religious 
affiliation itself is polarized in favor of the Catholic Church. Since the early 20th 
century, North American Protestant denominations, known as iglesias evangelicas, 
have had an increasing presence in Latin America; between 1960 and 1990, the 
number of evangélicos in Bolivia quintupled (Stoll, 1990). The success of Protestant 
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churches in Latin America is at least partially due to missionarys’ tactics for 
recruiting members, such as offering material support, education, and opportunities 
for self-improvement (Gill, 1998). In an increasingly mobile Bolivia, evangelica 
church membership provide alternative opportunities for resource buffering for 
Bolivians who have migrated away from their kin (Gill, 1993). In response to 
competition from Protestants in Latin America, the Catholic Church increased its 
investment in the poor and tried evangelica tactics like televangelism (Gill, 1998); in 
Bolivia, for example, Catholic mass is broadcast live on the national TV station 
every Sunday. With these tactics, the Catholic Church has maintained its majority in 
Bolivia: approximately 87% of Bolivians identified as Catholic in the year 2000 
(Froehle and Gautier, 2002; World Bank, 2016). 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Inter-group relationship building in humans may have been favored in a foraging 
ecology in which non-local resource access and buffering widespread shortfalls 
were critical to survival and reproduction. Accordingly, we predict that actors should 
value potential partnerships with individual out-group members more when they 
perceive net gains from these relationships in terms of additional resource access or 
buffering. Contemporary contexts favoring out-group valuation need not be identical 
to those under which out-group valuation was selected: in Bolivia, we investigate the 
impact of social and economic change among horticulturalists on valuation for 
members of other ethnic, work, and religious groups. In the next three chapters, we 
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explore the effects of these candidate factors on out-group valuation, then draw 
some preliminary conclusions and identify future directions in this research program. 
 
Figure 1. Locations of pilot and focal communities among the three study 
populations. Tsimane’ sites are marked with yellow, Mosetén with orange, and 
Interculturales with green. 
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2. RISK BUFFERING AND RESOURCE ACCESS SHAPE VALUATION OF OUT-
GROUP AND IN-GROUP STRANGERS 
 
This chapter is co-authored with Michael Gurven and is currently under review. AP 
and MG conceived and designed the study, AP collected the data, AP and MG 
wrote the chapter. 
 
Abstract 
Unlike other primates, humans exhibit extensive inter-group tolerance and 
frequently build relationships with out-group members. Despite its common 
occurrence, little is known about the conditions leading to out-group relationship 
building in humans. What are the social and ecological factors that promote 
valuation of out-group members as potential social partners? Do they differ from 
those that promote valuation of in-group members? We propose that opportunities 
for non-local resource access and resource buffering, crucial in the human foraging 
niche, will increase valuation of out-group strangers. Using survey and experimental 
data collected among three Bolivian horticultural populations, we find that individuals 
who have fewer non-locally available resources and more information about out-
groups demonstrate more generosity toward out-group strangers. Some variability in 
the effects of our predictors are instructive, as they appear to reflect particulars of 
the Bolivian context. Further, depending on the measure, existing network 
connections affect both out-group and in-group giving, suggesting that new 
partnerships from both in-groups and out-groups may bolster one’s networks.  Our 
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results illustrate how evolved human psychology is sensitive to the costs and 
benefits of both out-group and in-group relationships, but underscore that the social 
and ecological factors favoring new relationships with in-group versus out-group 
strangers may differ. 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans have a long history of interaction with individuals from different places and 
cultural backgrounds. While much research on inter-group relationships in human 
evolution has focused on competition and conflict 1–4, out-groups as sources of 
danger 5,6, and in-group favoritism at the expense of out-groups 7, little attention has 
been given to the conditions that favor building connections with individuals from 
different groups (cf. 8–12). Chimpanzees and other primates are mostly indifferent or 
hostile towards strangers from other groups 13, yet archaeological and ethnographic 
evidence provide many examples of relationship building with out-groups throughout 
human history, as facilitated by marriage, trade, and friendship 11,12,14–18. Between-
group relationships served functional roles, including improvement of non-local 
resource access, resource buffering, and information transmission. Among 
contemporary industrialized populations, social psychologists and behavioral 
economists have likewise documented higher valuation for out-group members – 
measured as cooperation with, trust in, or empathy toward out-group individuals – in 
contexts where competition is low and mutually beneficial interactions are possible 
8,19–21. Furthermore, an actor is more likely to value out-group members when her in-
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group is of low status 22,23, a correlate of poor resource acquisition in situations of 
resource scarcity 24.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that positive valuation of out-group 
members as potential social partners is governed by an evolved human psychology 
sensitive to the expected benefits and costs of interaction with others, not unlike the 
system that governs partner choice and alliance formation with in-group members 
25,26. As with in-group valuation, the expected benefits and costs of interaction with 
out-groups may be informed by a participant’s own observations, past interactions 
with out-groups, and socially transmitted information 27,28. When the expected net 
benefits of interaction are sufficiently high, an actor should be more willing to display 
tolerance of and cooperative intent towards out-group members, thereby investing in 
her reputation as a potential social partner 29–32. Higher valuation of out-group 
individuals may improve inter-group relations in turn, increasing the likelihood of 
large-scale collaboration 33 and reducing parochial behavior 34,35. 
When might out-group relationships have expected net benefits for an actor? 
Humans evolved as hunter-gatherers, dependent on a foraging ecology with return 
rates that varied across space and time. In-group relationships provide crucial 
buffers to shortfalls caused by illness and food production failure in isolated small-
scale populations 32,36. These relationships remain important in populations 
integrating to national markets 37,38 and industrialized populations 39, as reliance on 
credit is not a perfect buffer 40 and resource shortfalls are associated with lower 
fertility 41,42. Out-group relationships may likewise buffer shortfalls due to production 
failures, illness, and other idiosyncratic shocks, but they also expand on the 
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buffering possible with in-group networks, as they can provide non-local resource 
access and buffer local resource shortfalls 11,12,15,17. Out-group connections may be 
particularly valuable to help cope with shocks that impact all members of an actor’s 
local network. For example, when local sources of water would run out in the 1970s, 
the San would disperse, calling upon social connections up to 150 or 200 km away 
10. The San also relied on members of different ethnic groups for resource access, 
trading locally produced goods for pottery, hunting dogs, and iron tools14. 
In the present paper, we suggest that while need and insufficient buffering in 
existing networks should motivate investment in new relationships, whether with in-
group or out-group strangers, the need or desire for non-local resource access 
should affect valuation for new out-group relationships more than for new in-group 
relationships. Further, expectations of the gains to be reaped via out-group 
relationships may be altered by past observations of, experience with, or socially 
transmitted information about out-groups. We investigate out-group and in-group 
valuation in relation to non-local resource access among three populations of 
horticulturalists from lowland Bolivia. Further, we explore the relative roles of 
existing social support, as well as past experience with out-groups and stereotypes 
about their resource access, in modulating out-group and in-group valuation. 
We predict that: 
(P1) Lack of access to resources that cannot be easily obtained in an actor’s 
community will predict positive valuation for out-group members. 
(P2) Existing information about out-group members, whether via socially transmitted 
information or an actor’s own past experiences, will modulate her valuation for them. 
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(P3) An actor’s current state of need and the degree to which she can rely on her 
existing social networks will affect both her out-group and in-group valuation. 
Each of the above predictions was tested with several measures. As a proxy for out-
group and in-group valuation, participants played a non-anonymous economic game 
in which they could be generous toward in-group or out-group strangers; recipients, 
past participants in the study, learned the donor’s name and amount sent. 
The data analyzed here were collected among the Mosetén, the Tsimane’, 
and a multicultural community nicknamed “Intercultural.” Members of these three 
populations have differential exposure to out-group members and markets, which 
may boost the benefits to be gained from out-group relationships. These differences 
in exposure are not solely between-group differences, but include substantial inter-
individual differences in market integration and out-group contact; as such, we 
studied the three populations together to take advantage of this inter-individual 
variance.  
 
2.2 RESULTS 
 
Each participant was presented with three photos of in-group and three photos of 
out-group strangers, and was given 21 bolivianos (1/3 of a day’s wage; $0.14/B1) to 
allocate among these six individuals and herself (Figure 1). Participants gave away 
an average of 74% (B15.53) to the six candidate recipients, keeping the remainder 
for themselves (B5.47; SD=5.77). They sent an average of B2.94 (14% of the 
stakes; SD=1.56) to each in-group stranger, more than the average of B2.20 (10% 
of the stakes; SD=1.50) sent to each out-group stranger (t=4.27, p<0.001). Though 
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we designed the economic game such that recipients would learn the name of 
donors, 33% of our sample opted not to share their names with recipients. Other 
descriptive statistics appear in Supplementary Table 1. Table 1 summarizes our 
predictions, the proxies used for each prediction, and model results.  
(P1) Existing non-local resource access. For proxies of non-local resource 
access, higher values mean pre-existing access to non-local resources. Participants 
who had higher subjective socioeconomic statuses relative to others in their 
community (i.e., believed themselves to have more money and market-purchased 
items relative to others in their communities) were less likely to give money to out-
group strangers (-B0.33 for each one unit increase on the log scale, p<0.10; Table 
2) but no more likely to send money to in-group strangers (B0.14, p=0.52) or keep 
money for themselves (B0.60, p=0.44; Figure 2a; Supplementary Table 3). 
Household income had no significant effect on giving. The dollar value of market 
items owned had no significant effect across populations, but within the Tsimane’ 
subsample, individuals who had more invested in market items gave significantly 
less to out-group strangers than Tsimane’ participants who owned fewer items (-
B2.72 per standard deviation increase in market items, p<0.01; Supplementary 
Table 4). 
(P2) Past exposure. Participants who had lived in more locations were significantly 
more likely to give money to out-group strangers relative to those who had lived in 
fewer locations (B0.21 for each additional location, p<0.01), keeping less for 
themselves (-B0.62, p<0.10; Figure 2b). Those who had watched more TV or 
movies in the past week also gave more to out-group strangers relative to those 
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who had watched less (B0.23 for each standard deviation of watching, p=0.10), 
keeping less for themselves (-B1.06, p<0.10). There was also no effect of number of 
cities and towns visited on giving. 
(P2) Stereotypes. Due to small sample size, separate models were fit to investigate 
stereotypes, each employing only the variables that reached significance above to 
preserve degrees of freedom in these models. There was no effect of stereotypes 
about the out-group’s cooperativeness on participant giving to out-group strangers (-
B0.09, p=0.84), or even in-group strangers, i.e., to avoid out-group giving (-B0.15, 
p=0.81; Supplementary Table 6).  
(P3) Need. Participants who had been ill in the last month were less likely to give 
money to out-group strangers than those who had not been ill (-B0.90, p<0.01), 
although they were no more likely to send money to in-group strangers or keep it for 
themselves than healthy participants (B0.54, p=0.18; B0.91, p=0.52). There was no 
consistent effect of resource shortfalls – that is, lower than usual income or 
production in the last two months, food insecurity, and household dependency – on 
giving. 
(P3) Existing network support. Participants who could borrow money from two or 
more communities where they had previously lived gave more to in-group strangers 
than those who could not borrow from past communities where they had lived 
(B1.05, p<0.05); they instead kept less for themselves, although the effect was not 
significant (-B2.20, p=0.17). Those who do not give or receive in cooperative labor 
exchanges gave less to out-group strangers than those who do at least some 
cooperative labor (-B0.52, p<0.05); a trend suggests they instead kept more money 
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for themselves (B1.87, p<0.10; Figure 2c).  There was no effect of being able to stay 
in at least one community where a participant lived previously. 
Exploratory analysis: Opting into anonymity. To avoid coercion, participants 
were allowed to opt out of non-anonymous game play if they chose. Participants 
who did not opt out (i.e., shared their names with participants) drove the effects for 
subjective socioeconomic status and recent illness, whereas the effect of number of 
places lived was robust across both samples (Supplementary Table S7). Sharing 
one’s name is included as a control variable in all models on the full sample 
(reported in the above sections) and had no significant effect on giving. 
Additional variables. Other control variables did not have significant effects on 
giving. See Supplementary Table 2 for fit statistics. 
 
2.3 DISCUSSION 
 
Little is understood about the social and ecological conditions that favor out-group 
relationship building in humans, though it is a hallmark feature of human sociality. 
Here we found that lowland Bolivian horticulturalists demonstrate substantial 
valuation for both in-group and out-group strangers as potential social partners, as 
proxied by generosity in a non-anonymous economic game. Generosity toward out-
group strangers was higher among those with lower subjective socioeconomic 
statuses relative to others in their community, a proxy for lack of non-local resource 
access. Among the Tsimane’, but not the Mosetén or Interculturales, those who 
owned fewer market items were more generous toward out-group strangers. These 
associations between existing non-local resource access and out-group valuation 
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are consistent with our approach, which suggests that an actor will consider new 
social partnerships, investing in her reputation as a reliable partner accordingly, 
when she expects these relationships to yield net benefits 25,26,29.  
We predicted that existing information about out-group members would 
modulate valuation for them. In general, existing information increased out-group 
valuation, such as living in a greater number of other communities or watching more 
TV or movies. Holding negative stereotypes about the cooperative potential of an 
out-group had no effect on giving.  
Finally, we suggested that need and a lack of existing social support may 
raise valuation for both out-group and in-group members. We found variable effects 
for these proxies. Participants who had a recent illness were less likely to be 
generous toward out-group strangers, although there was no effect of a summary 
measure of recent resource shortfalls (including recent lower-than-expected 
production or income, food insecurity, and dependency). In terms of existing social 
support, participants who had cooperative partners for traditional cooperative labor 
gave more to out-group strangers, while those who could borrow from members of 
two past communities gave more to in-group strangers. 
 Our results are somewhat at odds with existing studies suggesting that 
market penetration may increase giving to strangers, as market norms may 
prescribe behavior toward strangers43,44 or increased resource access may lower 
between-group competition by taking care of basic needs45. Instead, we find that 
higher subjective socioeconomic status, a measure of one’s access to money and 
market items, predicts less generosity toward one kind of stranger, out-group 
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strangers, and not another, in-group strangers. However, our non-anonymous game 
substantially alters the stakes of the game context (e.g., 46,47), so our results are not 
directly comparable. Interestingly, only one proxy for non-local resource access had 
an effect on out-group giving; market items owned negatively predicted giving in 
only one population, while household income had no effect. One reason the effect of 
market items may differ across populations are the different experiences of 
members of each population as they are exposed to out-groups. For example, 
Tsimane’ participants may experience positive exposure to out-group members via 
the media – one favorite movie character is a clown from Perú – but negative 
exposure via market interactions, as some suffer discrimination in local towns. 
 In this vein, the present study also underscores the importance of existing 
information about the out-group, need, and existing network connections in 
modulating out-group valuation.  For example, the negative relationship we found 
between recent illness and out-group relationships may be attributable to risk.  
Because out-group partnerships may be more risky – because norm systems 
between groups may differ, increasing transaction costs16, or because friends that 
rarely interact are more difficult to monitore.g., 25 – out-group valuation may become 
part of an actor’s risk management portfolio once some needs are met, not when 
resources are especially scarce e.g., 12,21,48. Participants who could borrow from 
members of two of their past communities likewise may have invested more in in-
group members because their relative gains from additional sources of resource 
buffering or access was lower relative to the costs of these risky initial relationships. 
These explanations are all consistent with an evolved psychology sensitive to the 
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relative benefits and costs of out-group relationships, as suggested by ourselves 
and others 25,26. Our future work will employ experimental manipulations and 
sources of quasi-natural experiments in Bolivia to better understand why some 
proxies had effects here and not others, and which weigh the most heavily in out-
group valuation.  
 In conclusion, the idea that out-group valuation may enable non-local 
resource access and buffering is consistent with existing ethnographic, 
archaeological, and social psychological data. The human foraging ecology is 
unique, based on the acquisition of calorically dense, difficult-to-acquire foods; 
social networks extending beyond an actor’s local community were likely crucial 
sources of resource access and buffering in our ancestral past, particularly for non-
local resources and shortfalls striking an entire community 11,12. The importance of 
out-group relationships is not limited to small-scale societies, however: it may be 
even greater in populations integrating to national markets, as the least integrated 
individuals in these populations have the most to gain from non-local resource 
access. In the present study, we demonstrated that one measure – low subjective 
socioeconomic status – predicted out-group generosity across three lowland 
Bolivian populations, while a second – having few market-purchased items – was a 
positive predictor in one of the three populations. We suggest that evolutionary 
selective forces have favored a psychology sensitive to the relative benefits and 
costs of out-group relationships, particularly the relative benefits in the currency of 
non-local resource access; our future work will further pin down the subtleties of why 
some needs for access, but not others, have an effect. 
 46 
 
 
2.4 METHODS 
 
2.4.1 STUDY POPULATIONS 
 
The Tsimane’, the Mosetén, and the multicultural community here called 
“Intercultural” are three populations of South American horticulturalists in the 
Bolivian lowlands. Together, members of the three populations capture the range of 
variation in market integration among lowland Bolivian horticulturalists. For example, 
the Tsimane’, Mosetén, and Intercultural households in this sample have median 
incomes of $36, $260 and $323 per month, respectively (the national private sector 
median is $560; 49). By interviewing members of all three populations, we took 
advantage of this inter-individual variation in exposure to out-group members and 
the benefits of non-local market access, e.g., via markets. For additional 
ethnographic details, see Supplementary Methods 1.  
“Groups” relevant in the Bolivian context are clusters of individuals who self-
identify as the same ethnicity, religion, political party, work cooperative, or labor 
union. For this study, we identified non-political groups which members of our study 
populations could join or, in the case of ethnic groups, with whom they regularly 
interact; focus is on religious and ethnic groups, as they are large enough to contain 
strangers. Mosetén participants regularly interact with members of six ethnic groups 
and may become members of two local work cooperatives. The majority of 
Mosetenes are Catholic, but an Evangelical Friends congregation is also part of the 
community. Intercultural has four churches and three local cooperatives. We 
selected five focal ethnic groups of the eight with whom Interculturales regularly 
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interact. In their language and in conversation, the Tsimane’ distinguish between 
three native lowland ethnic groups (the Mosetén, Yuracaré, and Trinitarios) but 
cognize Andean immigrants to the lowlands as one group (collas) and non-
indigenous lowlanders as another (cambas). Three churches have an intermittent 
presence in Tsimane’ communities, but Tsimane’ participants were not part of any 
work cooperatives. 
2.4.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND SURVEY PROTOCOL 
 
The sample includes 217 individuals (male=50.2%) from these three populations 
interviewed between August 2014-March 2015. As literacy is not high among these 
populations, participants gave their informed oral consent to participate. Study 
protocol was approved by the University of California, Santa Barbara Institutional 
Review Board and research was carried out in accordance with the approved 
guidelines. Order of presentation of survey sections and items within sections were 
counterbalanced across participants. Protocol were designed for these three 
populations, which include individuals with various levels of schooling and literacy, 
based on pilot interviews and ethnographic data. See Supplementary Methods 2 for 
details about sampling and comprehension checks for the economic game. 
 Participants sorted cards representing local groups on a physical five point 
scale, which drew on notions linguistic concepts of social closeness in Spanish and 
the Tsimane’ language (Supplementary Fig. 1); cards in the closest square were 
1=“groups I belong to most or feel most a part of,” while groups in the farthest were 
5=“groups I belong to least.” Cards placed in positions 1 and 2 were classified as 
“in-group” and those from positions 4 and 5 as “out-group”; from these, two groups 
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were selected: either one ethnic in-group and one ethnic out-group, or one religious 
in-group and one religious out-group. 
Initial generosity. A non-anonymous economic game was designed to improve 
upon the ecological validity of other game formats (e.g., the Dictator Game50) in 
which participants can demonstrate cooperative intent. Photos of six candidate 
same-sex candidate recipients, three in-group strangers and three out-group 
strangers within ten years of her age, were arrayed on the table (Figure 1). All were 
past participants in the experiment, and we ascertained that all were strangers 
before proceeding. Participants were told the name, group affiliation, and age (an 
intended distractor) of each individual. Stacks of three one boliviano coins (Bs; 
$0.14/B1) were placed on each photo and in front of the participant (total stake of 
B21; approximately 1/3 of a day’s wage). A participant could move any number of 
coins between photos, from photos to her own stack, or from her stack to the 
photos. Participants were informed that any Bs left on a photo would be given to that 
person in the participant’s name (unless the participant wished to remain 
anonymous) and any Bs left in front of the participant would be hers. To avoid 
confusion and maintain participants’ trust, donors who kept money for themselves 
received their payouts at the end of the interview, while recipients were given their 
payouts, along with the names of the donors and the amounts given, at the end of 
the field season. For analysis, we averaged the amounts a participant gave to the 
three out-group members and, for comparison, to the three in-group members. 
There was no difference in the amount of money allocated to members of out-group 
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religions vs. members of out-group ethnic groups, so we include both group types in 
each analysis. 
Existing non-local resource access. Aspects of participants’ material style of life 
51, including subjective socioeconomic status relative to others in their community 52, 
were obtained by interview. Per previously evaluated methods used among the 
Tsimane’, household net income was calculated from participants’ self-reported 
earnings and expenditures on debts and wages over the last month. Participants 
also identified the quantity of popular market possessions owned by their household 
(Supplementary Methods 3). Current price was used to ascribe dollar amounts to 
market possessions. Because a participant’s comparison of herself to others may 
affect whether she believes she can access more resources elsewhere 53, net 
income and dollar amount invested in market possessions were converted to z-
scores at the sample level. Subjective socioeconomic status was logged to 
normalize the positively skewed data. 
Need. Participants’ access to sufficient basic household resources was measured 
as self-reported food insecurity (54; Supplementary Methods 4), personal illness 
lasting three days or more in the past month, dependency (number of children living 
in the home), and whether production and earnings during the previous month were 
the same, higher, or lower than normative for the household. A summary measure 
of food insecurity, dependency, and changes in income/production was constructed 
by including all three in a principal components analysis and extracting the first 
component (variance explained=47.03%). Recent illness did not load on this factor 
and is thus considered separately.  
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Existing network support. To capture whether participants had existing social 
connections that could buffer shortfalls affecting their local community, participants 
were asked whether they could stay with a family from a community where they had 
lived in the past (i.e., in their natal community or in the local market town) during a 
hypothetical flood affecting their household, and whether they could ask someone 
from these communities for a loan of B100 (1.5 to 2 days’ wages). Additionally, as 
the availability of existing trustworthy cooperative partners constrains the ability to 
engage in traditional cooperative labor – ayni, cooperative labor often used to 
harvest rice – in these populations, participants were also asked if they gave or 
received labor in ayni in the previous year. 
Past exposure. Participants listed the number of towns and cities they had visited 
in their lifetime, as well as the number of locations where they had lived; number of 
locations lived and visited were each summed. They also indicated the number of 
hours they spent watching TV or movies in the past week. Due to the highly variable 
distributions of cities or towns visited and hours of TV or movies watched, these two 
variables were converted to z-scores at the sample level. 
Stereotypes. Participants were asked to describe what members of other groups 
said about the focal out-group. These free-responses were later coded by whether 
they concerned the presence of traits related to cooperation (or of traits that would 
reduce the likelihood of cooperative outcomes). These codes were lumped into a 
binary variable: whether a participant had mentioned a negative stereotype with 
regard to cooperation, or had not. 
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2.4.3 ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
  
We controlled for other factors that might affect out-group valuation beyond the 
scope of the present hypotheses (Supplementary Methods 5). These include 
participants’ propensity toward risk taking (Supplementary Methods 6) and her 
Agreeableness (Supplementary Methods 7), which may predict prosocial tendencies 
in the economic game55. Whether a participant preferred to remain anonymous in 
the economic game is considered in the text, as participants may play differently if 
they believe their decisions are anonymous47.  
2.4.4 STATISTICAL METHODS 
 
Using the R statistical program56, we compared the effects for the variables that 
predict generosity toward out-group individuals to those that predict the generosity 
toward in-group individuals and money kept by the participant. Because generosity 
data violated Gaussian distributional assumptions, all models use a Bayesian 
approach (MCMCglmm 57). Model estimates are reported as means of the posterior 
distribution. Unless specified otherwise, all models include data from all three 
populations and population random intercepts and control for survey version. Data 
are available in Supplementary Data 1, and are described in Supplementary 
Methods 8. 
 Collinearity was assessed for each model with a maximum permissible 
variance inflation factor of 4.  To check the robusticity of our effects, we fit each 
model within each population. To avoid the influence of outliers, we rounded 
extreme values and transformed non-normal continuous predictors (Supplementary 
Table 8). 
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Figure 1. An example of the non-anonymous economic game. Six photos were arrayed on a table, all past 
participants in the experiment. The three men on the left were participants who identify with one ethnic or religious 
group, the three on the right with another. Participants were told the name and group affiliation of each individual. 
Stacks of three one boliviano coins were placed on each photo and in front of the participant. The participant could 
move any number of coins between photos, from photos to her own stack, or from her stack to the photos. 
Participants were informed that any coins left on a photo would be given to that person in the participant’s name 
(unless the participant wished to remain anonymous) and any coins left in front of the participant would be hers. 
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Figure 2. Predicted amounts allocated (with 95% prediction intervals) to an out-group member (dark gray, solid line), 
an in-group member (medium gray, short-long dash), and the self (light gray, long dash) by (a) log subjective 
socioeconomic status, (b) number of places lived, and (c) availability of cooperative labor partners. 
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Table 1. Summary of results for valuation of out-group and in-group strangers. All effects for which p<0.10 are 
reported. N.E. signifies no consistent effect. Estimates for out-group stereotypes appear in Supplementary Table 5. 
1Value of market items has a significant negative effect on out-group giving, but only among the Tsimane’.  
  Out-group In-group 
Variable Prediction Result Prediction Result 
Existing non-local resource 
access ↓ 
 
N.E. 
 Income last month 
 
N.E. 
 
N.E. 
Value of market items 
 
N.E.1 
 
N.E. 
log subjective SES 
 
↓ 
 
N.E. 
Need ↑ 
 
↑ 
 Shortfall summary 
 
N.E. 
 
N.E. 
Recent illness 
 
↓ 
  Existing network support ↓ 
 
↓ 
 Can borrow from one past 
comm. 
 
N.E. 
 
N.E. 
Can borrow from two past 
comms. 
 
N.E. 
 
↑ 
Can stay in past comm. 
 
N.E. 
 
N.E. 
No traditional labor  ↓  N.E. 
Past exposure ↑ 
 
N.E. 
 Hours TV/movies 
 
↑ 
 
N.E. 
Cities/towns visited 
 
N.E. 
 
N.E. 
Places lived 
 
↑ 
 
N.E. 
No negative out-group 
stereotype  N.E.  N.E. 
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Table 2. Estimates for the effects of each predictor on out-group and in-group giving, respectively.1 
  Out-group In-group 
Variable 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
p 
value 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
p 
value 
Intercept 2.13 -0.32 4.50 0.07 0.06 -2.29 2.37 0.96 
Existing non-local resource 
access 
   
  
   
  
Income last month1 0.06 -0.18 0.30 0.65 0.14 -0.18 0.47 0.40 
Value of market items1 -0.03 -0.31 0.27 0.85 0.17 -0.17 0.53 0.32 
log subjective SES -0.33 -0.70 0.01 0.07 0.14 -0.29 0.59 0.52 
Past exposure 
   
  
   
  
Hours TV/movies1 0.23 -0.05 0.49 0.10 0.03 -0.28 0.35 0.83 
Cities/towns visited1 0.09 -0.17 0.38 0.50 -0.22 -0.55 0.11 0.19 
Places lived 0.21 0.05 0.36 0.01 -0.03 -0.22 0.15 0.73 
Existing network support 
   
  
   
  
Can borrow from one past 
comm. -0.30 -1.10 0.47 0.45 0.31 -0.59 1.21 0.51 
Can borrow from two past 
comms. -0.42 -1.18 0.30 0.26 1.05 0.13 1.89 0.02 
Can stay in past comm. -0.05 -0.58 0.49 0.85 0.30 -0.34 0.96 0.37 
No traditional labor -0.52 -1.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.19 -0.80 0.38 0.52 
Need 
   
  
   
  
Shortfall summary -0.05 -0.25 0.17 0.67 -0.13 -0.38 0.13 0.33 
Recent illness -0.90 -1.52 -0.26 0.00 0.54 -0.24 1.35 0.18 
1***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05, .=p<0.10. Out-group model sample size = 150, DIC=532.17; in-group model 
sample size = 133, DIC=513.60. Estimates are means of the posterior distribution (fit with MCMCglmm). Population is 
included as a random effect in all models. Estimates for control variables (included in the above models, but not 
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reported here) reported in Supplementary Table 2. No variables evidenced collinearity (i.e., all exhibited a variance 
inflation factor of less than 4). 2Variables reflect population-specific z-scores, e.g., a participant’s household income in  
the last month relative to the mean household income in her population. 
5
7
 
 58 
 
2.5 REFERENCES 
 
1. Bowles, S. Did warfare among ancestral hunter-gatherers affect the evolution 
of human social behaviors? Science 324, 1293–1298 (2009). 
2. Puurtinen, M. & Mappes, T. Between-group competition and human 
cooperation. Proc. Biol. Sci. 276, 355–360 (2009). 
3. Bornstein, G. Intergroup conflict: individual, group, and collective interests. 
Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 7, 129–145 (2003). 
4. Van Vugt, M. & Park, J. H. Guns, Germs, and Sex: How Evolution Shaped 
Our Intergroup Psychology. Soc. Personal. Psychol. Compass 3, 927–938 
(2009). 
5. Schaller, M. & Neuberg, S. in Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology (eds. 
Crawford, C. & Krebs, D.) 401–414 (Taylor & Francis Group/Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 2008). 
6. Fincher, C. L. & Thornhill, R. Assortative sociality, limited dispersal, infectious 
disease and the genesis of the global pattern of religion diversity. Proc. Biol. 
Sci. 275, 2587–94 (2008). 
7. Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. Persistent parochialism: Trust and exclusion in ethnic 
networks. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 55, 1–23 (2004). 
8. Pan, X. S. & Houser, D. Cooperation during cultural group formation promotes 
trust towards members of out-groups. Proc Biol Sci 280, 20130606 (2013). 
9. Smith, E. A. in Hunters and gatherers: history, evolution, and social change 
(eds. Ingold, T., Riches, D. & James, W.) 222–252 (Berg Publishers, 1988). 
10. Wiessner, P. in Politics and History in Band Societies 61–84 (Cambridge 
 59 
 
University Press, 1982). 
11. Whallon, R. Social networks and information: Non-‘utilitarian’ mobility among 
hunter-gatherers. J. Anthropol. Archaeol. 25, 259–270 (2006). 
12. Gamble, C. The Palaeolithic Societies of Europe. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
13. Chapais, B. Primeval Kinship: How Pair-Bonding Gave Birth to Human 
Society. (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
14. Solway, J. S. & Lee, R. B. Foragers, genuine or spurious? Situating the 
Kalahari San in history. Curr. Anthropol. 31, 109–122 (1990). 
15. Malinowski, B. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. (Routledge and Keegan 
Paul, 1922). 
16. Ensminger, J. Making a Market: The Institutional Transformation of an African 
Society. (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
17. Barth, F. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The 
Social Organization of Culture Difference (Waveland Press, 1969). 
18. Ross, R. M. & Atkinson, Q. D. Folktale transmission in the Arctic provides 
evidence for high bandwidth social learning among hunter–gatherer groups. 
Evol. Hum. Behav. 37, 47–53 (2016). 
19. Judd, C. M. & Park, B. Out-group homogeneity: Judgments of variability at the 
individual and group levels. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 54, 778–788 (1988). 
20. Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L. & Validzic,  a. Intergroup bias: status, 
differentiation, and a common in-group identity. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 75, 
109–120 (1998). 
 60 
 
21. Yamagishi, T. & Suzuki, N. in Evolution, Culture, and the Human Mind (eds. 
Schaller, M., Norenzayan, A., Heine, S., Yamagishi, T. & Kameda, T.) 185–
203 (Psychology Press, 2011). 
22. Bettencourt, B. A., Dorr, N., Charlton, K. & Hume, D. L. Status differences and 
in-group bias: a meta-analytic examination of the effects of status stability, 
status legitimacy, and group permeability. Psychol. Bull. 127, 520–542 (2001). 
23. Ellemers, N., Kortekaas, P., & Ouwerkerk, J. Self categorization, commitment 
to the group and social self esteem as related but distinct aspects of social 
identity. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 28, 371–398 (1999). 
24. Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. Voting with your feet: Payoff biased migration and 
the evolution of group beneficial behavior. J. Theor. Biol. 257, 331–9 (2009). 
25. Tooby, J., Cosmides, L. & Price, M. E. Cognitive adaptations for n-person 
exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior. Manag. Decis. 
Econ. 27, 103–129 (2006). 
26. Boyer, P., Firat, R. & van Leeuwen, F. Safety, Threat, and Stress in Intergroup 
Relations: A Coalitional Index Model. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 10, 434–50 
(2015). 
27. Moya, C. & Boyd, R. Different Selection Pressures Give Rise to Distinct Ethnic 
Phenomena. Hum. Nat. 26, 1–27 (2015). 
28. Yamagishi, T., Jin, N. & Kiyonari, T. Bounded generalized reciprocity: Ingroup 
boasting and ingroup favoritism. Adv. Gr. Process. 16, 161–197 (1999). 
29. Raihani, N. J. & Bshary, R. Why humans might help strangers. Front. Behav. 
Neurosci. 9, 1–11 (2015). 
 61 
 
30. Delton, A. W., Krasnow, M. M., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. Evolution of direct 
reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot 
encounters. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 108, 13335–13340 (2011). 
31. Barclay, P. Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for 
humans. Evol. Hum. Behav. 34, 164–175 (2013). 
32. Gurven, M., Allen-Arave, W., Hill, K. & Hurtado, M. ‘It’s a Wonderful Life’: 
Signaling generosity among the Ache of Paraguay. Evol. Hum. Behav. 21, 
263–282 (2000). 
33. Buchan, N. R. et al. Globalization and human cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. 
Sci. U. S. A. 106, 4138–42 (2009). 
34. Hruschka, D. J. & Henrich, J. Institutions, parasites and the persistence of in-
group preferences. PLoS One 8, 1–9 (2013). 
35. Pisor, A. C. & Gurven, M. Corruption and the Other(s): Scope of 
Superordinate Identity Matters for Corruption Permissibility. PLoS One 10, 
e0144542 (2015). 
36. Sugiyama, L. S. Illness, injury, and disability among Shiwiar forager-
horticulturalists: Implications of health-risk buffering for the evolution of human 
life history. Am. J. Phys. Anthropol. 123, 371–389 (2004). 
37. Gurven, M., Jaeggi, A., von Rueden, C., Hooper, P. L. & Kaplan, H. S. Does 
market integration buffer risk, erode traditional sharing practices and increase. 
Hum. Ecol. 43, 515–530 (2015). 
38. Hadley, C., Mulder, M. B. & Fitzherbert, E. Seasonal food insecurity and 
perceived social support in rural Tanzania. Public Health Nutr. 10, 544–551 
 62 
 
(2007). 
39. Morton, L. W., Bitto, E. A., Oakland, M. J. & Sand, M. Accessing food 
resources: Rural and urban patterns of giving and getting food. Agric. Human 
Values 25, 107–119 (2008). 
40. Fafchamps, M. & Lund, S. Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines. J. Dev. 
Econ. 71, 261–287 (2003). 
41. Sobotka, T., Skirbekk, V. & Philipov, D. Economic recession and fertility in the 
developed world. Popul. Dev. Rev. 37, 267–306 (2011). 
42. Hurtado, A. M. & Hill, K. R. Seasonality in a foraging society: Variation in diet, 
work effort, fertility, and sexual division of labor among the Hiwi of Venezuela. 
J. Anthropol. Res. 46, 293–346 (1990). 
43. Paciotti, B. & Hadley, C. The Ultimatum Game in Southwestern Tanzania: 
Ethnic variation and institutional scope. Curr. Anthropol. 44, 427–432 (2003). 
44. Bowles, S. Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets 
and Other Economic Institutions. J. Econ. Liter 36, 75–111 (1998). 
45. Hruschka, D. J. et al. Impartial Institutions, Pathogen Stress and the 
Expanding Social Network. Hum. Nat. 25, 567–579 (2014). 
46. Gervais, M. M. RICH Economic games for networked relationships and 
communities: Development and preliminary validation in Yasawa, Fiji. Field 
methods 
47. Ligon, E. & Schechter, L. Motives for sharing in social networks. J. Dev. Econ. 
99, 13–26 (2012). 
48. Cashdan, E. Ethnocentrism and xenophobia: A cross-cultural study. Curr. 
 63 
 
Anthropol. 42, 760–765 (2001). 
49. Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Salarios y remuneraciones. Estadísticas 
económonicas (2014). at <http://www.ine.gob.bo/> 
50. Camerer, C. & Thaler, R. H. Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and manners. J. 
Econ. Perspect. 9, 209–219 (1995). 
51. Bindon, J. R., Knight, A., Dressler, W. W. & Crews, D. E. Social context and 
psychosocial influences on blood pressure among American Samoans. Am. J. 
Phys. Anthropol. 103, 7–18 (1997). 
52. Adler, N. E., Epel, E. S., Castellazzo, G. & Ickovics, J. R. Relationship of 
subjective and objective social status with psychological and physiological 
functioning: preliminary data in healthy white women. Health Psychol. 19, 
586–592 (2000). 
53. Dressler, W. W., Balieiro, M. C. & dos Santos, J. E. Culture, socioeconomic 
status, and physical and mental health in Brazil. Med. Anthropol. Q. 12, 424–
446 (1998). 
54. Bickel, G., Nord, M., Price, C., Hamilton, W. & Cook, J. Guide to Measuring 
Household Food Security. Office of Analysis, Nutrition, and Evaluation 1–82 
(2000). at <naldc.nal.usda.gov/download/38369/PDF> 
55. Ashton, M. C. & Lee, K. Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the 
HEXACO model of personality structure. Personal. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 11, 
150–66 (2007). 
56. R Core Team. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. 
(2015). at <http://www.r-project.org/> 
 64 
 
57. Hadfield, J. D. MCMC methods for multi-respoinse generalized linear mixed 
models: The MCMCglmm R package. J. Stat. Softw. 33, 1–22 (2010). 
  
 65 
 
3. WHEN TO DIVERSIFY, AND WITH WHOM? CHOOSING PARTNERS AMONG OUT-
GROUP STRANGERS IN LOWLAND BOLIVIA 
 
This chapter with co-authored with Michael Gurven. AP and MG conceived and 
designed the study, AP collected the data, AP and MG wrote the chapter. 
 
Abstract 
Evidence from the ethnographic and archaeological records suggests that humans 
often rely on out-group relationships for access to non-local resources and resource 
buffering. However, little is known about how actors choose out-group cooperative 
partners. The existing literature suggests that (in-group) partner choice is often 
based on characteristics associated with cooperation. Is out-group partner choice 
based on the same criteria as in-group partner choice? Because of the specific 
kinds of resource access that may be attained through out-groups, we suggest that 
out-group partner choice should track characteristics of both the candidate partner 
and the partner’s group that are associated with benefits for the actor. We collected 
data among three populations of Bolivian horticulturalists (n=157); together, the 
individuals in these three populations range in their integration to markets and their 
mobility, thus capturing a large range of potential benefits to out-group cooperation. 
Using a non-anonymous, one-shot economic game, we demonstrate that recipients 
who are perceived to be “good people” and are from groups perceived to have 
market and political resource access are given more money by donors. These 
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results suggest that both individual and group characteristics feature in partner 
choice among out-group members. 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans have relied on cooperative resource production since at least the origin of 
Homo (Hooper, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2014). Accordingly, our evolved psychology is 
attuned to characteristics in others that are associated with higher returns to 
cooperation (Barclay, 2013; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Kurzban & Leary, 2001), and 
actors prefer to interact with cooperative partners who have these characteristics 
(Barclay, 2013; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Noe & Hammerstein, 1994). 
Through selectively forming and maintaining cooperative relationships, actors are 
better able to smooth access to resources, such as hunted meat, that are 
characterized by variable acquisition rates (Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013). Indeed, relative 
to individual cooperative partners, groups of interconnected cooperative partners 
even more effectively smooth resource access for an actor (Hruschka & Henrich, 
2006; Levine & Kurzban, 2006; Tooby, Cosmides, & Price, 2006). These 
cooperative groups often engage in more than one type of cooperative endeavor 
(e.g., economic and political; Lyle & Smith, 2014; Moya & Boyd, 2015; Tooby et al., 
2006), which may contribute to their persistence across time (Gómez-Gardeñes, 
Reinares, Arenas, & Floría, 2012). 
 While some – including Darwin (1871) – suggest that human evolution has 
been characterized by inter-group competition and within-group cooperation, the 
ethnographic and archaeological records also provide abundant evidence of inter-
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group cooperation (Barth, 1969; Ensminger, 1992; Gamble, 1999; Jochim, 2006; 
Ross & Atkinson, 2016; Whallon, 2006; Wiessner, 2001). Inter-group relationships 
may provide access to non-local resources, buffer shortfalls affecting local 
cooperative partners (Brewer & Caporeal, 2006; Pisor & Gurven, n.d.), enable 
actors to specialize in resource production and rely on economies of scale (e.g., De 
Weerdt & Dercon, 2006), and provide access to alternative cooperative partners if 
an actor’s existing group provides insufficient support (Boyer, Firat, & van Leeuwen, 
2015). We previously demonstrated that actors may invest more in out-group 
relationships when they have less access to market resources (Pisor & Gurven, 
n.d.). However, how do actors select among candidate out-group partners? Do 
actors select cooperative partners from out-groups based on the same criteria as 
those guiding in-group partner choice? 
 Though this question has largely not been addressed by the existing 
literature, we suggest that both individual-level and group-level qualities may shape 
out-group partner choice. As with in-group partner choice, out-group partner choice 
should track individual-level characteristics associated with higher gains to 
cooperation, including expected competence in food production (Eisenbruch et al. 
2016) or specialized labor (Brewer, 1996), anticipated generosity (Barclay, 2013; 
Baumard et al., 2013; Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000), and resource 
access (e.g., Gurven, Jaeggi, von Rueden, Hooper, & Kaplan, 2015). Additionally, 
by virtue of their group membership, candidate cooperative partners may offer 
additional benefits to an actor. For example, if certain resources are not available 
locally, out-group partners may provide access via trade, gift giving, or delayed 
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exchange (Whallon, 2006). Actors belonging to groups that are the numerical 
minority or of lower social status than out-groups are more likely to positively 
evaluate out-groups (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Brewer, Manzi, & 
Shaw, 1993); this is likely because high status groups have more social capital or 
resource access (Brewer & Caporeal, 2006) and are therefore high-quality partners. 
Finally, past exposure to members of an out-group, particularly in the context of 
cooperative interactions with beneficial outcomes, may increase an actor’s valuation 
of a stranger from that same group, at least in ethnic (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2001; 
Hewstone & Brown, 1986) and religious groups (Paolini, Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 
2004).  
  We hypothesize that selection has favored features of the human psychology 
that evaluate prospective out-group partners by the same criteria as in-group 
partners, plus characteristics of out-groups that are reliably associated with their 
access to resources. Specifically, we predict that if an actor perceives that a 
prospective partner has qualities suggestive of cooperativeness and is part of a 
group perceived to have resource access, she will be more generous toward this 
prospective partner; indeed, generosity in first interactions may initiate longer-term 
cooperative relationships (Delton, Krasnow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2011; Henrich et 
al., 2005; Yamagishi, Terai, Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007). Here we 
investigate whether characteristics associated with perceived individual qualities of 
prospective partners, such as (P1.1) perceived resource holdings and (P1.2) 
perceived cooperative intent, as well as group qualities, such as (P2.1) perceived 
out-group resource access, (P2.2) the size of an out-group or the size of an actor’s 
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own in-group, and (P2.3) an actor’s past experience with the out-group, predict 
generosity toward prospective out-group partners. 
 To investigate out-group partner choice in action, we collected data among 
three populations of horticulturalists living in Bolivia. Bolivia is a highly multiethnic 
country; each of these three populations differs in its average extent of integration to 
Bolivian society, meaning differential exposure to out-group members and 
opportunities for non-local market resource access across individuals, both within 
and across populations. As such, we consider the three populations together to take 
advantage of this inter-individual variance. We use generosity toward out-group 
strangers in a non-anonymous economic game as a proxy for partner choice. Each 
participant could allocate money between three in-group strangers, three out-group 
strangers, and themselves. Participants knew that if they gave money, recipients 
would learn their full name and amount given. We interpret the amount of money 
given to each candidate recipient as indicative of a donor’s interest in a relationship 
with that recipient. 
Strikingly, participants gave the majority of money away to strangers. Among 
participants who sent positive amounts, more money was allocated to candidate 
recipients perceived to be “good people” (i.e., kind and open to others), and to be 
members of groups known for having access to market resources. We discuss 
these results, and some population-specific effects, in light of theoretical 
approaches to partner choice. 
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3.2 METHODS 
3.2.1 STUDY POPULATIONS 
The Mosetén, the Tsimane’, and the multicultural community with the pseudonym 
“Intercultural” are three populations of horticulturalists living in the Bolivian lowlands. 
The Mosetén and Tsimane' are two of the 36 pueblos indígenas recognized by the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia. The two have a history of intermarriage (Corella, Bert, 
Pérez-Pérez, Gené, & Turbón, 2007) and spoke different dialects of the linguistic 
isolate Mosetenan (Sakel, 2007). However, Catholic clergy established schools and 
centralized communities for the Mosetén in the 19th century (Huanca, 2006; 
Mamani, Soria, & Huasna Bozo, 2010). Today the Mosetén are more market 
integrated than the Tsimane’, with ready access to roads and higher levels of 
mobility. The Mosetén are fluent in Spanish, the most common Bolivian language, 
and often marry exogamously with non-Mosetén: 57% of our Mosetén sample have 
at least one non-Mosetén parent. The Tsimane’ remain primarily endogamous, 
occasionally intermarrying with lowland groups who have settled in Tsimane’ 
territory. Only 14% of Tsimane’ participants in this study speak fluent Spanish. 
The community Intercultural is a multicultural (intercultural) community on the 
boundary of Mosetén territory. Residents of Intercultural are predominantly 
immigrants or the children of immigrants: either they were moved from the Andes by 
government relocation programs in the 1960s or they immigrated for the favorable 
growing climate and the now-dwindling logging industry. Intercultural participants 
were predominantly Aymara (59%) and Quechua (18%), the two most populous 
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indigenous groups in Bolivia. The vast majority of Interculturales speak fluent 
Spanish. For additional ethnographic details, see Supplementary Methods 1. 
“Groups” relevant in the Bolivian context are individuals who self-identify as 
the same ethnicity, religion, political party, work cooperative, or labor union. For this 
study, we focus on religious and ethnic groups, non-political groups large enough to 
contain strangers. Mosetén participants regularly interact with members of six ethnic 
groups. The majority of Mosetenes are Catholic, but an Evangelical Friends 
congregation is also part of the community. Interculturales have four churches and 
regularly interact with eight ethnic groups; we focused on five of the eight. In their 
language and in conversation, the Tsimane’ distinguish between three native 
lowland ethnic groups (the Mosetén, Yuracaré, and Trinitarios) but cognize Andean 
immigrants to the lowlands as one group (collas) and non-indigenous lowlanders as 
another (cambas). Three churches have an intermittent presence in Tsimane’ 
communities. 
3.2.2 EXPERIMENTAL AND SURVEY PROTOCOL 
 
The present sample includes 157 individuals (54% male) from these three 
populations interviewed between August 2014-March 2015. See Supplementary 
Methods 2 for details about sampling strategy, counterbalancing and randomization, 
and comprehension checks for the economic game. The study protocol was 
approved by the University of California, Santa Barbara Institutional Review Board 
and research was carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines. 
3.2.3 GENEROSITY TOWARDS OUT-GROUP STRANGERS 
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Participants sorted cards representing local groups on a five-point scale from 
1=“groups I belong to most or feel most a part of” to 5=“groups I belong to least” 
(Figure S1). Cards placed in positions 1 and 2 were classified as in-group and those 
from positions 4 and 5 as out-group. From this sort, two groups were selected: 
either one religious in-group and one religious out-group, or one ethnic in-group and 
one ethnic out-group. 
 A non-anonymous economic game was designed to improve upon the 
ecological validity of other game formats (e.g., the Dictator Game; Camerer & 
Thaler, 1995; see also Gervais, n.d.) in which participants can demonstrate 
cooperative intent. Three photos of strangers were selected from the participant’s in-
group and three from her out-group; all were previous participants from other study 
communities (including those who participated in pilot interviews) of the same sex 
as the participant and within ten years of her age. The participant was told the 
name, group affiliation, and age (an intended distractor) of each candidate recipient. 
We asked whether she knew any individuals in the photos; if an individual was 
known, this photo was removed and exchanged for another. She was then told she 
had the opportunity to send (enviar) money to these candidate recipients: she could 
allocate 21 one boliviano coins (Bs, $0.14/B1; total stakes approximately 1/3 of a 
day’s wage) among these six strangers and herself (see Figure S2 for an 
illustration). Participants were informed that if they left any coins on a photo, the 
person in the photo would learn the participant’s name and how much she sent; any 
money not on a photo would be kept by the participant. To avoid confusion and 
maintain participants’ trust, donors who kept money for themselves received their 
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payouts at the end of the interview, while recipients were given their payouts, along 
with the names of the donors and the amounts given, at the end of the field season. 
Donors who wished to remain anonymous were allowed to do so; we control for this 
in all analyses. 
3.2.4 GROUP CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Access to resources via the out-group. Before game play, participants were 
asked about the benefits and costs of being a member of the focal out-group. 
Participants interpreted these questions broadly. When describing benefits and 
costs, they frequently mentioned access to market goods and skill at obtaining 
economic resources, or lack thereof. Openness to out-group members and 
willingness to collaborate across groups, or unwillingness to share resources and 
collaborate, were also often cited. AP coded the first benefit or cost mentioned by a 
participant for a given group. For the purpose of analysis, we binned benefits as 
pertaining to resources or other benefits, and costs as pertaining to between-group 
competition, lack of market access, other costs, or lack of any costs.  
 Group size. Because differences in group size in the local context are likely 
more salient to participants than differences in group size on the national level (e.g., 
the Tsimane’ are in the vast numerical majority in their communities, but represent 
approximately 1/10th of 1% of the Bolivian population), we employ local group size in 
the present analyses. From the ethnic identification of each participant’s mother and 
father, we calculated the percent representation of each ethnic group within each of 
the three populations. As we attempted to sample every household in our study 
communities, these estimates should reflect the percentages of people that are part 
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of each ethnic group locally. To calculate local religious group size, we used the 
church participants attended to calculate the percent representation of each 
religious group within each of the three populations. We then matched group size 
percentages to out-group recipients, as well as to donors. To explore whether the 
size of the recipient group relative to the donor group affected donor behavior, we 
calculated the ratio of recipient group size to donor group size; because of the 
influence of outliers and because increasing differences in recipient and donor 
group size may not have additive effects on donor behavior, we logged these 
values. However, as recipient group size data were not available for all recipients 
and limited the sample size in our models, we include only donor group size – rather 
than the ratio of the two group sizes – in all models unless specified otherwise.  
 Past exposure. Participants reported the ethnic and religious groups with 
whom they interacted, or with whom their parents interacted, during their childhood. 
We then coded whether the out-group featured in the game was mentioned in this 
free response. We also asked participants to detail all the places they had lived 
previously, as well as all the cities and towns they had visited for more than a week; 
the number of places lived and places visited were each counted and used as 
proxies for exposure to out-groups. Likewise, TV watching can be a source of 
passive exposure to out-group members (e.g., Buchan et al., 2009). Accordingly, we 
include hours of TV or movies watched per week as a predictor in all models. 
Because TV watching and number of cities and towns visited were negatively 
skewed, we z-scored both measures at the sample level. 
3.2.3 INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS 
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After the economic game was complete, the researcher asked each participant her 
perceptions of the six candidate recipients. While the accuracy of perceptions of 
personal characteristics from photos varies (Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-
Siedlecki, 2014) – for example, untrustworthiness may be underestimated (Porter, 
England, Juodis, Ten Brinke, & Wilson, 2008) – affect towards the candidate 
recipients likely impacts decision-making (Arora, Peterson, Krantz, Hardisty, & 
Reddy, 2012); see further discussion of this method in the Discussion.  
Resource access. Participants were asked to indicate whether each candidate 
recipient had “a lot of money, money, a little money, or no money.” These ratings 
were converted to a Likert scale (0-3).  
Cooperative intent. We asked participants whether each candidate recipient was a 
“good person” (una persona buena, which connotes kindness and openness to 
others in Bolivian Spanish) or a “bad person,” whether the participant could trust the 
candidate recipient, and whether the participant would want to be friends with the 
candidate recipient. Each of these responses proxies qualities that could increase 
partner value, such as generosity and trustworthiness (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 
2007).  
3.2.5 ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
 
There are additional factors that may moderate valuation for out-group members, as 
we address elsewhere, including donor’s existing resources and resource access, 
existing social network (Pisor & Gurven, n.d.), and personality (Ashton & Lee, 2007; 
Nettle, 2006); because these variables are not of direct relevance to the present 
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hypotheses, we treat them as secondary here. For further details on these variables, 
see Supplementary Methods 3. 
3.2.6 STATISTICAL METHODS 
 
Given that a participant differentiated among out-group members, which variables 
affected whether she gave more or less to a candidate out-group recipient? We 
analyze these data at the level of a participant’s decision for each candidate 
recipient, with random effects for participant nested within population random effects 
(nlme; Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Development Core Team, 2016). 
Variables collinear in a given model (i.e., variables with a variable inflation factor of 
4 or more) were excluded. 
 Due to the small number of participants who reported belonging to each 
evangelical denomination, we collapsed all evangelical denominations into a single 
category for the economic game, such that candidate recipients were “Catholics” 
and “Evangelists” for donors playing with religious in-groups and out-groups. This is 
consistent with the name for non-Catholic Christians in Latin America, evangélicos 
(Stoll, 1990). In accordance with this modification, we collapsed evangelical 
denominations into a single category for the purposes of calculating group size. 
 Data were missing at random for participants’ perceptions of recipient 
“goodness,” wealth, and trustworthiness. These values were imputed using 
predictive mean matching (mice; Van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011). 
Descriptive statistics report raw data without imputation; imputed values are 
included in model fits. 
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Because donors rated candidate recipients after making allocation decisions, 
which may introduce self-presentation bias, we calculated an average perceived 
wealth score for each recipient based on all the ratings of that recipient except the 
rating of the donor (i.e., a “leave one out” approach), creating a consensus measure 
of candidate recipient wealth. The same was done for the “good person” and 
willingness to trust responses. These measures were used in a robustness check 
reported in Table S8. 
 
3.3 RESULTS 
 
As amount given to out-group strangers did not differ between donors playing with 
religious groups vs. ethnic groups (B2.12 [i.e., 2 bolivianos and 12 cents] vs. B2.32; 
t=-1.19, p=0.24), we combine results from both group types in the present analyses. 
Participants could have kept all the money for themselves with no repercussions; 
instead, rather than demonstrating pure selfishness, they gave away an average of 
B14 of the B21 total stakes (67%) to strangers. In total, participants gave an 
average of B6.37 (46%) to out-group recipients. The average out-group and in-
group candidate recipient received B2.18 (SD=1.81) and B2.82 (SD=2.16) 
respectively. There was less variability in amounts given to out-group strangers than 
in-group strangers (F=1.36, p<0.001), that is, less selectivity demonstrated among 
out-group candidate partners. Descriptive statistics at the sample level appear in 
Tables S1a and S1b, and for each population in Tables S2a-S4b. Average 
bolivianos allocated to an out-group candidate recipient by categorical predictor 
appear in Table S5. 
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3.3.1 CHOOSING AMONG OUT-GROUP STRANGERS 
 
Some participants – 28 of 157, or 18% – did not allocate any money to out-group 
candidate recipients. Tsimane’ participants were especially unlikely to allocate 
money to out-groups (19 of 48 Tsimane’ participants; Figure 1). Fifty-one 
participants, or 32%, gave evenly to all out-group members; thirty-one of these 
(21%) gave each out-group member the same amount they kept for themselves. A 
higher average amount given to out-group members was predicted by a participant 
having lived more places, having watched more TV or movies, and a donor having a 
low subjective socioeconomic status relative to others in her community (i.e., a low 
perceived amount of money and market items relative to others) (Pisor & Gurven, 
n.d.). For participants who differentiated among out-group candidate recipients, 
what affected participants’ preference for some recipients over others? 
 
(P1.1) Do donors give more to participants perceived to have more resource 
holdings? 
In some models, but not all, recipients perceived as having “some money” were 
more likely to be allocated money than those perceived as having “no money”; 
likewise, consensus perceptions of a candidate recipient’s wealth positively 
predicted the amount a donor allocated to her (see Tables S6, S7, S9, S10, S11). 
There was no reliable difference in amounts given to candidate recipients perceived 
to have “no money” and “a lot of money.” 
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(P1.2) Do donors give more to recipients perceived to be cooperative? 
Candidate recipients who were perceived as “good people” by the donor were more 
likely to be given money relative to those considered to be “bad people” (B0.93, 
p<0.05; Table 1; Figure 2). The importance of “goodness” for amount given holds 
when controlling for amount given to in-group members by a subset of participants 
(Table S6). However, sample consensus about whether a given recipient was 
“good” or “bad” did not predict how much the donor gave the recipient (Table S7), 
meaning we cannot rule out self-presentation bias in this result. There was no effect 
of interest in friendship or willingness to trust on amount allocated (Tables S8), 
considered separately to avoid collinearity. 
 
(P2.1) Do donors give more to recipients from groups perceived to have more 
resource access? 
Consistent with our predictions, donors gave out-group recipients B0.97 more if the 
donor viewed the recipient’s group as having market or political resource access, 
relative to other potential benefits (p<0.05; Table 1; Figure 2). Access to these 
resources reached significance in most models, including a model controlling for 
average amount given to in-group members (Table S6), but not all (see Tables S7, 
S10, S11). Due to collinearity, we consider the role of perceived inter-group 
competition in the full sample, which includes donors who did not differentiate 
among out-group members. Donors allocated less to candidate recipients when the 
donor perceived the recipient’s group as engaging in inter-group competition, as 
compared to other costs of group membership (-B0.86, p<0.05; Table S9). 
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(P2.2) Do donors give more to recipients when the donor is from a smaller 
out-group, or when the recipient is from a larger group relative to the donor’s 
group? 
The size of the donor’s group, one measure of group size, had no effect (ethnic=-
B1.05, p=0.22; religious=-B0.56, p=0.42). To estimate the effect of the relative size 
of recipient to donor group size on amount given, we consider all participants – not 
only those who differentiated among candidate recipients – and subset the data to 
separately consider games played with ethnic vs. religious groups. The ratio of the 
recipient’s to the donor’s group size does not predict allocations for games played 
with ethnic or religious groups (-B0.07, p=0.37; B0.04, p=0.78; Table S11). Some 
results reported above do not hold for these subsets, but this may be due to their 
small size. 
 
(P2.3) Do donors with higher levels of exposure to out-group members in 
general give more out-group members? 
Inconsistent with our expectations, if a participant’s parents knew members of the 
out-group during the participant’s childhood, she was less likely to give money to 
strangers from that group relative to participants whose parents had not known 
members of the focal out-group (-B1.32; p<0.10). However, the sample of 
individuals whose parents knew members of the focal out-group is quite small 
(n=10), so this result should be treated with caution. Other measures of out-group 
exposure had no effect. 
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3.3.2 ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
 
Participants with higher subjective socioeconomic statuses gave -B0.45 less to each 
out-group recipient (p<0.10; Table 2); however, this effect is not robust to the 
inclusion of average amount given to in-group members (Table S6). No other 
alternative predictors had a consistent effect on amount given in the sample of 
participants who differentiated. Subjective socioeconomic status, the value of 
market items owned, lack of cooperative labor partners, a summary measure of 
shortfall (including recent lower-than-expected produce or income, food insecurity, 
and number of dependent children), and recent illness were all predictors of giving 
in the full model; except for the effect of the shortfall summary measure, these 
effects are consistent with our previous work (Pisor & Gurven, n.d.). 
 
3.4 DISCUSSION 
 
With their heavy reliance on cooperative resource acquisition, humans demonstrate 
selectivity when choosing cooperative partners. While much research has 
investigated the factors affecting partner choice with in-group members, little is 
known about partner choice with out-group members; this is despite extensive 
evidence that inter-group connections provide non-local resource access and buffer 
shortfalls striking areas larger than the local community. We predicted that both 
individual characteristics, such as traits related to cooperative intent and resource 
acquisition, and characteristics associated with the group, such as an actor’s 
perceptions of the group’s resource access and her past experience with the group, 
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would affect partner choice among out-group members. Among three populations of 
Bolivian horticulturalists playing a non-anonymous economic game, we found that 
the two more market-integrated populations (the Mosetén and Interculturales) were 
more likely to allocate money to out-group strangers than the less market-integrated 
population (the Tsimane’; Figure 1). Candidate recipients were given more money 
when they were perceived to be a “good person” (kind, open to others) or when they 
belonged to a group perceived to have market or political resource access (Figure 
2). In some models, perceived wealth was also rewarded with more money. 
Contrary to predictions, donors whose parents had known members of a candidate 
recipient’s out-group during the donor’s childhood gave less, although we urge 
caution in the interpretation of this effect as so few participants indicated their 
parents knew members of the out-group. When we also considered donors who 
gave equally to out-group members or gave zero, participants gave less when 
candidate recipients were from groups donors considered to engage in inter-group 
competition. 
 Our results suggest that an actor’s perceptions of a candidate partner’s 
individual characteristics, as well as her perceptions about the recipient’s group, 
affect out-group partner choice, at least among these three populations. Our finding 
that qualities related to resource access and cooperative intent predicted increased 
generosity is consistent with past research on partner choice among in-group 
members. In in-groups, a candidate partner’s perceived productivity (Eisenbruch, 
Grillot, Maestripieri, & James, 2016), generosity (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Eisenbruch 
et al., 2016; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), and trustworthiness (Cottrell et al., 2007) 
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predict an actor’s generosity towards that candidate partner in first interactions. 
While we did not find effects for a candidate partner’s perceived trustworthiness or 
value as a friend, we did find that perceived kindness and openness – that is, being 
a “good person” in Bolivian Spanish – mattered. In some models, donors gave 
recipients more money when they perceived recipients to be wealthy. This is 
inconsistent with potential predictions based on the literature suggesting that 
donations, gifts, or resource transfers are need-based (Aktipis, Cronk, & de Aguiar, 
2011; Gurven et al., 2000; Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013; Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; 
Winterhalder, 1996). The importance of perceived wealth may reflect the importance 
of obtaining resource access via new cooperative partners. In fact, donors may 
selectively target individuals who have some money, but not “a lot,” as those with 
some money may have more to gain from an additional relationship than a wealthy 
person. 
 Though we found effects for some group characteristics on out-group giving 
and out-group partner choice, a number of variables had no effect. Candidate 
recipients from groups perceived to have more market access and to engage in less 
inter-group competition were given more money by donors. This is consistent with 
the idea that out-groups can be important sources of resource access and buffering 
(Gamble, 1999; Whallon, 2006) – at least, when inter-group competition for 
resources is not high (Kelly, 1995). While the lack of importance of relative group 
size in partner choice was contrary to our predictions, this result is compatible with 
the often mixed findings on minority-majority status and inter-group relationships 
(Bettencourt et al., 2001; Brewer et al., 1993). Though only one of our several 
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measures of past out-group exposure had an effect on out-group generosity, these 
variables were imperfect proxies of positive interactions with out-group members. A 
large body of social psychological research suggests that positive inter-group 
interactions, rather than neutral or negative, are key to building connections 
between groups (Brewer, 1996; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2001). Further, only some of 
this literature speaks directly to whether contact between religious groups should 
have the same effect on valuation of strangers from that group as does contact 
between ethnic groups (e.g., Paolini et al., 2004). At least in the present sample, 
whether a participant played with religious or ethnic out-group members did not 
change the direction of effect for three of the four out-group exposure proxies (Table 
S11). 
 In this vein, we found that the Tsimane’, the least market-integrated 
population, were substantially less likely to give money to out-group strangers than 
the other two populations. As reported elsewhere, more market-integrated Tsimane’ 
were especially unlikely to allocate money to out-group strangers, a pattern not seen 
for in-group strangers (Pisor & Gurven, n.d.). In anonymous games, as opposed to 
the non-anonymous game reported here, more market-integrated Tsimane’ 
participants were also less likely to be generous toward anonymous in-group 
members from the same community (Gurven, 2004). One possible interpretation of 
these findings is that Tsimane’ who are more market-integrated do not focus on 
relationship building with strangers, but rather focus on building social capital with 
known in-group members (Gurven et al., 2015; Reyes-Garcia, Godoy, Vadez, 
Huanca, & Leonard, 2006). This inward focus may be reinforced by discrimination 
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the Tsimane’ face from non-Tsimane’ in market towns. These findings strike a 
contrast to recent results from other market-integrating populations (Kasper & 
Mulder, 2015) and suggest that the importance of in-group and out-group 
relationships may not be reliably associated with market integration across 
populations. 
 We note several limitations of the present study. First, the researcher 
conducting the interviews (AP) was herself an out-group member, which could have 
impacted participant responses: some participants may have been more likely to 
bias their self-representation than others (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, & Smith, 
1994). While cultural transmission (Henrich et al., 2010) and the role of institutions 
in buffering risk (Hruschka et al., 2014) may shape the perceived benefits and costs 
of out-group relationships, the present data do not speak to these possibilities. 
Second, participants may also have biased their self-presentation when providing 
their perceptions of the candidate recipients, as descriptions of the recipients were 
given after allocation decisions were made. Interestingly, while consensus 
perceptions of a recipient’s wealth predicted the amount she received from a donor, 
wealth ratings by an individual donor did not; on the other hand, goodness ratings 
by an individual donor predicted amount the donor gave to a recipient, but 
consensus ratings of a recipient’s goodness did not. The effect of consensus wealth 
ratings on giving suggests that participants are detecting some of any number of 
features of the face that could be increasing the likelihood of giving (Todorov et al., 
2014). Additionally, the present data are cross-sectional and cannot address how 
changing levels of resource availability or out-group exposure affect out-group 
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partner choice. Future data collection will address the potential importance of 
cultural transmission, institutional effects, and changes in exposure and opportunity, 
particularly important to consider in the ever-changing Bolivian social context, and 
will employ a new method to minimize the role of self-presentation bias in participant 
ratings. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The ethnographic and archaeological records underscore the importance of out-
group relationships to humans. However, little is known about how actors choose 
cooperative partners among out-groups. We suggest that both actors’ perceptions of 
the individual characteristics of prospective partners and actors’ perceptions of 
group characteristics should affect out-group partner choice, especially when these 
characteristics are associated with benefits for the actor. Among three populations 
of Bolivian horticulturalists, we find that perceived qualities of the individual out-
group strangers, as well as characteristics of the groups to which they belong, 
predict generosity. While not all variables measured affect generosity, the pattern of 
effects is instructive: for example, discrimination may explain the low level of 
generosity to out-group strangers among the Tsimane’. Taken together, these 
findings shed light on the predictors of partner choice among out-group members, 
an as-yet understudied aspect of human sociality. 
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Figure 1. The proportion of each population represented in the sample (horizontal 
bar width) and the proportion of each population that allocated zero or even 
amounts to out-group candidate recipients, or differentiated among recipients. 
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Figure 2. Predicted bolivianos given to a candidate out-group recipient based on the 
perceived “goodness” of the recipient and the perceived market and political 
resource access of the recipient’s group. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
predicted mean value. 
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Table 1. Given a participant differentiated among out-group members, estimates of 
the amount of money she gave a candidate out-group recipient. 
    Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
  (Intercept) 3.30 1.47 0.03 
Individual 
Characteristics A little good 0.20 0.48 0.67 
  Good person 0.93 0.44 0.03 
  Has some money 0.50 0.49 0.31 
  Has money -0.30 0.48 0.54 
O-G Resource 
Access Benefits: Resources 0.97 0.43 0.03 
Relative Group Size Donor ethnic grp. % size -1.05 0.86 0.23 
  Donor relig. grp. % size -0.56 0.69 0.42 
O-G Past Exposure Parents knew out-group -1.32 0.72 0.07 
  No. places lived -0.04 0.11 0.69 
  No. places visited* 0.20 0.19 0.30 
 
Hours of TV per week* -0.02 0.17 0.89 
Additional Variables Lodging during flood -0.28 0.39 0.48 
  Net household income* 0.09 0.15 0.56 
  Market items owned* 0.12 0.19 0.54 
  log Subjective SES -0.45 0.23 0.06 
  No traditional labor -0.38 0.35 0.28 
  Shortfall summary -0.02 0.16 0.88 
  Recent illness -0.38 0.52 0.47 
  Agreeableness -0.01 0.05 0.86 
  Extraversion 0.02 0.07 0.79 
  Risk aversion 0.02 0.06 0.69 
  Age 0.01 0.01 0.70 
  Years of school 0.03 0.06 0.61 
  Sex: male -0.09 0.41 0.83 
  
Times attends church 
per mo. -0.01 0.11 0.89 
  
Shared name with 
recips. 0.03 0.38 0.94 
AIC=976.99. Number of observations=219. Number of participants=73. Effects of 
out-group costs and log ratio of recipient to donor group size not estimated due to 
constraints of over-parameterization or collinearity. *z-scored at the sample level. 
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4. CORRUPTION AND THE OTHER(S): SCOPE OF SUPERORDINATE IDENTITY 
MATTERS FOR CORRUPTION PERMISSIBILITY 
 
This chapter was previously published as: 
Pisor, A.C. & Gurven, M. (2015) Corruption and the other(s): Scope of superordinate 
identity matters for corruption permissibility. PLoS ONE 10(12): e0144542. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0144542 
 
Abstract 
The decision to engage in corruption – public and private corruption, nepotism, and 
embezzlement – is often attributed to rational actors maximizing benefits to 
themselves. However, the importance of reciprocal relationships in humans 
suggests that an actor may weigh the costs of harms of her corrupt behavior to 
individuals who may generate future benefits for her. We hypothesize that actors 
who have a larger circle of actual and potential social partners will have more 
individuals to consider when generating harms and will thus be less likely to find 
corrupt acts permissible than actors with smaller circles of valued others. Using data 
from the World Values Survey and European Values Study (WVS), we explore 
whether participants with a larger geographic identity or a greater number of group 
memberships (i.e. a larger scope of actual and potential social partners) are less 
likely to find accepting bribes permissible. We find mixed support for our 
hypotheses, but consistently find that WVS participants with local, country, 
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continent, or world geographic identities are less likely to find accepting a bribe 
permissible than those with regional identities – that is, actors whose primary 
identities encompass more than their region find corruption less permissible. We 
discuss the importance of considering an actor’s valuation of others when modeling 
corruption persistence, noting that establishing scopes of positive valuation is a 
precursor to predicting where actors will target benefits and shunt costs. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Corruption, commonly defined as taking advantage of public office for private gain 
[1,2], is considered a major deterrent to economic development [3]. The World 
Economic Forum [4] estimates that 5% of global GDP is lost to corruption each year. 
Pervasive corruption is also blamed for reducing public and private trust [5,6] and for 
promoting greater socioeconomic inequality [7,8]. The prevalence of corruption (or 
its perceived prevalence, as is often measured) is higher in countries with non-
democratic institutions, strong kin ties, and greater ethno-linguistic heterogeneity 
(measured as the number of ethnic groups or languages spoken in a nation; 
[1,9,10]). Individuals perceive corruption as more prevalent when transparency is 
low (e.g. [11]), often true in contexts of high income inequality [12].  
Whether the focus is on country-level or individual-level analyses, this 
research holds that rational actors will engage in corrupt behaviors when the 
expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. However, corrupt acts generate 
harms for others, and most models of corruption assume that actors are 
unconcerned about those who will have to absorb any costs the actors generate. 
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Alternatively, one might expect an actor to be less willing to engage in a corrupt act 
if it will harm bystanders that she positively values as actual or potential social 
partners (i.e. individuals with whom she currently engages, or could potentially 
engage in repeated, mutually-beneficial interactions). The rational logic of avoiding 
corrupt behavior when the immediate benefits might seem high is that generating 
harms for others may reduce the likelihood of later being selected as a trustworthy 
social partner. 
This paper explores how having larger numbers of positively valued social 
partners affects an actor’s likelihood of finding corruption permissible. We 
hypothesize that an actor who identifies with larger superordinate groups, where 
superordinate groups unify sub-groups (e.g., religious groups, ethnic groups) of both 
known individuals and strangers who are positively valued as potential social 
partners [13,14], will be more likely to avoid and disapprove of corrupt behavior 
because she stands to harm a greater number of potential social partners, thereby 
potentially damaging her reputation. Both harm to others and reputational damage 
will reduce the likelihood that other superordinate group members will trade with, 
support, or buffer the actor in the future. If the sum total of these costs outweighs 
the selfish benefits of engaging in corrupt acts, an actor may avoid them altogether. 
We test this hypothesis using individual judgments of corruption permissibility from 
the World Values Survey and European Values Study, as judgments of corruption 
permissibility may reflect one’s own willingness to engage in corrupt acts. If 
superordinate group size predicts corruption permissibility, this relationship may 
explain why countries with high kin loyalties, e.g. low-income or predominantly 
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Catholic countries, are perceived by their citizens to be more corrupt than high-
income, Protestant countries with fewer kin loyalties [1,15], and why subjective 
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity (i.e. whether an actor views local groups as diverse 
and different from one another) is a better predictor of corruption prevalence than 
objective ethno-linguistic heterogeneity [16–20]. It is less a question of religious 
affiliation or number of ethnic groups in a country as it is the number of people an 
actor values sufficiently to avoid generating costs for them. Our results show that 
superordinate group size, as proxied by the geographic size of one’s primary group 
identity, explains variation in corruption permissibility not considered by previous 
research. This relationship suggests an avenue for future investigation. Further, we 
outline how approaching the question of corruption persistence from an evolutionary 
perspective motivates the present hypothesis and can organize some existing 
findings. 
 
4.1.1 CORRUPTION AS EXTENDED SELF-INTEREST 
 
A broad definition of corruption is the private appropriation of a public resource, 
which generates costs to society. Narrower definitions depict corruption as an abuse 
of power by public officials (“public” corruption). Researchers espousing a narrow 
definition believe broader interpretations ought to distinguish private corruption (e.g. 
bribery of a non-public figure who can provide a service), nepotism (e.g. favoring kin 
or friends for a particular position or windfall), and embezzlement (e.g. drawing extra 
money from an organization while in a power position) from public corruption [21]. 
All four contexts – public and private corruption, embezzlement, and nepotism – 
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have features in common, however. First, in all four, actors strategically channel 
benefits to self, kin, or social partners. Indeed, actors are known to use corrupt acts 
to build and maintain social relationships [22–24], obtain resources [25–27], and 
avoid undesirable costs [28,29]. Second, in all four, an actor's behavior violates 
national or international laws or norms. Third, all diminish societal well-being 
because private gain comes at the expense of others, either by increasing the cost 
of a service (whether in monetary or other currency, including time) or by drawing 
from a depletable resource (such as public funds). Given these commonalities, 
consistent with some existing work [22,30] we broadly define corruption as 
behaviors providing private gain to self, kin, and/or other group members that 1) 
generate harms for others by 2) “jumping the queue” of resource allocation [1] 3) in 
violation of norms or laws that may be applied to the local context, e.g. international 
laws that may or may not be adopted in practice. We say “may” because the 
perceived wrongness of corrupt acts may not track the magnitude of the social costs 
generated [22,25,31] and corruption may be construed as a gift or an earned right 
by bystanders [32,33]. 
 A rational actor may engage in a corrupt behavior, or find a corrupt behavior 
permissible, when its perceived net benefits outweigh those of lawful or norm-
consistent behavior. However, what are the relevant benefits and costs? The 
standard approach recognizes biases in corrupt behavior that favor kin and social 
partners (nepotism and cronyism; e.g. [3]), but the origin of these preferences is 
usually not examined [34]. Instead, these biases have been explained as reflecting 
ease of recruiting family member co-conspirators and lower likelihood of detection 
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by authorities [35,36]. This exclusive focus on gains for an individual actor conflates 
self-interest with an actor’s preferences to support kin and maintain reciprocal 
relationships [37]. Preferences to support kin may be a feature of an evolved human 
psychology that generates benefits for self and kin, optimizing biological fitness 
even if generating costs for non-kin [38,39].  
Favoring group members can also directly benefit an actor’s fitness by 
enabling others to return those favors via reciprocity [40,41]. One reason to favor 
group members is the need to buffer risk and uncertainty in resource access, though 
additional motivations may include gaining information access, political clout, or 
mates. The unpredictability of food resources is a defining characteristic of 
traditional human subsistence strategies that requires buffering amongst individuals 
to reduce food insecurity [42–45]. Even with the introduction of market-related 
options for risk management (e.g. insurance, savings, government-funded disaster 
relief), investing in and harvesting one’s networks of information and exchange 
remains crucial [46–48]. An actor’s access to potential social partners, and the 
resources they provide, can be damaged by the generation of harms, especially if 
these costs can be traced to the actor herself [49]. In both small-scale [50] and 
large-scale societies [51], sharing partners and allies are at a premium [52]. Actors 
with reputations for in-group stinginess [45] or who generate harms are not 
preferred as social partners [53,54]. An actor need not explicitly consider the 
consequences of her behavior for valued others, but only behave as if she were 
considering both her own welfare and theirs [55]. Her other-regarding behavior may 
be steered by psychological mechanisms favored by natural selection, including 
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emotions such as shame and pride [56] and the ability to empathize with others’ 
emotions [57]. Increased exposure to out-group members (e.g., via globalization) 
could also increase preferences to exhibit fairness toward a larger number of 
individuals (cosmopolitan attitudes [58]). Our predictions apply with equal force to 
actors with cosmopolitan attitudes: when an actor can form partnerships with a 
larger number of people (e.g., when she is integrated in a social network), she may 
feel more empathy toward these individuals [59] and cooperate more with them 
[58,60]. In sum, we should expect people to be sensitive to costs and benefits that 
affect their own fitness interests (or proxies for fitness, such as wealth and status) 
and that of their kin, actual and potential social partners [61,62].  
The individuals whom an actor positively values as potential social partners, 
which include strangers, are likely to be those with whom she identifies. Having a 
superordinate group identity (e.g., identifying with one’s region or nation [63], or 
even the globe [59]) increases the likelihood that an actor values members of 
groups that are otherwise out-groups for her, such as ethnic groups or religious 
groups. Indeed, even in small-scale societies, the potential to reap valuable gains 
from trade, coalition formation, and risk management often transcends the otherwise 
high transaction costs of interactions between ethnic and religious groups [64,65]. 
We thus treat the scope of an actor’s superordinate identity as a proxy for the scope 
of individuals whom she considers to be potential social partners. 
As aforementioned, those who cannot locally access needed resources may 
seek more contact with a larger scope of individuals than those who already have 
access [65–67]. However, this logic may not extend to individuals in the most dire of 
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situations: those with the lowest incomes and the poorest health may have a short 
time horizon and be less likely to weigh the well-being of out-group members 
heavily. The opportunity cost of lost partnerships only increases in situations of 
resource scarcity (e.g. due to a lack of government institutions), as individuals place 
an even higher premium on reliable social partners [68].  
We suggest that the larger an actor’s scope of positively valued individuals, 
the more people’s welfare she will have to weigh before generating harms they must 
absorb; in turn, the larger the scope of her positive valuation, the less likely she will 
be to find corruption permissible. In this paper, we test whether proxies for a larger 
scope of positive valuation – the size of one’s primary geographic identity and the 
number of groups to which one belongs – can account for variation in corruption 
permissibility above and beyond that captured by more traditional predictors of 
corruption from the literature. We explore these predictions using individual-level 
data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study (hereafter, WVS 
refers to both). While country-level data are frequently used in research on 
corruption, country-level corruption indices are not necessarily good predictors of 
individual-level behavior [69,70]. Further, by employing a large cross-national data 
set, we gain additional insight into propensity to engage in corruption across a 
variety of social, political, and economic contexts. We operationalize corruption as 
someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties, a potential proxy for a 
participant’s own willingness to accept a bribe. Existing studies have shown that a 
number of country-level variables are correlated with country-level corruption, 
including objective religious and ethnic heterogeneity, economic inequality, and 
 108 
 
political freedom. We control for these factors, as well as country-level corruption 
itself (as measured by the perceptions of businesspeople and academics), as the 
context within which individual actors decide whether or not a corrupt act is 
permissible. Because confidence in the police and civil services, belief in God, 
household dependency (as number of children), level of education, and participant 
age and sex are uncorrelated with superordinate group size yet could affect a 
participant’s motivation to condone corruption, we include these variables in all 
models. We explore the role of a lack of resource access (as proxied by a summary 
measure of household income, satisfaction with finances, and subjective health), as 
lack of access may increase the potential benefits of resource access via additional 
network connections.  
 
4.1.2 HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS  
 
We test the hypothesis (H1) that an actor who positively values a larger group of 
people as actual or potential social partners (i.e. has a larger superordinate group) 
will be less likely to find corrupt acts permissible. Though we cannot determine who 
a participant envisioned as affected by these harms when deciding whether it was 
permissible to accept a bribe, we suggest that all else equal, permissibility will 
decline as superordinate group size increases. We operationalize this as follows: 
 (P1.1) Participants whose primary identity is at a larger geographic scale will 
find corruption to be less justifiable than participants whose identity is more 
local in scale. 
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(P1.2) Participants who belong to more civic, social and activity groups will 
find corruption to be less justifiable than participants with fewer memberships 
in these groups. 
(H2) Corruption permissibility should be lower among those for whom the net 
benefits from additional partnerships are greater. We predict that: 
(P2) Participants who stand to gain benefits from additional resource access 
(i.e. who do not have high levels of subjective or objectively measured 
income, or good health) will be less likely to find corruption permissible. 
 
4.2 METHODS  
 
To explore the relationship between a participant’s superordinate group size and 
corruption permissibility, we use data from the World Values Survey  
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org) and European Values Study 
(www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu). We control for variables important in the corruption 
literature that may constrain the availability or benefits of additional social 
partnerships, or that may influence corruption permissibility via paths other than 
those hypothesized here, using individual-level data from WVS and country-level 
data compiled from the United Nations, the World Bank, Freedom House, and 
Transparency International. 
 
4.2.1 CORRUPTION PERMISSIBILITY  
 
To gauge corruption permissibility, we adopted a measure of bribery permissibility 
from the WVS. The present paper uses WVS data from 91 countries collected 
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between 1981 and 2009 (n=399,376). Analyses are limited to the subsamples for 
which observations were available on all variables; sample sizes (ranging from 5785 
to 80,390) are reported with model estimates.  
  To gauge whether participants find corruption permissible, we employ a 
WVS question asking participants to indicate whether "someone accepting a bribe in 
the course of their duties" would always, sometimes, or never be justified. 
Participants’ responses were recorded on a ten point Likert scale, with 1 indicating 
that accepting a bribe was never justifiable. Because 74% of participants responded 
that corruption was never justifiable, to increase statistical power we collapsed all 
other responses into a single category, creating a binary (0="never," 1="at least 
sometimes") measure of corruption permissibility. 
 
4.2.2 SUPERORDINATE GROUP SIZE: PRIMARY GEOGRAPHIC IDENTITY AND NUMBER OF 
GROUP MEMBERSHIPS  
We adopt two measures of superordinate group size from the WVS. The first 
addresses participants’ primary geographic identity. This was a forced choice 
question: participants were asked, "To which of these geographic groups would you 
say you belong first of all?" They were allowed to choose between five levels of 
scale: local, region, country, continent, and world. In the full WVS sample, the 
majority picked "local" (41%) or "country” (34%) while only 10% each chose 
"continent" or "world". Because such a small number selected “continent” or “world,” 
we combined the two into a single category. The concept of local, regional, and 
country level identity was translated similarly in all surveys, however "continent" was 
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not consistently translated in different areas of the world. In South America, for 
example, participants were asked whether they saw themselves as members of 
Mercosur or the Latin American community, depending on the country.  
 Our second measure of superordinate group size is a summary measure of 
group memberships. We counted the number of organizations to which a survey 
participant belonged (similar to [71]). Participants were asked about membership in 
15 different groups, including local political movements, human rights movements, 
sports clubs, and religious groups. Only 45% of participants who responded 
belonged to any of those groups, which suggests a limitation in the use of these 
questions: there are likely organizations other than political, athletic, religious, and 
human rights groups to which participants belong. Very few individuals belonged to 
a large number of groups; to avoid the influence of outliers we capped the number 
of group memberships at two standard deviations above the mean (4.31). Further, 
because of differences in questions asked in different countries and across different 
years, only 133,711 of the 399,376 participants who responded to the bribery 
permissibility question answered questions about group membership, limiting the 
sample size for models that include this measure. We ran models including number 
of group memberships and models including primary geographic identity separately 
because of this sample size limitation. 
 
4.2.3 RESOURCE ACCESS: A SUMMARY MEASURE  
 
Per our predictions, other variables that may affect corruption permissibility include 
income, satisfaction with household finances, and subjective health, as a decline in 
 112 
 
each may increase the magnitude of benefits to be gained via risk buffering. We 
include both objective income and subjective financial situation because purchasing 
power and perceived need may be independent predictors of corrupt behavior. 
Income is an integer rank from 1-11 that is country-specific, such that participants 
with 11 have among the highest incomes in a country. Subjective income, how a 
participant compares her household income to what she wishes to earn, can provide 
additional information about a participant's perceived shortfalls. Participants were 
asked whether they were satisfied with their household finances on a scale of 1-10, 
with 10 as most satisfied. Participants rated their subjective health on a scale of 1-5, 
with 5 representing "very good" health.  
 
4.2.4 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROLS 
  
We control for other individual-level variables that may affect corruption 
permissibility, independently of having a larger superordinate group. Three variables 
identified by previous research on corruption are included, as well as four potential 
confounders. We control for belief in God using the same question that Atkinson and 
Bourratt [72] found to predict corruption acceptance in a WVS sample; they suggest 
that belief in a vigilant, omniscient God can help enforce cooperative behavior, a 
hypothesis supported by priming research [73,74]. Previous work has demonstrated 
that the functioning of government services, particularly the (bribe-free) enforcement 
provided by police, increases the likelihood of detection and punishment for corrupt 
acts. In our analysis, we combined the two questions probing confidence in two 
government services that can curb corruption, police and in civil services, into one 
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summary variable: we reverse coded these variables so that confidence was 
measured on a scale from 1-4, where 1 was "[no confidence] at all" and 4 was "a 
great deal of confidence." We then centered the summary variable at zero. Several 
studies using WVS data have suggested that women are less corrupt than men [75] 
because "women will be less likely to sacrifice the common good for personal 
(material) gain" [76]. Men also tend to be less generous in Dictator Games, 
economic experiments that tap participant altruism and fairness [77,78]. We control 
for sex in our analyses accordingly. In all models, we control for age, education, and 
household dependency. Age may affect corruption permissibility independently of 
cohort, education, and employment effects [79]. Education increases exposure to a 
larger scope of individuals, but depending on the context of exposure, valuation for 
these individuals can be either boosted or lowered. Level of education was 
measured using a country-specific rank: participants with the lowest educational 
attainment in the country were coded as 1, while those with the highest were coded 
as 3. Number of children is a proxy for household dependency, which may diminish 
the effect of increased income on bribery permissibility. The distribution of number 
of children was negatively skewed, so we rounded all participants above 2 SD of the 
mean, 5.29 children, down to 5.29. Finally, we include the population size of a 
participant’s town as a robusticity check. The population of a participant’s town is an 
integer scale, with 1 being a town with a population of 2,000 or less and 8 being a 
population of 500,000 or more. Because town population was unavailable for many 
participants, we used this variable only as a check to avoid limiting sample size. 
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 In an effort to situate one of our results, we also conducted exploratory 
analyses of the predictors of having a regional geographic identity. As we suggested 
in the Introduction, the relationship between kin biases and corruption permissibility 
[1,15] may be a function of an actor’s scope of valuation; as such, we explored 
whether a participant’s geographic identity (here, regional identity) was a correlate 
of their kin biases. As a proxy for kin biases, we include a question asking 
participants whether “more emphasis on family life” would be a good, neutral, or bad 
change to their way of life. We check whether profit motive is related to a regional 
identity, as profit motive has explained tolerance of corrupt behavior in some 
laboratory experiments (e.g. [80]). As a proxy for profit motive, we include whether 
participants believe “less emphasis on money and material possessions” would be a 
good, neutral, or bad change to their way of life. Finally, we examine whether 
participants with regional identities value more respect for authority figures, as 
respect for authority may decrease a participant’s likelihood of engaging in acts that 
harm others [81] and may be correlated with a regional identity, as those who 
identify with their region may be marginalized members of a nation and less bound 
to the national government [82]. As a proxy for respect for authorities, we include 
whether participants believe “greater respect for authority” would be a good, neutral, 
or bad change to their way of life. 
 
4.2.5 COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES  
 
Models including country-level variables are reported in the Supporting Information 
(S1 and S2 Tables; S1 and S3 Figs), as are the methods for these variables (S1 
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Appendix). We employed United Nations census data as a measure of objective, 
country-level religious and ethnic heterogeneity; World Bank measures of country 
population size, population density, and Gini coefficient; Freedom House’s Freedom 
in the World Political Rights Index; and Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index. We also adopted the World Bank’s classification of countries into 
world regions, which we include in models reported in the main text. 
 
4.2.6 STATISTICAL METHODS 
 
All models were fit using the R statistical package version 3.1.3 [83]. Using logistic 
regressions with logit links, we regressed corruption permissibility on the two 
hypothesized predictors of interest (primary geographic identity, number of group 
memberships), individual-level variables (income, satisfaction with household 
finance, subjective health, education, belief in God, confidence in police and civil 
services, age, and sex), and, in models reported in the Supporting Information (S1 
and S2 Tables; S1 and S3 Figs), country-level variables (religious and ethnic 
fractionalization or polarization, population size and density, Gini, the FIW political 
rights index, and the CPI).  
 To evaluate whether the inclusion of proxies for superordinate group size 
improved model fit relative to models including only controls, we compared models 
using Akaike weights. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a goodness of fit 
measure that maximizes the likelihood of model fit while penalizing additional 
parameters. We weighted AIC values from several candidate models to identify the 
best fit model [84] using qpcR [85]. 
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We predicted that participants whose resource access is low, but not too low, 
would stand to gain the most from a larger circle of potential social partners. We 
created a single summary variable to represent the resource access proxies: 
objective income, subjective income, and subjective health. Principal components 
analysis on standardized values suggested that, relative to subjective income, 
subjective health had a loading of 0.88 and objective income a loading of 0.94 on 
the first component. For the group membership subset, the loadings for subjective 
health and objective income were 0.82 and 0.98 that of subjective income, 
respectively. Accordingly, we standardized the three variables and summed them, 
weighting them according to their relative loadings in each subset. We then inverted 
the summary measures such that higher values indicate less resource access. 
 
4.2.7 ROBUSTICITY CHECKS  
 
The countries in this data set are not a representative world sample. There are a 
number of ways to control for potential clustering of residuals driven by the particular 
set of countries sampled, two of which we employ here. To avoid collinearity issues, 
both modeling approaches first required that we exclude country-level variables 
from the model. Because country-level variables had constrained the sample size, 
the number of observations in models excluding country-level variables was four 
times the size that of models including country-level variables. We first ran multilevel 
models by including random intercepts for each country in our models (i.e. using 
logistic mixed-effect models implemented in lme4; [86]). Second, we fit the same 
models by including fixed effect country dummies in place of country random 
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effects. Third, to check for any effect of shared cultural history, we fit fixed effect and 
random effect models controlling for world region in place of country. All model 
types provided consistent results for the variables of interest (with the exception of 
the region models for number of group memberships, as discussed below). Because 
of the four orders of magnitude increase in sample size when country-level variables 
were excluded, we focus on fixed effect models with country dummy variables in the 
text. Models including country-level variables are reported in Supporting Information 
(S1 and S2 Tables; S1 and S3 Figs). 
 
4.3 RESULTS  
 
Descriptive statistics appear in Tables 1 and 2. Local- and country-level identities 
were the most common primary geographic identity across countries (41% and 34% 
of participants respectively). Participants had a mean membership in 1.01 
(SD=1.69) groups. Fig 1 and 2 illustrate participants' primary geographic identity (1) 
and number of group memberships (2) by country. Consistent with findings in the 
corruption literature, bribery was viewed as more permissible among participants 
who were male, those who did not believe in God, and those who had lower 
confidence in police and civil services (Tables 3, 4) 
 
Primary Geographic Identity (P1.1). Participants who report having a larger 
primary geographic identity will find someone accepting a bribe to be less 
permissible. 
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Consistent with P1.1, individuals with a country identity find corruption less 
permissible than do individuals with a local identity (odds ratio (OR) for country level 
is 0.89, p<0.001). However, contrary to P1.1, those with a regional identity found 
corruption more permissible than those with a local identity (OR=1.15, p<0.001), 
while those with local and continent or world identities did not differ in their 
perceived corruption permissibility (continent or world identities OR=0.98, p=0.46). 
The difference in corruption permissibility between those with local and regional 
identities holds in logistic models with individual-level controls, whether we control 
for country of residence as a fixed effect or random intercept, include country-level 
variables instead of country controls, or include a control for the size of the 
participant’s home town (Table 3; Fig 3; S1 Table; S1 Fig).  
To determine whether the pattern of this relationship differs among countries, 
we regressed corruption permissibility on the individual-level variables separately by 
country. We held local identity at baseline. The 95% confidence intervals for the 
ORs for regional, country, or continent or world identities did not overlap OR=1 in 24 
of 55 countries, suggesting that these countries could be driving the effect. Re-
running the full model with these 24 countries excluded dampens the magnitude of 
the contrasts, but does not change the direction of the effect for participants with 
local or country identities (regional identity OR=1.07, p=0.13; country identity 
OR=0.96, p=0.15; continent or world identity, OR=1.02, p=0.71; n=39,328).  
For the subset of data for which country-level variables were available, we 
explored whether different features of a participant’s country of residence could be 
driving the observed effects. We divided this subset into countries below and above 
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the sample median for Gini coefficient; we then derived parameter estimates 
separately for countries below the median and for countries above. We repeated 
this process for absence of political rights (i.e. countries above the median have 
fewer political rights), perceptions of country-level corruption prevalence, and 
religious heterogeneity (S2 Fig). Results suggest that the non-linear relationship 
between primary geographic identity and corruption permissibility may be a product 
of participants’ responses from countries with high economic inequality, few political 
rights, low perceived corruption at the country level, and low levels of religious 
heterogeneity. Two countries, Chile and South Africa, both had few political rights, 
low country-level corruption, and high Gini; together, they represent 38% of the 
subset for which country-level variables were available. However, excluding them 
from analyses does not change the pattern of results, again suggesting that the non-
linear pattern is not solely a consequence of country of residence. 
 
Number of Group Memberships (P1.2). Participants who belong to a greater 
number of groups will find someone accepting a bribe to be less permissible. 
Controlling for country and individual-level variables, contrary to P1.2, we find that 
every additional group a participant belongs to is associated with a 8% higher 
probability of finding corruption permissible (p<0.001), the direction opposite of that 
predicted (Table 4). This finding is robust to the inclusion of country random 
intercepts, country-level variables, and the size of the participant’s home town 
(Table 4, S2 Table, S3 Fig), though the use of world region fixed or random effects 
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in place of country lowers the magnitude of effect (2% higher probability of finding 
corruption permissible, p=0.05).  
Looking at within-country patterns, confidence intervals for the ORs do not 
overlap OR=1 in seven of the 22 countries in the sample (Fig 4). Participants in 
these countries were also likely to be members of more groups than participants in 
other countries (1.40 vs 1.27, t=6.34, df=15,659.05, p<0.001). These countries do 
appear to be driving the effect: once they are removed from the sample, number of 
group memberships does not predict corruption permissibility in full models with 
controls (p=0.78). As only two of these seven countries have the full set of country-
level variables, we cannot assess whether country characteristics are driving the 
effect, however the effect is unrelated to that of world region: only two of the seven 
countries are from the same region (sub-Saharan Africa) and removal of these two 
nations from the full sample does not replicate the effect (7% higher odds with each 
group membership, p<0.001, n=20,525). 
 The two proxies for superordinate group size, primary geographic identity and 
number of group memberships, are not consistently associated with one another: 
while participants with a continent or world identity belong to 0.19 more groups on 
average than those with a regional identity (p<0.001), there is no difference in 
number of memberships between those with local, regional, or country identities. 
When the two proxies for superordinate group size are included together in the 
same model predicting corruption permissibility (limiting the size of the subsample to 
n=23,090), both geographic identity and group membership variables retain their 
effect. For each additional group membership, a participant has 8% increased 
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probability of finding corruption permissible, while participants with regional identities 
have a 1.14 odds (p<0,01) and participants with country identities a 0.93 odds 
(p=0.06) of finding corruption permissible relative to participants with local identities; 
there was no effect of having a continent or world identity for this subset (p=0.69). 
AIC weights suggest that, for this smaller subsample, the model including both 
variables provides a better fit (weighted AIC=0.99) than models including only 
number of group memberships plus controls, only primary geographic identity plus 
controls, or only controls. 
 
Predicted Determinants of the Net Benefits of Corrupt Behavior. 
Participants who stand to gain benefits from additional resource access (i.e. 
who have intermediate levels of subjective or objectively measured income, or 
health) will be less likely to find corruption permissible.  
Contrary to P2, participants with intermediate levels of resource availability were 
significantly more likely to find corruption permissible than those experiencing 
resource abundance or shortfall (Fig 5; Tables 3 and 4). This relationship was 
consistent across models. 
 
4.3.1 PREDICTORS OF A REGIONAL IDENTITY: EXPLORATORY ANALYSES  
 
To explore the consistent, unpredicted relationship between having a regional 
identity and finding corruption permissible, we tested whether several candidate 
predictors could account for having a regional identity: kin biases, which have been 
found to predict corruption previously [1,15] and may trade off with investments in 
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new social partners; profit motive, which has affected tolerance for corrupt behavior 
in laboratory experiments (e.g. [80]); and respect for authority, which may decrease 
behavior costly to others [81] and be less common – at least, for a central, national-
level authority – in marginalized regions [82]. Across three of four subsamples, 
participants who believed that greater respect for authority would be a negative 
change were significantly more likely to have a regional identity than those who 
believed it would be a positive change (S3 Table). Likewise, believing that greater 
emphasis on family life would be a negative change in one’s life was a positive 
predictor of having a regional identity across three of the four subsamples. 
 
4.4 DISCUSSION  
 
We hypothesized that the larger an actor’s scope of positively valued actual or 
potential social partners (i.e. the larger her superordinate identity), the less 
permissible she would find a corrupt act. We suggested that people have an evolved 
psychology that enables them to weigh the anticipated benefits of a corrupt act for 
self, kin, and/or social partners, relative to the anticipated costs of generating harms 
for bystanders that may include an actor’s positively valued potential social partners. 
Consistent with this notion, we posited that actors for whom the costs of generating 
these harms was amplified – for example, those who could benefit from additional 
resource access and thus may be concerned with maintaining a good reputation – 
would be less likely to find corruption permissible.  
 Overall we found mixed support for our hypotheses. Consistent with 
prediction, we found a relationship between superordinate identity, measured as 
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primary geographic identity, and corruption permissibility. Though more complicated 
than predicted, this relationship was robust across different model specifications: 
participants who identified most with their region consistently found corruption more 
permissible than participants with local or country identities. We did not predict that 
local identity would be consistently associated with less corruption permissibility 
than regional identity, primarily because the logic of our argument assumed that 
harms uniformly affect a broad geographic expanse. To attempt to identify 
characteristics of participants with regional identities that may drive the relationship 
between a regional identity and corruption permissibility, we explored whether 
participants who believed kin to be important, exhibited profit motive, and had a lack 
of respect for authority were more likely to have regional identities. We found that 
participants who believed greater emphasis on family life and greater respect for 
authority would be negative changes were more likely to have a regional identity. 
This analysis was only exploratory, but suggests that actors with regional identities 
may think of themselves as “free agents,” less concerned about kin, authorities, and 
the welfare of others – resulting in higher corruption permissibility – than actors with 
other superordinate identities. 
Contrary to our expectations, participants with a larger number of group 
memberships, our second proxy for in-group size, were more likely to find corruption 
permissible, though this effect was not robust to controls for world region or the 
exclusion of the seven countries in which the effect was most pronounced. While we 
expected participants with less access to resources, but not so little access that their 
time horizon was especially short, to be less likely to find corruption permissible, 
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results suggest that participants with intermediate levels of resource access were 
actually the most likely to find corruption permissible. Previous research has 
established the importance of the size and exclusivity of groups, as well as the 
degree of overlap between the groups of which a participant can be a member, for 
predicting levels of trust. Fukuyama [87] suggests that group number and group size 
may be inversely correlated: the more groups there are available to an actor, the 
fewer members are likely to be in each. Thus, belonging to more groups may not 
actually reflect a larger or broader social community. Groups also vary in the extent 
to which membership expands generalized trust (cf. [71]). Membership in groups 
that are open-access is related to generalized trust in the US, whereas membership 
in restricted access groups is not [88]. The most common groups in our sample 
were religious groups, labor unions, and sports groups, all of which may have 
restricted membership. Labor unions and sports teams are also groups that may be 
competitive in nature: any benefits generated by members may be targeted towards 
a small set of individuals, potentially at a cost to out-group individuals [89,90]. 
Additionally, similar to Fukuyama’s argument about how group size may decrease 
as group number increases, group memberships will also be less predictive of in-
group size if groups are highly overlapping [91,92]: the greater the overlap in group 
memberships (e.g. if members of religious group A are also members of volunteer 
organization B and political organization C), the less likely generalized trust is to 
correlate with the number of group memberships [92]. Because of data limitations, 
we were unable to estimate size, number, or membership constraints of the groups 
available to an individual. Another possible explanation for the positive relationship 
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between group membership and corruption permissibility is that group membership 
helps improve household welfare by buffering against resource shortfalls [93], 
thereby diminishing perceived needs. With a reduced need for resource buffering, 
one might expect less motivation to build additional social partnerships and less 
concern about harms from corruption impacting others.  
 
4.4.1 PRESENT CONTRIBUTION IN RELATION TO PAST RESEARCH  
 
Previous research only indirectly addresses whether positive valuation of others 
affects participation in and tolerance of corruption. In the social capital literature, 
Fukuyama [87] identifies public corruption as reflecting “a lower standard of moral 
behavior” towards strangers (p. 9) because “co-operative norms are [not] operative” 
(p. 8). Warren [94] draws similar conclusions, observing that corruption results from 
actors targeting reciprocity and trust towards in-group members, generating costs 
for out-groups who lack the power to counter these harms. Both imply that excluding 
individuals from cooperation and trust relegates them to out-group status, subject to 
harms as in-group benefits are generated, but neither connects the withholding of 
trust and cooperation in the first place to low valuation of these out-group individuals 
– who may share a superordinate identity with an actor – as potential social 
partners.  
 This paper underscores the fact that humans do not value the well-being of a 
broad scope of other people by default. Some researchers maintain that the human 
brain can represent relationships with about 150 individuals [95] and that beyond 
that number, a single value may be used to represent groups of people [52]. Contact 
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with single individuals from out-groups can enable an actor to expand her scope of 
positive valuation, increasing the size of her superordinate identity [96]. Our results 
suggest that encouraging a broad scope of positive valuation may curb corruption 
and tolerance for corrupt acts. For example, anti-corruption campaign materials that 
personalize those affected by the harms that corruption generates may be more 
effective than materials that speak of the social ills generated but provide little 
additional context. 
Our present hypotheses that are motivated by evolutionary logic; though 
these expectations can be derived directly from consideration of how an actor’s 
valuation of others will affect her decision to engage in corruption, frameworks that 
consider rational actors as interested in only their own well-being will need 
modification given evidence of how our evolved preferences impact decision-
making. It is unlikely that the mind can calculate all benefits and costs of any 
behavior [97], including corrupt acts. However, a history of natural selection may 
have favored emotions (and the ability to anticipate the emotions of others) that are 
sensitive to situational cues, such as those suggesting shared identity or common 
purpose with others [52,56]. These emotions can therefore motivate actors to 
consider the welfare of others when engaging in behaviors that confer costs and 
benefits. For example, contempt for out-group members (and their welfare) [56] 
might make it easier to support corruption that favors in-groups but harms out-
groups, whereas anticipated anger from in-group members who might experience 
harms [98] could serve to limit corrupt behavior. 
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Few studies to date have addressed corruption from an evolutionary 
perspective. Two research groups have modeled how power differentials can lead to 
elite corruption, both in humans [99] and animals in general [100]. Abdallah and 
colleagues [101] suggest that centralized punishment, common in state societies, is 
an evolutionarily unstable strategy for solving public goods provisioning because 
centralized institutions are susceptible to corruption. Atkinson and Bourrat [72] posit 
that belief in supernatural punishment makes corruption less permissible, perhaps 
because "God is watching" and enforcing moral behavior. Newson and Richerson 
[102] suggest that lowered public corruption encourages state fealty, which may re-
direct allegiances from the family and thus contribute to fertility decline.  
 
4.4.2 LIMITATIONS 
 
One limitation of the present study is our inability to examine how survey 
participants interpret questions about geographic identity, group memberships, 
generalized trust, and corruption permissibility. To our knowledge, the extent to 
which survey responses predict propensity to engage in corrupt acts has not been 
demonstrated. Another open question is how salient and consistent different 
geographic identities are across countries. For example, the salience of a regional 
identity may be a function of the political environment [82] and whether people self-
select into living in a region because they like it or cannot afford to live elsewhere 
[103]. Country-specific categories of identity would better capture the relationship 
between in-group size and corruption permissibility. While WVS data from some 
countries (such as Colombia) included self-professed membership in different ethnic 
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categories, these were available only for a minority of countries in the WVS and, as 
we described above, ethnic category membership may not tell us the scope of an 
actor’s positive valuation. As aforementioned, because of data limitations, we also 
could not explore who participants thought might be affected by the acceptance of a 
bribe. It is possible that variable interpretations may underlie some of our reported 
findings. For example, if participants who identify with marginalized regions interpret 
the harms generated by corrupt acts as affecting the larger nation, corruption might 
then be viewed with greater permissibility. However, the permissibility of bribery is 
likely a conservative proxy of corruption permissibility, as an act such as 
embezzlement can result in more far-reaching costs. Because of this, we expect the 
relationship between superordinate identity and corruption permissibility would only 
increase in magnitude if we adopted a different proxy for corruption permissibility.  
As is always the case with cross-sectional survey data, we cannot infer the 
direction of causality in any of the models presented here. One possible explanation 
of our results is that past experiences of corruption can both lower perceived 
corruption permissibility and decrease the scope of positive valuation to the regional 
level by providing actors with evidence for how others value them. Alternatively, past 
experiences of corruption may signal to actors that corrupt behavior is status quo, 
inducing actors to also switch to defection [104], or make an actor feel they are 
unlikely to caught in a corrupt act [1,21,105]. We attempted to control for past 
exposures to corrupt behavior by including country-level measures from the 
Corruption Perceptions Index, but we cannot rule out these alternative explanations.  
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Because of the necessarily limited scope of the data collected by the WVS, 
we used country-level data to control for common correlates of corruption – like 
religious heterogeneity and socioeconomic inequality – which may have better 
predictive power at a finer grain of geographic scope. Ethnic and religious 
heterogeneity often differ between different regions of a country (e.g. [106]), as does 
inequality. The patterns of interaction affected by group membership and inequality 
on the smaller scale can affect the transmission of cultural norms, which could affect 
an actor’s willingness to be more tolerant of or generous to strangers at larger 
geographic scales [107,108]. Further, individual-level experiences of heterogeneity 
depend on the context, such as the way heterogeneity appears in practice (e.g. 
markets, policy; [16,88,109]). The same is true for socioeconomic inequality (e.g. 
[110]). While we were able to include a measure of participants’ subjective 
socioeconomic status in our models, we were not able to include a measure of a 
participant’s subjective perception of heterogeneity. 
  
4.4.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Our results call attention to the predictive power of superordinate group size for 
corruption permissibility, independent of other established factors. Further work is 
needed to elucidate the determinants of a larger scope of positive valuation and its 
relationship to the perceived benefits and costs of a given action for an actor, 
including perceived harms affecting bystanders and perceived effects on reputation. 
Though social scientists have extensive data on the nature of repeated interactions, 
they have only recently given attention to social identity as a trait that impacts 
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behavior in ways inconsistent with rational choice frameworks (e.g. [111–114]), 
including how identity affects initial cooperation (e.g. [115–117]). Individual-level 
data will be crucial for studying these patterns, though much of the existing 
corruption literature focuses on country-level analyses. Theoretical modeling, 
ethnographic study, and experiments will be necessary next steps to further explore 
how an increased scope of positive valuation changes the costs and benefits of an 
action for an actor.   
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Fig 1. Proportion (box height) of participants with each primary geographic 
identity (box width) across 55 countries. “Cont.+” represents participants with a 
continent or world identity. 
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Fig 2. The distribution of participant's number of group identities across 22 
countries. 
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Fig 3. Odds of finding corruption permissible for three levels of primary 
geographic identity relative to regional identity. 
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Fig 4. Odds of finding corruption permissible with each additional 
membership in countries whose 95% CI >0. 
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Fig 5. The probability of finding corruption permissible by extent of resource 
shortfall. 
 
  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables.  
Variable Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum N 
Predictor 
      Number Group 
Memberships 1.01 0 1.69 0 4.31 131499 
Individual-level 
Variables 
      Subjective Household 
Income 5.79 6 2.60 1 10 271871 
Objective Household 
Income 4.67 4 2.42 1 11 277865 
Subjective Health 3.78 4 0.92 1 5 336387 
Number of Kids 1.82 2 1.57 0 5.29 299780 
Age 42.09 40 16.71 14 108 373701 
Confid. in Police, Civil 
Service 3.00 3 1.46 0 6 340846 
Town Population 
(integer) 4.76 5 2.52 1 9 272798 
Country-level 
Variables       
Religious 0.48 0.44 0.26 0.01 0.94 165029 
1
3
6
 
  
 
Fractionalization 
Religious Polarization 0.53 0.54 0.21 0.02 0.89 165029 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.36 0.32 0.23 0.04 0.93 132331 
Ethnic Polarization 0.50 0.49 0.23 0.08 0.94 132331 
Average Gini 3.55 3.52 0.25 2.97 4.21 366968 
CPI 5.61 6.19 2.38 0.69 10.00 383240 
Political Rights Index 2.48 2 1.86 1 7 383240 
Log Population Density 4.32 4.40 1.06 1.87 6.67 372526 
Log Population Size 16.84 17.04 1.49 13.69 20.07 377153 
Year of Interview   1999   1981 2009 383240 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for categorical variables. 
Variable Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 N Interpretation 
Predictor 
    
  
Primary Geographic 
Identity 0.41 0.14 0.34 0.10 296554 
Level 1 = local, level 4 = 
cont./world 
Individual-level 
Variables 
    
 
 
Highest Education 0.35 0.44 0.22 --- 302548 
Level 1 = lowest, level 3 = 
highest 
I Get What I Want 0.65 0.35 --- --- 51218 Level 1 = no, level 3 = yes 
Believe in God 0.16 0.84 --- --- 275959 Level 1 = no, level 2 = yes 
Participant Sex 0.48 0.52 --- --- 378634 
Level 1 = male, level 2 = 
female 
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Table 3. Primary geographic identity (baseline = local) and corruption permissibility1,2.  
Variable 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
z 
value 
p 
value 
(Intercept)3 3.82 0.07 18.81 <0.001 
Region 1.15 0.03 5.05 <0.001 
Country 0.89 0.02 -5.27 <0.001 
Cont./World 0.98 0.03 -0.74 0.46 
Shortfall 1.02 0.01 3.80 <0.001 
Shortfall2 0.98 0.00 -10.57 <0.001 
Education Level 2 0.86 0.02 -6.80 <0.001 
Education Level 3 0.77 0.03 -9.41 <0.001 
Believes in God 0.84 0.03 -5.49 <0.001 
Confid. Police, Govt. 
Srvc. 0.98 0.01 -3.44 <0.001 
Sex: Female 0.85 0.02 -9.11 <0.001 
Age 0.98 0.00 -22.99 <0.001 
Number of Kids 0.97 0.01 -4.19 <0.001 
 
1Models with random country intercepts, country-level variables, or town population size (with country fixed effects) 
provide highly similar results, and so are not reported. Reported model n = 80,390. Country fixed effects not reported. 
1
3
9
 
  
 
2AIC selection criteria suggest that the model including primary geographic identity provides a better fit than the model 
with only controls (weighted AICin-group size = 1; AICnull = 79,565.87, AICin-group size = 79,489.08). 
3The intercept represents participants with regional identities, who had the lowest household resource shortfall, the 
lowest level of education, reported the lowest confidence in police and civil services, did not believe in God, had no 
children, were 0 years old, and male.  
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Table 4. Number of group memberships and corruption permissibility1,2.  
Variable 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
z 
value 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 2.60 0.12 7.93 <0.001 
Number of 
Memberships 1.08 0.01 5.86 <0.001 
Shortfall 1.04 0.01 3.62 <0.001 
Shortfall2 0.98 0.00 -5.75 <0.001 
Education Level 2 0.80 0.04 -5.44 <0.001 
Education Level 3 0.71 0.05 -6.53 <0.001 
Believes in God 0.77 0.07 -3.46 <0.001 
Confid. Police, Govt. 
Srvc. 0.97 0.01 -2.85 <0.01 
Sex: Female 0.89 0.03 -3.38 <0.001 
Age 0.99 0.00 -10.48 <0.001 
Number of Children 0.98 0.01 -1.38 0.17 
 
1Models with random country intercepts, country-level variables, or town population size (with country fixed effects) 
provide highly similar results, and so are not reported. Reported model n = 23,288.  
1
4
1
 
  
 
2AIC selection criteria suggest that the model including primary geographic identity provides a better fit than the model 
with only controls and resource shortfall variables (AICin-group size = 0.99; AICnull = 22,277.93, AICin-group size = 22,245.83).
1
4
2
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has sought to place inter-group relationship building among 
humans in an evolutionary framework. Relative to other primates, humans are highly 
tolerant of individuals from other groups, and even build relationships with out-group 
members, though evolutionary-minded researchers have predominantly focused on 
inter-group competition as a selection pressure among humans. Drawing on existing 
theory from evolutionary anthropology, evolutionary psychology, social psychology, 
and development and behavioral economics, we suggest instead that humans are 
strategically parochial (or rather perhaps strategically non-parochial), valuing out-
group members as potential social partners when there are net benefits to doing so. 
This dissertation has particularly focused on two strategic socioeconomic 
motivations underlying out-group relationship building: non-local resource access 
and buffering resource shortfall. Each is expected to boost the net benefits of out-
group relationships. Further, we explored whether higher valuation curbs willingness 
to generate costs affecting out-group members, an area of research with numerous 
potential policy implications.  
 We have provided some answers to the following questions, posed in the 
introductory chapter: 
When should an actor invest in out-group relationships? We 
hypothesized that actors should value candidate out-group cooperative partners 
more highly when there are larger benefits to non-local resource access, whereas 
an actor’s degree of need and the quality of her existing network connections may 
affect both out-group and in-group valuation. Using a non-anonymous economic 
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game, surveys, and ethnographic interviews conducted among three populations of 
lowland Bolivian horticulturalists, we found that participants who had a lower 
subjective socioeconomic status – that is, those who believed they had less money 
and market items relative to other people in their community – were more likely to 
be generous toward out-group members. We suggest that this generosity may be 
motivated by a desire to obtain non-local resource access via relationships with out-
group members. However, we note that alternative explanations exist. For example, 
only Tsimane’ participants who had a greater investment in market items were 
significantly less likely to give to out-group members. We suggest this may be due 
to discrimination suffered by the Tsimane’ in market towns. One measure of a 
participant’s existing social network support decreased generosity toward out-group 
members, while another boosted generosity toward in-group members. These 
results suggest that out-group valuation among these three populations, as proxied 
by generosity in an economic game, is sensitive to resource access and available 
social support, though the nature of the resources and social support alter the effect.  
What qualities should an actor seek in a candidate out-group 
cooperative partner? In addition to the individual qualities that guide in-group 
partner choice, such as characteristics associated with cooperative outcomes, we 
hypothesized that perceived qualities of the group would affect an actor’s choice of 
out-group partners; specifically, we suggested that group qualities associated with 
resource access and treatment of out-group members should feature in out-group 
partner choice. Using the same data described above, we found that a donor was 
more likely to send money to recipients who she perceived to be “good people.” 
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Furthermore, donors were also more generous toward recipients if they perceived 
the recipient’s group as having access to market and political resources. Together, 
these results suggest that both group and individual characteristics feature in 
partner choice among out-group strangers. However, as for the above study, not all 
proxies for the variables of interest equally affected out-group valuation. 
How might out-group valuation curb the generation of externalities? 
When an actor stands to gain from out-group relationships, her valuation should 
affect both her generosity toward prospective cooperative partners, as tested above, 
and her willingness to avoid generating costs impacting them. Accordingly, we 
suggested that actors with a larger scope of valued candidate partners would be 
less likely to condone corrupt acts, as they should be more sensitive to the potential 
reputational fallout that could hurt their prospects with these candidate partners. To 
address this possibility, we used data collected by the World Values Survey and 
European Values Study among 55 countries, treating the scope of a participant’s 
superordinate identity as a proxy for the scope of her valued potential partners. We 
found that individuals who primarily identified with their country or a larger area were 
less likely to find corruption permissible than those who identified primarily with their 
region – but those who identified with their locality, the smallest scope of identity, 
also found corruption less permissible than those with regional identities. 
Exploratory analyses suggest that individuals who identify with their region may 
consider themselves “free agents” – they are more likely to not espouse obedience 
to authority or the importance of family than individuals with other identities – and 
thus may attend less to negative outcomes for others. Furthermore, contrary to the 
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patterns of generosity described for Bolivian horticulturalists, participants with the 
largest and smallest degree of resource shortfalls were the least likely to find 
corruption permissible. This study suffers from a number of limitations, but suggests 
that superordinate identity does affect willingness to generate costs for others.  
Taken together, these studies offer an alternative perspective on a large 
literature on inter-group relationships. Like many social psychologists, we suggest 
that inter-group relationships, that is, relationships between individuals from different 
groups, form conditionally, based on expected mutual net benefits. We suggest that 
an understanding of the human evolutionary past – characterized by resource 
shortfalls at varying geographic scales and the importance of non-local resources – 
can provide insight into why the potential for cooperative gain and differences in 
resource access impact the likelihood of inter-group relationship building. This 
ecologically and socially “rational” behavior is also consistent with a large body of 
work in development economics and behavioral economics, such as research on 
the predictors of cross-community collective action failure (e.g., Varughese and 
Ostrom, 2001; Habyarimana et al., 2007; Waring and Bell, 2013); we reframe the 
predictors of between-group tolerance or between-group collaboration as inputs to a 
psychology shaped by human evolution, which in turn affects decision-making. From 
this alternative perspective, we can make informed predictions about when actors 
may value out-group members and act accordingly – and when low out-group 
valuation may lead to costly social outcomes, such as corruption.  
The present studies also have implications for the evolutionary social 
sciences. In an area of study where parochial behavior has been at the forefront of 
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research on inter-group behavior for two decades, the tide is only recently beginning 
to change in favor of a focus on strategic inter-group tolerance. To this vanguard of 
research, which includes work on the evolved cognition of ethnicity and its various 
inputs (Moya and Boyd, 2015), the role of institutions in smoothing resource access 
and limiting inter-group competition (Hruschka et al., 2014), and between-group 
differences in resource access and consequent chronic stress (Boyer et al., 2015), 
we add theory on the conditions that may favor inter-group relationship building. 
Further, our approach contributes to approaches to cultural evolution: it suggests 
that inter-group relationships may have frequently enabled between-group cultural 
transmission (e.g., Ross and Atkinson, 2016) and that the parochialism central to 
some models of cultural group selection may not have been as common as has 
been implicitly assumed (e.g., Koopmans and Rebers, 2009). 
As this dissertation represents the beginning of my research program on 
inter-group relationship building, the present conclusions are limited in some 
respects. First, Bolivian data were necessarily cross-sectional. While we were able 
to control for some participant characteristics that may affect self-selection into out-
group relationships (e.g., personality, education), others were more difficult to 
capture (e.g., does out-group valuation encourage mobility, or does mobility 
increase out-group valuation?). The limitation of cross-sectional data did not permit 
me to explore the role of institutional effects on out-group valuation, if any. For 
example, increased exposure to market institutions that enforce fairness could 
increase valuation for strangers, as they are legally constrained to not generate 
harms for the actor in market exchanges (Henrich et al., 2010). Another round of 
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data collection is planned and will enable insight into changes in out-group valuation 
(e.g., does increased mobility predict a positive net change in out-group valuation?). 
The World Values Survey and European Values Study data featured in Chapter 4 
were likewise cross-sectional and collected with little to no context about participant 
interpretations of these questions (e.g., who was affected by the corrupt behavior 
mentioned in the survey?). With a collaborator, I am now experimentally testing the 
predictions from that chapter. 
Second, the variables in models presented here are measures inspired by a 
number of disciplines and research traditions; it is an outstanding question as to 
whether these variables, which often had different effects in our models, are 
measuring similar constructs. For example, I drew on Style of Life scales (e.g., 
Bindon et al., 1997; Dressler et al., 1998; Snodgrass et al., 2006), the components 
of which I believed may affect out-group valuation via different routes – for example, 
market penetration may affect the extent to which out-group relationships may 
provide net benefits, while passive exposure to out-groups via television may 
increase perceived social closeness. I have organized a group of collaborators to 
identify a common toolkit for measuring economic and social change; we plan to 
employ this toolkit to characterize the effects economic and social changes have on 
health and behavior across various populations. 
In sum, this dissertation re-frames existing research on inter-group 
interactions in a way that furthers the scientific study of human sociality, particularly 
by emphasizing the plasticity of inter-group competition, tolerance, and relationship 
building. It underscores the importance of understanding our evolved psychology, 
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and the relevant inputs to that psychology, even when conducting research in an 
ever-changing world. It also offers a crucial piece to a new wave of research in 
human behavior – when should people build out-group relationships? – a wave that 
promises to impact the evolutionary social sciences in the years to come. 
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Supplementary Methods 1 – Additional ethnographic details 
The Mosetén and Tsimane' are two of the 36 pueblos indígenas recognized by the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia. The two populations have recognized territories 
(Tierras Comunitarias de Origen) on either side of a range of mountains separating 
the Beni Department from the La Paz Department of Bolivia. Historically the two 
populations intermarried and had highly similar languages and practices – together, 
the Mosetén and Tsimane' languages are a linguistic isolate known as Mosetenan 1 
–  but the Mosetén were missionized a century earlier 2. Catholic Franciscan clergy 
established schools for the Mosetén and, by the end of the 20th century, had helped 
fund the paving of roads connecting the area to the market town, enabling extensive 
cash cropping and logging over the last three decades. The Mosetén have 
increasingly intermarried with non-Mosetén (Quechua and Aymara speakers), who 
then settled in the Mosetén territory; approximately half of all households in the 
communities sampled include one non-Mosetén adult member. While all Mosetenes 
speak fluent Spanish, the dominant language in Bolivia, only 14% of Tsimane’ 
participants speak Spanish fluently. Evangelical New Tribes and Catholic 
Redemptorist missionaries began work with the Tsimane' in the early 1950s. Dirt 
roads were constructed in 1975 but have reached few communities; many Tsimane’ 
continue to rely on river travel, which has curbed market penetration. Today the 
majority of Tsimane' communities have schools, but roughly one third were 
constructed only in the last decade. The Tsimane’ remain predominantly 
endogamous: when intermarriage does occur, the Tsimane’ tend to marry lowland 
ethnic groups living in or near Tsimane’ territory. Poor preservation in the region 
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limits our ability to estimate how long the Mosetén and Tsimane’ have lived in this 
area 3, but haplotype data suggest that they are more closely related to populations 
in the Andes than other lowland populations 4. 
A third population is a multicultural (intercultural) community located at the 
boundary of Mosetén territory in the Beni River Valley (the community is here called 
“Intercultural”). The Mosetén historically lived in the area, joined in the mid-20th 
century by Trinitarios searching for the promised land (la tierra santa). In the 1960s, 
a government-sponsored colonization project relocated Aymara speakers from the 
Andes to the Intercultural area. In response, most Mosetén and Trinitario families 
moved farther upriver. Many Aymara speakers ultimately returned to the Andes, but 
a small consortium of families who remained in the area – Aymaras, Trinitarios, and 
immigrants from the Beni – secured funds for a road to the local market town in 
1975 and founded Intercultural in 1979. In the last four decades, Intercultural has 
grown to a population of 1100 as residents have immigrated both from nearby 
communities and distant regions for the favorable growing climate and soils or the 
now-dwindling logging industry. Intercultural participants were predominantly 
Aymara (59%) and Quechua (18%), the two most populous indigenous groups in 
Bolivia. 
 
Supplementary Methods 2 – Additional details about sampling and checking 
game comprehension 
Tsimane’ interviews were conducted in the Tsimane’ language with the help of a 
research assistant, Mosetén and Interculturales interviews in Spanish by the 
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researcher. Tsimane’ interviews were translated from Spanish to Tsimane’ and 
back-translated until concepts were conveyed consistently in both languages. 
Interviews were conducted in two parts across two different days. An attempt was 
made to sample one adult from each household in each community, with an equal 
number of male and female participants. Individuals who engaged in more wage 
labor or sold more produce may have been less likely to be at home than other 
members of the community; to compensate for this, households whose members 
were absent were re-visited at regular intervals in an attempt to interview these 
individuals. Instructions for the economic game were given at the beginning of the 
second interview using example individual recipients (cartoon faces named Juan, 
Carlos, and Patricia) and U.S. pennies in place of bolivianos (Bs). To ascertain 
participant understanding, two possible allocations were demonstrated and 
participants were asked to tell the researcher how much each group or individual 
would receive in each circumstance. The researcher proceeded only if a participant 
correctly reported the amounts; if they did not, the researcher repeated the 
instructions for the experiment and demonstrated a third allocation. Participants 
were compensated with household gifts equivalent in value to one hour’s wages for 
each interview. 
 
Supplementary Methods 3 – Popular market possessions as assessed during 
pilot ethnographic research 
 Mosetén and Interculturales: Cars/trucks, TVs, satellites, stores or small 
restaurants, refrigerators or freezers, cell phones, chainsaws, string trimmers. 
 166 
 
 Tsimane’: Outboard motors, TVs, cell phones, chainsaws. 
 
Supplementary Methods 4 – Food security questionnaire as adapted from 5 for 
use among Bolivian horticulturalists 
Scoring: Responding “always” to a given question was given a score of 1, 
“never” a score of 0, and sometimes a score of 0.5. Scores were summed across 
questions. 
1.  In the last 12 months, how frequently did you think the food in your household 
would run out before you could get more? Always, sometimes, or never? 
(Spanish) En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia pensabas que la comida/los 
viveres de tu casa va a acabar antes de podrías sacar más? Siempre, a veces, o 
nunca? 
(Tsimane’) Oij yomodye’ jiyaques, jun buty quim’ ca dyijyim paj qui moyam jibitidyes 
aca’yadyes mi aty räi’ ya, janas qui buty daque mdyijyica’ mi mo’ra jibitidyes mi a aty 
jam bura’ jam dami? Räjcan, are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
2.  In the last 12 months, how frequently did the food in your household run out and 
you could not get more? Always, sometimes, or never? 
En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia acabó la comida/los viveres de tu casa 
y no podías sacar más? Siempre, a veces, o nunca? 
Oij yomodye’ jiyaques, jun buty quim’ aty räi’ jibitidyes aca’ya’dyes mi, aty jam jun 
buyi quim daĉan dam dyem? Räjcan, are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
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3.  In the last 12 months, how frequently could you not provide a complete diet for 
your household? Always, sometimes, or never? 
En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia no podías sacar comida 
completa/viveres completos para tu casa? 
Oij yómodye’ jiyaques, aty buty quim jam cuts jibiti’dyes aca’ya’dyes mi? Räjcan, 
are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
4.  In the last 12 months, how frequently did your household only have a few kinds 
of inexpensive food or food that was not tasty because you could not get more? 
Always, sometimes, or never? 
En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia tenía tu casa solamente unos tipos de 
comida/viveres barata o comida/viveres de mal sabor porque no podías sacar más? 
Siempre había comida buena? Siempre, a veces, o nunca? 
Oij yomodye’ jiyaques, jedye ca momo mo’ya aca’ya’ mi, are’ mo’ dyi’ momo’ 
jibitidyes mi? Räjcan, are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
 
Supplementary Methods 5 – Additional variables included in analyses 
Actors more prone to risk may be more likely to engage in potentially costly initial 
generosity toward out-groups 6, but those who discount the future may invest more 
in the self or in existing relationships rather than new ones 7; as such, we used four 
questions to measure participants’ risk proneness, one of which also gauges 
temporal discounting (8; Supplementary Methods 6). We also controlled for 
Agreeableness, which is a predictor of prosocial behavior in economic games9, and 
Extraversion, which increases likelihood of exploration and forming new social 
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relationships10 (see Supplementary Methods 7). We controlled for frequency of 
church attendance in the past month, as attendance could increase in-group 
favoritism 11 or increase the likelihood that participants felt their actions might be 
observed by an omniscient god 12. Sex differences in generosity and 
cooperativeness are prevalent 13 and cohort effects on trust have been reported 14, 
so we included both sex and age in all models. Education increases exposure to 
information about out-groups, whether positive or negative in content; also, 
participants seeking additional resources through out-groups may build their human 
capital to attain access. Because of these possibilities, we controlled for a 
participant’s highest level of schooling. Mate search may increase out-group 
exposure, although it is not consistently associated with marital status in the Bolivian 
context; we include marital status as an imperfect potential predictor of out-group 
valuation. 
 
Supplementary Methods 6 – Stimulating and instrumental risk taking 
questionnaire adapted from 8 for brevity and use among Bolivian 
horticulturalists 
Scoring: Items were scored on a five point scale, with “true” responses scored as 
5 and “false” scored as 1. Scores were summed across questions. 
1.  You take risks only if it is necessary to achieve something. True, almost true, 
somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
(Spanish) Tomas riesgo solamente si es necesaria para lograr algo. Verdadero, casi 
verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
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(Tsimane’) Me tsan anic carij midyes miqui nac anic jemoñe si’ mi tupuj me’jetaque’ 
mi. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
2.  You do not like to do things whose results depend too much on chance. If 
something depends a lot on chance, you do not do it. True, almost true, somewhat 
true, almost false, or false? 
No quieres hacer cosas cuyos resultados dependen demasiado mucho en la suerte. 
Si algo depende mucho en la suerte, no lo haces. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Tupuj dyäcje mi mo carijtaqui mi jam juiya mujucha tuyin bijodye jeñej mo’ in cätidye 
in metsam mo’ya’ tupudye jam qui nac jämi’ ya in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o 
jam o jam yirity? 
3.  Do you prefer work for a larger wage that can end any day more than stable work 
with a smaller wage, for example, contract work that does not pay you well? True, 
almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Prefieres más un trabajo por un sueldo más grande que se puede terminar 
cualquier día o un trabajo estable con un sueldo más pequeño, por ejemplo, un 
trabajo con contracto que no te paga bien? El primero, el segundo, o los dos por 
igual? 
Ma’je’ buty mi yiris carijtacdye yirity tum yaitacdye jämtyi, jam cavin räi’si’ mo tacya 
chime moya carijtacdye damsi yaitacdye, ejemplo carijtacdye contrato in? 
4.  To achieve in life, you need to take risks. True, almost true, somewhat true, 
almost false, or false? 
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Para lograr algo en esta vida, necesitas tomar riesgos. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Paj qui jäm’ joij ve juijya’ mi jemoñe buty mi me’je metsan’ carij midyes. Anic me’ o 
me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
 
Supplementary Methods 7. Personality inventories adapted from 15 for brevity 
and use among Bolivian horticulturalists 
Scoring: Items were scored on a five point scale, with “true” responses scored as 
5 and “false” scored as 1. Scores were summed across questions. 
 Agreeableness 
1. You do not want to help other people if helping them will disadvantage you. If it 
will cost you, you will not help others. True, almost true, somewhat true, almost 
false, or false? 
No quieres ayudar a otras personas si esa ayuda lleva desventajas para ti. Si hay 
un gasto para ti, no vas a ayudarles. Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi 
falso, o falso? 
Jam adac ma’je notacsi yoctyi muntyi in, mo qui nam notacdye’ mi jam jäm juijya 
midyes. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
2. You like to be generous without expecting a service in return. True, almost true, 
somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Te gusta ser generoso sin esperar un servicio a cambio. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
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Ma’je buty mi pajqui so’macsity jedye’ mi, jam bisem yoctyis notacdye. Anic me’ o 
me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
3. Your well-being is more important to you than the problems of other people. True, 
almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Tu bienestar es más importante a ti como los problemas de otras personas. 
Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Mo’ jäm’jodye’ anic buty jemonac cui dyes midyes mi, jam jeñej mu in carijsistumtyi’ 
yoctyi muntyi’ in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
4. You would help other people even if you have serious problems of your own. 
True, almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Todavía ayudes a otra gente aunque tienes tus propios problemas graves. 
Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Taca’ buty nótacsi yoctyi’ muntyi’ mi, me’tsan’ mis mo’ya’ cui’si’ carijsis anic are’sis. 
Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
 Extraversion 
1. When you are together with a lot of people, you prefer to be apart from them. 
True, almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Cuando tú estás junto a muchas personas prefieres que quedarte fuera de ellos. 
Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Me’ juijya mi mu’ya yiri’ya daityiya muntyi’ in, tupuj buty jäquive bu’yi mi 
jorajyayeban mu in ya in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
2. You feel better when there are a lot of people around you. True, almost true, 
somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
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Sientes mejor cuando hay muchas personas cerca de ti. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Jäm’ cuti mi me’ mu’ya’ dai’ muntyi’ in tyeijya juijya in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo 
o jam o jam yirity? 
3. You feel better when you are alone. True, almost true, somewhat true, almost 
false, or false? 
Sientes mejor cuando estás solo. Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, 
o falso? 
Jämyi buty mi yirity dyety juijyam. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
4. You always have fun meeting new people. True, almost true, somewhat true, 
almost false, or false? 
Siempre te diviertes a conocer personas nuevas. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso?  
Räjĉan buty ma’jotacsi mi quimdyem atysijtyi’ muntyi’ in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ 
momo o jam o jam yirity? 
 
Supplementary Methods 8 – Description of supplemental data 
A csv file of the data used in these analyses is available as part of the 
supplementary materials. To protect participant identity, participant PIDs are false, 
community names are excluded, and participant ages are rounded to the nearest 
decade (e.g., ages 25-34 appear as age 30). Outliers have not been removed, 
except for variables included in the shortfall summary variable as was necessary to 
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calculate these values (i.e., number of children, food security; see Table S1 for 
details about outlier removal). 
  
  
 
Supplementary Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the full sample.  
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max N4 
% 
level 1 
% 
level 2 
% 
level 3 
Avg. to out-group 2.19 1.40 2.67 0 5.31 157 
  
  
Avg. to in-group 2.95 1.56 3 0 7 168 
  
  
Money kept 5.47 5.77 3 0 21 198 
  
  
Existing non-local resource 
access 
     
  
  
  
Income last month1 -0.01 0.99 -0.30 -2.40 3.44 217 
  
  
Value of market items1 0.02 0.99 -0.31 -1.13 2.27 217 
  
  
log subjective SES 1.04 0.69 1.10 0.00 2.30 217 
  
  
No traditional labor --- --- 1 --- --- 198 0.60 0.40   
Need 
     
  
  
  
Shortfall summary 0.03 1.20 -0.03 -2.45 3.16 217 
  
  
   Food insecurity2 1.45 0.84 1.5 0 3 217 
  
  
   No. children in home2 2.59 1.87 2 0 7 217 
  
  
   Produce/income below 
normal2 --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.37 0.49 0.14 
Recent illness --- --- 1 --- --- 217 0.84 0.16   
Existing network support 
     
  
  
  
Can borrow from past 
comms. --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.17 0.37 0.47 
Can stay in past comm. --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.34 0.66   
Past exposure 
     
  
  
  
No negative stereotypes --- --- 1 --- --- 49 0.53 0.47   
Knew focal out-group as child --- --- 1 --- --- 157 0.91 0.09   
Parents knew out-group --- --- 1 --- --- 157 0.93 0.07   
Hours TV/movies1 0.01 1.01 -0.38 -0.78 3.15 217 
  
  
Cities/towns visited1 0.01 1.01 -0.34 -1.01 3.14 217 
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Places lived 3.20 1.90 3 0 8 217 
  
  
Additional variables 
     
  
  
  
Share name with recipient --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.37 0.63   
Risk proneness 7.57 2.73 8 0 12 217 
  
  
Agreeableness 7.58 3.34 8 0 16 217 
  
  
Extraversion 6.08 2.52 6 0 13 217 
  
  
Sex: Male --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.50 0.50   
Age3 22.24 14.34 21 0 67 217 
  
  
Married --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.13 0.87   
Years schooling 6.68 4.49 6 0 16 215 
  
  
Times to church/mo. 1.91 1.79 2 0 5 220 
  
  
Population --- --- 2 --- --- 217 0.35 0.33 0.32 
1Variables z-scored. 2Variables which form the shortfall summary measure is constructed. 3Centered at zero (i.e., an 
age of 18 has a value of 0). 4Includes participants presented with recipients from intermediate groups (members of 
groups in position 3; see Supplementary Figure 1) in the economic game, though these participants are excluded from 
analysis.  
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Supplementary Table 2. Parameter estimates for out-group and in-group giving, including controls.  
  Out-group In-group 
Variable 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
p 
value 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
p 
value 
Intercept 2.13 -0.32 4.50 0.07 0.06 -2.29 2.37 0.96 
Existing non-local 
resource access 
   
  
   
  
Income last month1 0.06 -0.18 0.30 0.65 0.14 -0.18 0.47 0.40 
Value of market items1 -0.03 -0.31 0.27 0.85 0.17 -0.17 0.53 0.32 
log subjective SES -0.33 -0.70 0.01 0.07 0.14 -0.29 0.59 0.52 
Past exposure 
   
  
   
  
Hours TV/movies1 0.23 -0.05 0.49 0.10 0.03 -0.28 0.35 0.83 
Cities/towns visited1 0.09 -0.17 0.38 0.50 -0.22 -0.55 0.11 0.19 
Places lived 0.21 0.05 0.36 0.01 -0.03 -0.22 0.15 0.73 
Existing network support 
   
  
   
  
Can borrow from one past 
comm. -0.30 -1.10 0.47 0.45 0.31 -0.59 1.21 0.51 
Can borrow from two past 
comms. -0.42 -1.18 0.30 0.26 1.05 0.13 1.89 0.02 
Can stay in past comm. -0.05 -0.58 0.49 0.85 0.30 -0.34 0.96 0.37 
No traditional labor -0.52 -1.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.19 -0.80 0.38 0.52 
Need 
   
  
   
  
Shortfall summary -0.05 -0.25 0.17 0.67 -0.13 -0.38 0.13 0.33 
Recent illness -0.90 -1.52 -0.26 0.00 0.54 -0.24 1.35 0.18 
Additional variables 
   
  
   
  
Share name with recipient 0.09 -0.41 0.59 0.74 0.48 -0.12 1.10 0.12 
Risk proneness 0.00 -0.08 0.08 0.99 0.06 -0.04 0.16 0.25 
Agreeableness 0.04 -0.04 0.12 0.34 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.45 
Extraversion -0.02 -0.11 0.08 0.74 0.02 -0.09 0.14 0.72 
Sex: Male -0.25 -0.79 0.26 0.34 0.15 -0.50 0.78 0.64 
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Age2 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.36 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.27 
Married -0.02 -0.66 0.65 0.94 0.68 -0.16 1.56 0.12 
Years schooling -0.03 -0.10 0.04 0.41 0.01 -0.08 0.09 0.86 
Times to church/mo. 0.04 -0.09 0.17 0.56 0.09 -0.07 0.24 0.26 
Both models control for survey version, which was counterbalanced. Out-group sample size=157, effective sample 
size (i.e., number of samples from the posterior distribution)=27,000; DIC=532.17. In-group sample size=133, 
effective sample size=26,510; DIC=513.60. 1Variables z-scored. 2Age is centered at age 18.  
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Supplementary Table 3. Parameter estimates for money kept for the self, including controls.  
  Self 
Variable 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
p 
value 
Intercept 14.56 6.10 22.45 0.00 
Existing non-local 
resource access 
    Income last month1 -0.45 -1.49 0.58 0.40 
Value of market items1 -0.43 -1.62 0.80 0.48 
log subjective SES 0.60 -0.93 2.12 0.44 
Past exposure 
    Hours TV/movies1 -1.06 -2.18 0.03 0.06 
Cities/towns visited1 0.17 -1.01 1.37 0.78 
Places lived -0.62 -1.27 0.01 0.06 
Existing network support 
    Can borrow from one past 
comm. -0.58 -3.84 2.73 0.73 
Can borrow from two past 
comms. -2.20 -5.27 1.03 0.17 
Can stay in past comm. -0.91 -3.26 1.41 0.45 
No traditional labor 1.87 -0.19 4.08 0.08 
Need 
    Shortfall summary 0.54 -0.37 1.43 0.24 
Recent illness 0.91 -1.85 3.63 0.52 
Additional variables 
    Share name with recipient -1.69 -3.97 0.41 0.13 
Risk proneness -0.10 -0.44 0.26 0.58 
Agreeableness -0.23 -0.55 0.11 0.17 
Extraversion -0.03 -0.43 0.37 0.90 
Sex: Male 0.69 -1.63 2.94 0.55 
1
7
8
 
  
 
Age2 -0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.52 
Married -1.21 -4.09 1.67 0.40 
Years schooling 0.02 -0.31 0.33 0.90 
Times to church/mo. -0.40 -0.96 0.17 0.16 
Model controls for survey version, which was counterbalanced. Sample size=157, effective sample size=27,000; 
DIC=1015.26. 1Variables z-scored. 2Age is centered at age 18.  
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Supplementary Table 4. Parameter estimates for out-group giving by population, including controls. Percentile 
intervals omitted due to space constraints. 
  Tsimane' Mosetén Interculturales 
Variable 
Post. 
mean 
p 
value 
Post. 
mean 
p 
value 
Post. 
mean 
p 
value 
Intercept 1.77 0.45 1.91 0.15 1.50 0.38 
Existing non-
local resource 
access   
 
        
Income last 
month1 0.10 0.85 0.12 0.54 -0.12 0.55 
Value of 
market items1 -2.72 0.00 0.12 0.59 -0.08 0.70 
log subjective 
SES -0.28 0.53 -0.47 0.13 -0.05 0.90 
Past exposure   
 
        
Hours 
TV/movies1 3.45 0.03 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.30 
Cities/towns 
visited1 0.48 0.77 0.16 0.45 -0.17 0.44 
Places lived -0.01 0.97 0.20 0.09 0.15 0.31 
Existing 
network 
support   
 
        
Can borrow 
from one past 
comm. -0.46 0.52 0.81 0.02 -0.37 0.37 
Can borrow 
from two past -0.66 0.39 
--- --- --- --- 
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comms. 
Can stay in 
past comm. 0.06 0.92 0.20 0.66 -0.45 0.36 
No traditional 
labor -1.03 0.13 -0.68 0.11     
Need   
 
        
Shortfall 
summary 0.00 1.00 -0.07 0.64 -0.23 0.26 
Recent illness --- --- -0.38 0.38 -0.28 0.57 
Additional 
variables   
 
        
Share name 
with recipient 1.44 0.07 -0.12 0.75 0.37 0.47 
Risk proneness 0.05 0.63 0.00 0.99 0.04 0.60 
Agreeableness -0.04 0.71 0.06 0.34 0.09 0.21 
Extraversion 0.05 0.69 -0.02 0.80 0.04 0.74 
Sex: Male -1.07 0.15 0.27 0.50 0.70 0.27 
Age2 0.02 0.50 -0.01 0.75 -0.01 0.43 
Married --- --- --- --- -0.21 0.69 
Years 
schooling -0.02 0.89 -0.02 0.75 -0.04 0.51 
Times to 
church/mo. 0.07 0.63 -0.08 0.53 0.26 0.08 
Categorical variables excluded when number of individuals at each level was too small in a given population. Survey 
version is excluded from all three models due to issues with collinearity. Being able to borrow from past communities 
is binned into two categories – no communities and one community in one bin, two communities in the other – for the 
Mosetén and Interculturales. Tsimane’ sample size=47, effective sample size=27,000; DIC=199.31. Mosetén sample 
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size=52, effective sample size=27,000; DIC=180.08. Intercultural sample size=51, effective sample size=27,403; 
DIC=190.16. 1Variables z-scored. 2Age is centered at age 18. 
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Supplementary Table 5. Parameter estimates for out-group giving, in-group giving, and money kept for the self for 
the subsample for which stereotype data were available. Percentile intervals omitted due to space constraints.  
  Out-group In-group Self 
Variable 
Post. 
mean 
p 
value 
Post. 
mean 
p 
value 
Post. 
mean 
p 
value 
Intercept 1.12 0.15 4.47 0.00 4.50 0.22 
Existing non-local resource access     
 
  
 
  
log subjective SES -0.58 0.13 -0.57 0.28 3.94 0.03 
Past exposure     
 
  
 
  
Hours TV/movies1 0.54 0.09 -0.01 0.97 -0.95 0.51 
Places lived 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.36 -1.45 0.02 
No negative out-group stereotype -0.09 0.84 -0.16 0.81 -0.05 0.99 
Existing network support     
 
  
 
  
No traditional labor -0.23 0.59 -0.10 0.87 2.07 0.31 
Need     
 
  
 
  
Recent illness -0.68 0.14 1.35 0.07 -2.52 0.27 
Only variables which were significant in models reported above were included in these models, to preserve degrees of 
freedom given small sample sizes. Both models control for survey version, which was counter-balanced. Out-group 
sample size=44, effective sample size=27,652; DIC=150.52. In-group sample size=40, effective sample size=27,715; 
DIC=171.42. Money kept for self sample size=44, effective sample size=27,000, DIC=298.60. Model including 
stereotypes provides a worse fit than model excluding stereotypes (DIC=150.51 vs DIC=148.16).  1Variable z-scored. 
1
8
3
 
  
 
 
Supplementary Table 6. Parameter estimates for out-group giving by whether the participant wished to share their 
name or remain anonymous, including controls.  
  Non-anonymous Anonymous 
Variable 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% p value 
Post. 
mean 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% p value 
Intercept 2.90 0.61 5.08 0.01 2.33 -1.04 5.70 0.17 
Existing non-local 
resource access 
   
    
  
  
Income last month1 0.03 -0.28 0.33 0.87 -0.17 -0.72 0.37 0.54 
Value of market items1 0.20 -0.17 0.57 0.30 0.16 -0.42 0.74 0.57 
log subjective SES -0.38 -0.82 0.04 0.08 -0.70 -1.55 0.14 0.10 
Past exposure 
   
    
  
  
Hours TV/movies1 0.13 -0.22 0.49 0.47 0.43 -0.18 1.05 0.17 
Cities/towns visited1 0.38 -0.01 0.75 0.05 -0.22 -0.75 0.30 0.39 
Places lived 0.18 -0.02 0.36 0.07 0.41 0.12 0.69 0.01 
Existing network support 
   
    
  
  
Can borrow from one past 
comm. -0.61 -1.54 0.33 0.20 0.61 -0.42 1.70 0.24 
Can borrow from two past 
comms. -0.55 -1.42 0.33 0.22  --- --- --- --- 
Can stay in past comm. 0.07 -0.65 0.86 0.85 -0.52 -1.52 0.48 0.30 
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No traditional labor -0.49 -1.10 0.12 0.12 -0.43 -1.48 0.62 0.41 
Need 
   
    
  
  
Shortfall summary -0.13 -0.39 0.13 0.33 -0.11 -0.65 0.45 0.70 
Recent illness -1.02 -1.81 -0.19 0.01 -0.40 -1.83 1.08 0.58 
Additional variables 
   
    
  
  
Risk proneness -0.03 -0.13 0.06 0.49 -0.10 -0.30 0.10 0.31 
Agreeableness 0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.64 -0.01 -0.20 0.19 0.89 
Extraversion -0.07 -0.18 0.05 0.23 0.10 -0.14 0.33 0.39 
Sex: Male -0.33 -1.00 0.38 0.34 0.15 -1.09 1.43 0.81 
Age2 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.59 -0.02 -0.07 0.03 0.38 
Married -0.03 -0.88 0.85 0.95   ---  ---  ---  --- 
Years schooling 0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.69 -0.05 -0.18 0.08 0.45 
Times to church/mo. 0.00 -0.17 0.16 0.98 0.28 -0.02 0.60 0.08 
Categorical variables excluded when number of individuals at each level was too small in a given population. Survey 
version is excluded from the anonymous model. Being able to borrow from past communities is binned into two 
categories – no communities and one community in one bin, two communities in the other – for the anonymous 
subset. Non-anonymous sample size=101, effective sample size=27,000, DIC=368.21. Anonymous sample size=49, 
effective sample size=27,000; DIC=194.73. 1Variables z-scored. 
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Supplementary Table 7. Adjustments for outliers and heteroscedasticity.  
Variable Adjustment for Statistical Purposes 
Number of children living in the home 
Values above 97.5 %ile rounded to 97.5 
%ile 
Net household income  
Places visited 
Value of market items owned 
Hours of TV or movies watched in last 
week 
Years of school 
Risk proneness 
Times attended church in last month 
Food insecurity 
Market items, z-scored 
Subjective SES Logged to reduce heteroscedasticity 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Participants sorted cards representing local ethnic 
groups, churches, and work cooperatives on a scale from “groups I belong to most” 
to “groups I belong to least”; the yellow scale was oriented in front of the participant 
such that the rectangle for “groups I belong to most” was closest to him or her and 
the rectangle for “groups I belong to least” was farthest away. Participants had to 
sort all the cards on the scale, but could leave as many or as few in each rectangle 
as they wished. The figure below shows sorting in stages as the participant places 
the cards in the rectangles. The number of groups in the card sort was determined 
by the number of locally salient groups: 9 for the Tsimane’, 10 for the Mosetén, and 
12 for the Interculturales. Some are religious organizations (e.g., Catholics are a 
cross, Nazarenes are a Bible), some are ethnic groups (e.g., Tsimane’ are a T, 
Quechua are a Q), and some are work cooperatives (e.g., the dairy cooperative has 
a cow, the pig farming cooperative has a pig). We classified groups placed in the 
two rectangles closest to the participant as in-group, those placed in the two 
rectangles farthest from the participant as out-group, and those in the middle 
rectangle as intermediate. Participant comprehension was ascertained before data 
were collected. Cow and pig images courtesy of johnny_automatic and tuxwrench 
(https://openclipart.org/detail/388/cow; https://openclipart.org/detail/216216/piggy). 
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A2.  SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: WHEN TO DIVERSIFY, AND WITH WHOM? 
CHOOSING PARTNERS AMONG OUT-GROUP STRANGERS IN LOWLAND BOLIVIA 
 
Supplementary Methods 1. Additional ethnographic details 
Supplementary Methods 2. Sampling strategy, counterbalancing and randomization, 
comprehension checks 
Supplementary Methods 3. Additional variables 
Supplementary Methods 4. Food security 
Supplementary Methods 5. Popular market possessions 
Supplementary Methods 6. Personality and risk measures 
Supplementary Table 1. Descriptive statistics at the sample level 
Supplementary Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the Interculturales 
Supplementary Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the Mosetén 
Supplementary Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the Tsimane’ 
Supplementary Table 5. Average amount to out-groups by categorical predictor 
variable 
Supplementary Table 6. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, controlling for mean given to in-group 
recipients 
Supplementary Table 7. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, with recipient consensus “goodness” and 
wealth as predictors 
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Supplementary Table 8. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, with interest in friendship and willingness to 
trust as predictors 
Supplementary Table 9. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among all 
participants 
Supplementary Table 10. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among all 
participants, controlling for mean given to in-group recipients 
Supplementary Table 11. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among all 
participants, including ratio of recipient to donor ethnic and religious group 
size 
Supplementary Figure 1. Card sort methodology 
Supplementary Figure 2. Economic game methodology 
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Supplementary Methods 1 – Additional ethnographic details 
By the turn of the 21st century, international aid and the Catholic clergy had 
constructed roads reaching the Mosetén communities, with the help of local 
communities. Community members now have access to electricity, cell service, 
running (non-potable) water, and organized transportation to the local market town. 
The Mosetén have increasingly intermarried with Quechua and Aymara speakers, 
who have settled in the Mosetén territory. Tsimane’ communities, on the other hand, 
have very little infrastructure and access to resources. Evangelical New Tribes and 
Catholic Redemptorist missionaries began work with the Tsimane in the mid-20th 
century. Roads were constructed beginning in 1974 but are poorly maintained and 
reach few communities; many Tsimane’ households rely predominantly on river 
travel. In the study communities, there is no access to electricity, reliable cell 
service, running water, or organized (river) transport. Today the majority of Tsimane' 
communities have schools, but roughly one third were constructed only in the last 
decade.  
 Intercultural was founded by colonists. In the 1960s, a government-
sponsored colonization project relocated Aymara speakers from the Andes to the 
Intercultural area, where some lowland families were living. Together, these 
households secured funds for a road to the local market town in 1975, established a 
school, and founded Intercultural in 1979. Interculturales have access to electricity, 
cell service, running water, and organized transport to the local town, with cars 
coming and going more often than seen among the Mosetén. 
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Supplementary Methods 2 – Sampling strategy, counterbalancing and 
randomization, comprehension checks 
Tsimane’ interviews were conducted in the Tsimane’ language with the help of a 
research assistant, Mosetén and Interculturales interviews in Spanish by the 
researcher. Tsimane’ interviews were translated from Spanish to Tsimane’ and 
back-translated until concepts were conveyed consistently in both languages. The 
order of different sections was counterbalanced across six versions of the interview; 
questions within each section were randomized. Interviews were conducted in two 
parts across two different days. An attempt was made to sample one adult from 
each household in each community, with an equal number of male and female 
participants. Individuals who engaged in more wage labor or sold more produce 
may have been less likely to be at home than other members of the community; to 
compensate for this, households whose members were absent were re-visited at 
regular intervals in an attempt to interview these individuals. Instructions for the 
economic game were given at the beginning of the second interview using example 
individual recipients (cartoon faces named Juan, Carlos, and Patricia) and U.S. 
pennies in place of bolivianos (Bs). To ascertain participant understanding, two 
possible allocations were demonstrated and participants were asked to tell the 
researcher how much each group or individual would receive in each circumstance. 
The researcher proceeded only if a participant correctly reported the amounts; if 
they did not, the researcher repeated the instructions for the experiment and 
demonstrated a third allocation. Participants were compensated with household gifts 
equivalent in value to one hour’s wages for each interview. 
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Supplementary Methods 3 – Additional variables 
Donor resource access. Participants’ access to sufficient basic household 
resources (e.g., regular harvests) was measured as self-reported food security 
(Supplementary Methods 4), personal illness lasting three days or more in the past 
month, dependency (number of children living in the home), and whether production 
and earnings during the previous month were the same, higher, or lower than 
normative for the household. A summary measure of food security, dependency, 
and normal income/production was constructed by including all three in a principal 
components analysis and extracting the first component (variance 
explained=47.3%). Recent illness did not load on this factor and is thus considered 
separately. 
 Aspects of participants’ material style of life (Bindon, Knight, Dressler, & 
Crews, 1997), including subjective socioeconomic status relative to others in their 
community (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000), were obtained by interview. 
Household net income was calculated from participants’ self-reported earnings and 
expenditures on debts and wages over the last month. Participants also identified 
the quantity of popular market possessions owned by their household 
(Supplementary Methods 5). Current price was used to ascribe dollar amounts to 
market possessions. Because a participant’s comparison of herself to others in her 
community may affect whether she believes she can access more resources 
elsewhere (Dressler, Balieiro, & dos Santos, 1998), net income and dollar amount 
invested in market possessions were converted to z-scores at the sample level. 
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These three measures load together in a principal components analysis, but had 
differing effects in a previous paper (Pisor & Gurven, n.d.); as such, we included 
each of these three variables as separate predictors in each model. A fourth 
variable is less a proxy for household integration to the market (i.e., it does not load 
on the aforementioned principal component) but rather an indicator of alternative 
production strategies. Participants were asked if they engaged in ayni – traditional 
cooperative labor often used to harvest rice –in the previous year. 
Social network support. To capture whether participants had existing social 
connections that could buffer shortfalls affecting their local community, participants 
were asked whether they could stay with a family outside their local community (i.e., 
in their natal community or in the local market town) during a hypothetical flood 
affecting their household. Whether participants could ask someone from a family 
outside their local community for a loan of B100 (1.5 to 2 days’ wages) mattered in 
past analyses (Pisor & Gurven, n.d.), however this measure could not be 
incorporated here due to issues with collinearity.  
Personality and risk. Actors who are higher on Agreeableness (as defined by the 
HEXACO model) are more likely to be cooperative while those higher on 
Extraversion more likely to build more social alliances (Ashton & Lee, 2007; 
Denissen & Penke, 2008; Nettle, 2006). Risk aversion may cut both ways: ability to 
avoid risk and delay reward could prevent initial investment in new relationships with 
complete strangers, while on the other hand forging new relationships with high 
quality partners could reflect a long-term strategy (ibid). As such, we include 
Agreeableness, Extraversion (Denissen & Penke, 2008), and risk aversion 
 196 
 
(Zaleskiewicz, 2001) in all models; questions subsets used in analyses appear in 
Supplementary Methods 6. 
Other controls. We controlled for frequency of church attendance in the past 
month, as attendance could increase in-group favoritism (Sosis & Ruffle, 2003) or 
increase the likelihood that participants felt their actions might be observed by an 
omniscient god (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Sex differences in generosity and 
cooperativeness are prevalent (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011) and cohort 
effects on trust have been reported (Putnam, 1995), so we included both sex and 
age in all models. Education increases exposure to information about out-groups, 
whether positive or negative in content; also, participants seeking additional 
resources through out-groups may build their human capital to attain access. 
Because of these possibilities, we controlled for a participant’s highest level of 
schooling. Mate search may increase out-group exposure, although it is not 
consistently associated with marital status in the Bolivian context; however, marital 
status had no effect and caused collinearity in some models, so it is excluded from 
the analyses reported here. 
 
Supplementary Methods 4 – Food security questionnaire as adapted from 
(Bickel, Nord, Price, Hamilton, & Cook, 2000) 
Scoring: Responding “always” to a given question was given a score of 1, 
“never” a score of 0, and “sometimes” a score of 0.5. Scores were summed 
across questions. 
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1.  In the last 12 months, how frequently did you think the food in your household 
would run out before you could get more? Always, sometimes, or never? 
(Spanish) En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia pensabas que la comida/los 
viveres de tu casa va a acabar antes de podrías sacar más? Siempre, a veces, o 
nunca? 
(Tsimane’) Oij yomodye’ jiyaques, jun buty quim’ ca dyijyim paj qui moyam jibitidyes 
aca’yadyes mi aty räi’ ya, janas qui buty daque mdyijyica’ mi mo’ra jibitidyes mi a aty 
jam bura’ jam dami? Räjcan, are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
2.  In the last 12 months, how frequently did the food in your household run out and 
you could not get more? Always, sometimes, or never? 
En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia acabó la comida/los viveres de tu casa 
y no podías sacar más? Siempre, a veces, o nunca? 
Oij yomodye’ jiyaques, jun buty quim’ aty räi’ jibitidyes aca’ya’dyes mi, aty jam jun 
buyi quim daĉan dam dyem? Räjcan, are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
3.  In the last 12 months, how frequently could you not provide a complete diet for 
your household? Always, sometimes, or never? 
En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia no podías sacar comida 
completa/viveres completos para tu casa? 
Oij yómodye’ jiyaques, aty buty quim jam cuts jibiti’dyes aca’ya’dyes mi? Räjcan, 
are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
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4.  In the last 12 months, how frequently did your household only have a few kinds 
of inexpensive food or food that was not tasty because you could not get more? 
Always, sometimes, or never? 
En los últimos 12 meses, con qué frecuencia tenía tu casa solamente unos tipos de 
comida/viveres barata o comida/viveres de mal sabor porque no podías sacar más? 
Siempre había comida buena? Siempre, a veces, o nunca? 
Oij yomodye’ jiyaques, jedye ca momo mo’ya aca’ya’ mi, are’ mo’ dyi’ momo’ 
jibitidyes mi? Räjcan, are’ jämdye’ya’, are’ jam jam yiri’? 
 
Supplementary Methods 5 – Popular market possessions as assessed during 
pilot ethnographic research 
 Mosetén and Interculturales: Cars/trucks, TVs, satellites, stores or small 
restaurants, refrigerators or freezers, cell phones, chainsaws, string trimmers. 
 Tsimane’: Outboard motors, TVs, cell phones, chainsaws. 
 
Supplementary Methods 6 – Personality and risk measures 
Scoring: Items were scored on a five point scale, with “true” responses scored as 
5 and “false” scored as 1. Scores were summed across questions. 
 Risk, adapted from (Zaleskiewicz, 2001) 
1.  You take risks only if it is necessary to achieve something. True, almost true, 
somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
(Spanish) Tomas riesgo solamente si es necesaria para lograr algo. Verdadero, casi 
verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
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(Tsimane’) Me tsan anic carij midyes miqui nac anic jemoñe si’ mi tupuj me’jetaque’ 
mi. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
2.  You do not like to do things whose results depend too much on chance. If 
something depends a lot on chance, you do not do it. True, almost true, somewhat 
true, almost false, or false? 
No quieres hacer cosas cuyos resultados dependen demasiado mucho en la suerte. 
Si algo depende mucho en la suerte, no lo haces. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Tupuj dyäcje mi mo carijtaqui mi jam juiya mujucha tuyin bijodye jeñej mo’ in cätidye 
in metsam mo’ya’ tupudye jam qui nac jämi’ ya in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o 
jam o jam yirity? 
3.  Do you prefer work for a larger wage that can end any day more than stable work 
with a smaller wage, for example, contract work that does not pay you well? True, 
almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Prefieres más un trabajo por un sueldo más grande que se puede terminar 
cualquier día o un trabajo estable con un sueldo más pequeño, por ejemplo, un 
trabajo con contracto que no te paga bien? El primero, el segundo, o los dos por 
igual? 
Ma’je’ buty mi yiris carijtacdye yirity tum yaitacdye jämtyi, jam cavin räi’si’ mo tacya 
chime moya carijtacdye damsi yaitacdye, ejemplo carijtacdye contrato in? 
4.  To achieve in life, you need to take risks. True, almost true, somewhat true, 
almost false, or false? 
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Para lograr algo en esta vida, necesitas tomar riesgos. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Paj qui jäm’ joij ve juijya’ mi jemoñe buty mi me’je metsan’ carij midyes. Anic me’ o 
me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
 Agreeableness, adapted from (Denissen & Penke, 2008) 
1. You do not want to help other people if helping them will disadvantage you. If it 
will cost you, you will not help others. True, almost true, somewhat true, almost 
false, or false? 
No quieres ayudar a otras personas si esa ayuda lleva desventajas para ti. Si hay 
un gasto para ti, no vas a ayudarles. Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi 
falso, o falso? 
Jam adac ma’je notacsi yoctyi muntyi in, mo qui nam notacdye’ mi jam jäm juijya 
midyes. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
2. You like to be generous without expecting a service in return. True, almost true, 
somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Te gusta ser generoso sin esperar un servicio a cambio. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Ma’je buty mi pajqui so’macsity jedye’ mi, jam bisem yoctyis notacdye. Anic me’ o 
me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
3. Your well-being is more important to you than the problems of other people. True, 
almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Tu bienestar es más importante a ti como los problemas de otras personas. 
Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
 201 
 
Mo’ jäm’jodye’ anic buty jemonac cui dyes midyes mi, jam jeñej mu in carijsistumtyi’ 
yoctyi muntyi’ in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
4. You would help other people even if you have serious problems of your own. 
True, almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Todavía ayudes a otra gente aunque tienes tus propios problemas graves. 
Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Taca’ buty nótacsi yoctyi’ muntyi’ mi, me’tsan’ mis mo’ya’ cui’si’ carijsis anic are’sis. 
Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
 Extraversion, adapted from (Denissen & Penke, 2008) 
1. When you are together with a lot of people, you prefer to be apart from them. 
True, almost true, somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Cuando tú estás junto a muchas personas prefieres que quedarte fuera de ellos. 
Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Me’ juijya mi mu’ya yiri’ya daityiya muntyi’ in, tupuj buty jäquive bu’yi mi 
jorajyayeban mu in ya in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
2. You feel better when there are a lot of people around you. True, almost true, 
somewhat true, almost false, or false? 
Sientes mejor cuando hay muchas personas cerca de ti. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso? 
Jäm’ cuti mi me’ mu’ya’ dai’ muntyi’ in tyeijya juijya in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo 
o jam o jam yirity? 
3. You feel better when you are alone. True, almost true, somewhat true, almost 
false, or false? 
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Sientes mejor cuando estás solo. Verdadero, casi verdadero, intermedio, casi falso, 
o falso? 
Jämyi buty mi yirity dyety juijyam. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ momo o jam o jam yirity? 
4. You always have fun meeting new people. True, almost true, somewhat true, 
almost false, or false? 
Siempre te diviertes a conocer personas nuevas. Verdadero, casi verdadero, 
intermedio, casi falso, o falso?  
Räjĉan buty ma’jotacsi mi quimdyem atysijtyi’ muntyi’ in. Anic me’ o me’ o dam’ 
momo o jam o jam yirity? 
 
  
 
 
Supplementary Table 1a. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables at the sample level.  
Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum N*** N**** 
Donor ethnic grp. % size 0.57 0.29 0.02 0.94 492 --- 
Donor relig. grp. % size 0.54 0.25 0.07 0.83 495 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor ethnic 
grp. size -4.16 2.61 -6.91 1.04 246 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor relig. 
grp. size -1.09 1.23 -2.34 2.34 249 --- 
No. places lived 3.21 1.91 0.00 8.00 492 157 
No. places visited* 0.00 0.96 -1.04 3.12 492 157 
Hours of TV per week* -0.01 0.96 -0.81 3.14 495 158 
Consensus “goodness” 1.45 0.33 0.00 2.00 486 --- 
Consensus wealth 1.58 0.36 0.00 3.00 487 --- 
Consensus friendship interest 0.48 0.22 0.00 1.00 487 --- 
Consensus willingness to trust 1.30 0.34 0.00 2.00 487 --- 
Net household income* -0.10 0.92 -2.25 3.58 495 158 
Market items owned* 0.01 1.01 -1.16 2.55 495 158 
log Subjective SES 1.04 0.70 0.00 2.30 495 158 
Shortfall summary -0.02 1.21 -2.40 2.79 495 158 
Agreeableness 8.22 3.35 0.00 17.00 495 158 
Extraversion 6.20 2.51 0.00 13.00 495 158 
Risk aversion 7.39 2.95 0.00 12.00 495 158 
Age** 22.27 14.14 0.00 67.00 495 158 
Years of school 6.89 4.42 0.00 16.00 492 157 
Times attends chuch per mo. 1.85 1.77 0.00 5.00 495 158 
Bolivianos allocated 2.21 1.81 0.00 8.72 474 --- 
2
0
3
 
  
 
*z-scored at the sample level. **Centered at age 18; for example, the mean age of the sample, 40.27, is reported as 
22.27 above. ***Number of observations, as in number of candidate recipients. ****Total number of donors.  
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Supplementary Table 1b. Descriptive statistics for categorical variables at the sample level.  
Variables Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 N* N Descriptions 
Benefits 
414 
(84%) 
81 
(16%) 
 
  495 158 
1=other, 2=resources 
Costs 
369 
(75%) 
48 
(10%) 36 (7%) 42 (8%) 495 158 
1=other, 2=competition, 3=no 
MI, 4=none 
Parents knew out-group 
444 
(94%) 30 (6%) 
 
  474 155 
1=no, 2=yes 
Perceived "goodness" 
79 
(17%) 
105 
(23%) 
282 
(61%)   466 149 
1=bad person, 2=a little 
good, 3=good person 
Perceived wealth  
48 
(10%) 
169 
(37%) 
245 
(53%)   462 147 
1=no money, 2=some 
money, 3=money 
Interest in friendship 
274 
(55%) 
221 
(45%) 
 
  495 158 
1=not interested, 
2=interested 
Willingness to trust 
111 
(23%) 
103 
(22%) 
260 
(55%)   474 151 
1=would not trust, 2=could 
trust a little, 3=could trust 
Lodging during flood 
141 
(28%) 
354 
(72%) 
 
  495 158 
1=no, 2=yes 
No traditional labor 
294 
(59%) 
201 
(41%) 
 
  495 158 
1=yes, traditional labor, 2=no 
traditional labor 
Recent illness 
411 
(83%) 
84 
(17%) 
 
  495 158 
1=no, 2=yes 
Sex: male 
228 
(46%) 
267 
(54%) 
 
  495 158 
1=no, 2=yes 
Shared name 
159 
(32%) 
336 
(68%) 
 
  495 158 
1=no, 2=yes 
Population 
168 
(34%) 
180 
(36%) 
147 
(30%)   495 158 
1=Intercultural, 2=Mosetén, 
3=Tsimane' 
*Number of observations. 
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Supplementary Table 2a. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables among the Interculturales.  
Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum N*** N 
Donor ethnic grp. % size 0.51 0.22 0.02 0.64 168 --- 
Donor relig. grp. % size 0.38 0.09 0.18 0.43 168 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor ethnic 
grp. size -6.38 1.85 -6.91 0.00 78 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor relig. 
grp. size 0.08 0.27 -0.07 0.88 90 --- 
No. places lived 3.84 1.51 1.00 8.00 168 53 
No. places visited* 0.44 1.15 -1.04 3.12 168 53 
Hours of TV per week* 0.10 1.04 -0.81 3.14 168 53 
Consensus “goodness” 1.54 0.24 0.58 2.00 165 --- 
Consensus wealth 1.55 0.30 0.78 2.18 165 --- 
Consensus friendship interest 0.54 0.18 0.14 1.00 165 --- 
Consensus willingness to trust 1.38 0.27 0.58 2.00 165 --- 
Net household income* -0.10 1.07 -2.25 3.58 168 53 
Market items owned* 0.47 1.14 -1.02 2.55 168 53 
log Subjective SES 0.90 0.65 0.00 1.95 168 53 
Shortfall summary -0.56 1.02 -2.40 1.75 168 53 
Agreeableness 7.30 3.01 1.00 15.00 168 53 
Extraversion 6.18 2.40 1.00 12.00 168 53 
Risk aversion 7.30 2.55 0.00 12.00 168 53 
Age** 26.23 15.38 2.00 63.00 168 53 
Years of school 8.21 4.11 0.00 15.00 168 53 
Times attends church per mo. 1.43 1.78 0.00 5.00 168 53 
Bolivianos allocated 2.76 1.69 0.00 8.72 159 52 
*z-scored at the sample level. **Centered at age 18. ***Number of observations. 
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Supplementary Table 2b. Descriptive statistics for categorical variables among the Interculturales.  
Variables 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4 N* N Descriptions 
Benefits 150 18 
 
  168 53 1=other, 2=resources 
Costs 132 6 27 3 168 53 
1=other, 2=competition, 3=no MI, 
4=none 
Parents knew out-group 150 9 
 
  159 52 1=no, 2=yes 
Perceived "goodness" 
18 35 104   157 50 
1=bad person, 2=a little good, 
3=good person 
Perceived wealth  
10 51 92   153 48 
1=no money, 2=some money, 
3=money 
Interest in friendship 72 96 
 
  168 53 1=not interested, 2=interested 
Willingness to trust 
38 39 85   162 51 
1=would not trust, 2=could trust a 
little, 3=could trust 
Lodging during flood 54 114 
 
  168 53 1=no, 2=yes 
No traditional labor 63 105 
 
  168 53 
1=yes, traditional labor, 2=no 
traditional labor 
Recent illness 153 15 
 
  168 53 1=no, 2=yes 
Sex: male 57 111 
 
  168 53 1=no, 2=yes 
Shared name 69 99     168 53 1=no, 2=yes 
*Number of observations. 
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Supplementary Table 3a. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables among the Mosetén. 
Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum N*** N 
Donor ethnic grp. % size 0.37 0.16 0.04 0.48 180 --- 
Donor relig. grp. % size 0.71 0.26 0.08 0.83 180 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor ethnic 
grp. size -1.64 0.95 -3.01 1.04 108 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor relig. 
grp. size -1.67 1.42 -2.34 2.34 72 --- 
No. places lived 3.97 1.83 1.00 8.00 180 56 
No. places visited* 0.02 0.93 -1.04 3.12 180 56 
Hours of TV per week* 0.45 0.94 -0.81 3.14 180 56 
Consensus “goodness” 1.57 0.25 0.75 2.00 175 --- 
Consensus wealth 1.68 0.41 0.00 3.00 176 --- 
Consensus friendship interest 0.56 0.24 0.00 1.00 176 --- 
Consensus willingness to trust 1.44 0.33 0.50 2.00 176 --- 
Net household income* 0.10 1.03 -1.28 3.58 180 56 
Market items owned* 0.14 0.99 -1.17 2.40 180 56 
log Subjective SES 1.12 0.77 0.00 2.30 180 56 
Shortfall summary -0.19 1.13 -2.40 2.78 180 56 
Agreeableness 7.42 2.84 1.00 13.00 180 56 
Extraversion 6.18 2.65 1.00 13.00 180 56 
Risk aversion 6.90 3.25 0.00 12.00 180 56 
Age** 19.93 11.09 2.00 46.00 180 56 
Years of school 8.73 3.86 1.00 16.00 180 56 
Times attends chuch per mo. 1.97 1.62 0.00 5.00 180 56 
Bolivianos allocated 2.59 1.47 0.00 8.72 168 54 
*z-scored at the sample level. **Centered at age 18. ***Number of observations.  
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Supplementary Table 3b. Descriptive statistics for categorical variables among the Mosetén.  
Variables 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4 N N Descriptions 
Benefits 147 33 
 
  180 56 1=other, 2=resources 
Costs 123 21 3 33 180 56 
1=other, 2=competition, 3=no MI, 
4=none 
Parents knew out-group 162 6 
 
  168 54 1=no, 2=yes 
Perceived "goodness" 
12 37 125   174 54 
1=bad person, 2=a little good, 
3=good person 
Perceived wealth  
9 54 111   174 54 
1=no money, 2=some money, 
3=money 
Interest in friendship 78 102 
 
  180 56 1=not interested, 2=interested 
Willingness to trust 
25 29 123   177 55 
1=would not trust, 2=could trust a 
little, 3=could trust 
Lodging during flood 42 138 
 
  180 56 1=no, 2=yes 
No traditional labor 126 54 
 
  180 56 
1=yes, traditional labor, 2=no 
traditional labor 
Recent illness 132 48 
 
  180 56 1=no, 2=yes 
Sex: male 108 72 
 
  180 56 1=no, 2=yes 
Shared name 60 120     180 56 1=no, 2=yes 
*Number of observations. 
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Supplementary Table 4a. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables among the Tsimane’.  
Variables Mean SD Minimum Maximum N*** N 
Donor ethnic grp. % size 0.90 0.18 0.03 0.94 144 --- 
Donor relig. grp. % size 0.50 0.23 0.07 0.68 147 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor ethnic 
grp. size -5.81 1.11 -6.91 -4.71 60 --- 
Log ratio recip. to donor relig. 
grp. size -1.82 0.59 -2.30 0.00 87 --- 
No. places lived 1.54 1.29 0.00 5.00 144 48 
No. places visited* -0.53 0.26 -1.04 0.49 144 48 
Hours of TV per week* -0.71 0.18 -0.81 -0.13 147 49 
Consensus “goodness” 1.21 0.37 0.00 1.76 146 --- 
Consensus wealth 1.49 0.31 0.33 3.00 146 --- 
Consensus friendship interest 0.33 0.14 0.00 0.55 146 --- 
Consensus willingness to trust 1.05 0.30 0.00 1.45 146 --- 
Net household income* -0.35 0.31 -0.56 0.71 147 49 
Market items owned* -0.65 0.33 -1.16 -0.08 147 49 
log Subjective SES 1.09 0.67 0.00 2.20 147 49 
Shortfall summary 0.81 1.05 -2.04 2.73 147 49 
Agreeableness 10.24 3.46 0.00 17.00 147 49 
Extraversion 6.24 2.46 0.00 12.00 147 49 
Risk aversion 8.10 2.88 0.00 12.00 147 49 
Age** 20.61 15.08 0.00 67.00 147 49 
Years of school 3.04 2.77 0.00 12.00 144 48 
Times attends church per mo. 2.18 1.87 0.00 5.00 147 49 
Bolivianos allocated 1.23 1.89 0.00 8.72 147 49 
*z-scored at the sample level. **Centered at age 18. ***Number of observations. 
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Supplementary Table 4b. Descriptive statistics for categorical variables among the Tsimane’.  
Variables 
Level 
1 
Level 
2 
Level 
3 
Level 
4 N N Descriptions 
Benefits 117 30 
 
  147 49 1=other, 2=resources 
Costs 114 21 6 6 147 49 
1=other, 2=competition, 3=no MI, 
4=none 
Parents knew out-group 132 15 
 
  147 49 1=no, 2=yes 
Perceived "goodness" 
49 33 53   135 45 
1=bad person, 2=a little good, 
3=good person 
Perceived wealth  
29 64 42   135 45 
1=no money, 2=some money, 
3=money 
Interest in friendship 124 23 
 
  147 49 1=not interested, 2=interested 
Willingness to trust 
48 35 52   135 45 
1=would not trust, 2=could trust a 
little, 3=could trust 
Lodging during flood 45 102 
 
  147 49 1=no, 2=yes 
No traditional labor 105 42 
 
  147 49 
1=yes, traditional labor, 2=no 
traditional labor 
Recent illness 126 21 
 
  147 49 1=no, 2=yes 
Sex: male 63 84 
 
  147 49 1=no, 2=yes 
Shared name 30 117     147 49 1=no, 2=yes 
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Supplementary Table 5. Average bolivianos allocated to an out-group candidate recipient by predictor variable.  
Variables 
Level 1 
Mean (SD) 
Level 2  
Mean (SD) 
Level 3  
Mean (SD) 
Level 4  
Mean (SD) N* N Descriptions 
Benefits 2.20 (1.78) 2.16 (1.83)   418 142 1=other, 
2=resources 
Costs 2.21 (1.84) 1.44 (1.34) 2.77 (2.83) 2.31 (1.05) 418 142 1=other, 
2=competition, 
3=no MI, 4=none 
Parents knew focal 
out-group 
2.25 (1.80) 1.39 (1.43)   418 142 1=no, 2=yes 
Lodging during 
flood 
2.38 (1.75) 2.11 (1.80)   418 142 1=no, 2=yes 
No traditional labor 2.26 (1.71) 2.09 (1.90)   418 142 1=yes, traditional 
labor, 2=no 
traditional labor 
Recent illness 2.32 (1.84) 1.61 (1.36)   418 142 1=no, 2=yes 
Sex: male 2.04 (1.71) 2.32 (1.84)   418 142 1=no, 2=yes 
Shared name 2.25 (1.69) 2.16 (1.83)   418 142 1=no, 2=yes 
Population 2.78 (1.70) 2.47 (1.39) 1.23 (1.89)  418 142 1=Intercultural, 
2=Mosetén, 
3=Tsimane' 
2
1
2
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Supplementary Table 6. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, controlling for mean given to in-group recipients. 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 3.33 1.75 0.06 
A little good 0.23 0.50 0.65 
Good person 0.90 0.45 0.05 
Has some money 1.15 0.51 0.02 
Has money 0.44 0.50 0.38 
Donor ethnic grp. % size -0.71 0.99 0.48 
Donor relig. grp. % size -0.85 0.90 0.35 
Benefits: Resources 1.73 0.57 0.00 
Parents knew out-group -2.17 0.73 0.01 
No. places lived -0.02 0.14 0.91 
No. places visited* 0.27 0.21 0.21 
Hours of TV per week* 0.00 0.18 0.99 
Lodging during flood -0.19 0.47 0.69 
Net household income* 0.18 0.17 0.29 
Market items owned* -0.01 0.25 0.96 
log Subjective SES -0.27 0.27 0.32 
No traditional labor -0.11 0.38 0.78 
Shortfall summary -0.13 0.19 0.52 
Recent illness -0.28 0.63 0.66 
Agreeableness 0.00 0.06 0.96 
Extraversion 0.07 0.08 0.43 
Risk aversion -0.01 0.06 0.84 
Age** 0.02 0.02 0.25 
Years of school 0.05 0.07 0.47 
Sex: male -0.73 0.45 0.11 
Times attends church per 
mo. 0.12 0.13 0.39 
Shared name with recips. -0.41 0.47 0.38 
Mean amt. to I-G recips. -0.45 0.19 0.02 
AIC=757.36. Number of observations=174. Number of participants=58. *z-scored at 
the sample level. **Centered at age 18. 
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Supplementary Table 7. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, with recipient consensus “goodness” and wealth as 
predictors. 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 2.73 1.47 0.07 
Consensus "goodness" 0.47 0.46 0.30 
Consensus wealth 0.72 0.38 0.06 
Donor ethnic grp. % size -1.18 0.82 0.16 
Donor relig. grp. % size -0.30 0.71 0.68 
Benefits: Resources 0.57 0.41 0.17 
Parents knew out-group -1.01 0.71 0.16 
No. places lived 0.03 0.11 0.81 
No. places visited* 0.17 0.20 0.40 
Hours of TV per week* 0.05 0.18 0.78 
Lodging during flood -0.39 0.37 0.30 
Net household income* 0.07 0.16 0.66 
Market items owned* 0.17 0.19 0.39 
log Subjective SES -0.48 0.23 0.04 
No traditional labor -0.25 0.34 0.47 
Shortfall summary -0.16 0.16 0.31 
Recent illness -0.79 0.51 0.13 
Agreeableness -0.01 0.05 0.91 
Extraversion -0.01 0.07 0.88 
Risk aversion 0.04 0.06 0.46 
Age** -0.01 0.01 0.50 
Years of school -0.04 0.06 0.48 
Sex: male -0.09 0.40 0.83 
Times attends church per 
mo. 0.08 0.10 0.43 
Shared name with recips. 0.06 0.39 0.87 
AIC=1046.04. Number of observations=216. Number of participants=72. *z-scored 
at the sample level. **Centered at age 18. 
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Supplementary Table 8a. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, with interest in friendship as a predictor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AIC=982.61. Number of observations=219. Number of participants=73. *z-scored at 
the sample level. **Centered at age 18. 
 
 
  
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 3.80 1.41 0.01 
Interest in friendship 0.10 0.32 0.76 
Has some money 0.66 0.50 0.19 
Has money -0.27 0.49 0.58 
Donor ethnic grp. % size -1.31 0.86 0.14 
Donor relig. grp. % size -0.53 0.70 0.45 
Benefits: Resources 0.88 0.43 0.04 
Parents knew out-group -1.30 0.73 0.08 
No. places lived -0.02 0.11 0.83 
No. places visited* 0.17 0.19 0.38 
Hours of TV per week* -0.06 0.17 0.70 
Lodging during flood -0.27 0.39 0.48 
Net household income* 0.07 0.15 0.64 
Market items owned* 0.13 0.19 0.52 
log Subjective SES -0.42 0.23 0.08 
No traditional labor -0.39 0.35 0.27 
Shortfall summary -0.09 0.16 0.61 
Recent illness -0.51 0.52 0.33 
Agreeableness 0.00 0.05 0.96 
Extraversion 0.01 0.07 0.86 
Risk aversion 0.03 0.06 0.57 
Age** 0.00 0.02 0.82 
Years of school 0.03 0.06 0.64 
Sex: male -0.16 0.41 0.70 
Times attends church per 
mo. 0.02 0.11 0.83 
Shared name with recips. 0.06 0.39 0.88 
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Supplementary Table 8b. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
participants who differentiated, with willingness to trust as a predictor. 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 3.79 1.44 0.01 
Could trust a little 0.00 0.47 0.99 
Could trust 0.35 0.44 0.42 
Has some money 0.56 0.51 0.28 
Has money -0.34 0.50 0.49 
Donor ethnic grp. % size -1.16 0.87 0.19 
Donor relig. grp. % size -0.71 0.70 0.32 
Benefits: Resources 0.88 0.43 0.05 
Parents knew out-group -1.37 0.73 0.07 
No. places lived -0.05 0.11 0.65 
No. places visited* 0.21 0.19 0.27 
Hours of TV per week* -0.08 0.17 0.62 
Lodging during flood -0.28 0.39 0.48 
Net household income* 0.11 0.15 0.45 
Market items owned* 0.14 0.19 0.48 
log Subjective SES -0.43 0.23 0.07 
No traditional labor -0.44 0.35 0.21 
Shortfall summary -0.08 0.16 0.65 
Recent illness -0.41 0.51 0.43 
Agreeableness -0.01 0.05 0.87 
Extraversion 0.03 0.07 0.65 
Risk aversion 0.02 0.06 0.68 
Age** 0.00 0.02 0.77 
Years of school 0.05 0.06 0.48 
Sex: male -0.14 0.41 0.73 
Times attends church per 
mo. 0.03 0.11 0.82 
Shared name with recips. -0.03 0.40 0.94 
AIC=983.19. Number of observations=219. Number of participants=73. *z-scored at 
the sample level. **Centered at age 18. 
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Supplementary Table 9. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
all participants 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 2.93 0.86 0.00 
Could trust a little 0.01 0.25 0.96 
Could trust 0.52 0.21 0.02 
Has some money 0.60 0.26 0.02 
Has money 0.13 0.26 0.61 
Donor ethnic grp. % size -0.77 0.46 0.10 
Donor relig. grp. % size -0.28 0.45 0.53 
Benefits: Resources 0.60 0.31 0.06 
Costs: Competition -0.86 0.37 0.02 
Costs: No market access 0.14 0.40 0.72 
Costs: None -0.40 0.38 0.30 
Parents knew out-group -1.13 0.43 0.01 
No. places lived 0.18 0.06 0.01 
No. places visited* 0.12 0.12 0.29 
Hours of TV per week* 0.14 0.11 0.21 
Lodging during flood 0.11 0.11 0.32 
Net household income* 0.05 0.11 0.66 
Market items owned* -0.35 0.15 0.02 
log Subjective SES -0.35 0.23 0.12 
No traditional labor -0.46 0.21 0.03 
Shortfall summary -0.16 0.09 0.09 
Recent illness -0.89 0.28 0.00 
Agreeableness 0.01 0.03 0.83 
Extraversion -0.02 0.04 0.64 
Risk aversion 0.00 0.03 0.95 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.91 
Years of school -0.02 0.03 0.41 
Sex: male -0.09 0.23 0.71 
Times attends church per 
mo. 0.05 0.06 0.46 
Shared name with recips. 0.07 0.22 0.74 
AIC=1847.12. Number of observations=462. Number of participants=157. *z-scored 
at the sample level. **Centered at age 18. 
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Supplementary Table 10. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
all participants, controlling for mean given to in-group recipients 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 1.66 1.09 0.13 
Could trust a little 0.13 0.25 0.60 
Could trust 0.61 0.22 0.01 
Has some money 1.03 0.29 0.00 
Has money 0.56 0.29 0.05 
Donor ethnic grp. % size* -0.57 0.53 0.28 
Donor relig. grp. % size* -0.19 0.55 0.73 
Benefits: Resources 0.41 0.36 0.26 
Costs: Competition -0.39 0.52 0.45 
Costs: No market access 0.41 0.44 0.35 
Costs: None -0.16 0.46 0.72 
Parents knew out-group -0.66 0.50 0.19 
No. places lived 0.26 0.08 0.00 
No. places visited** 0.05 0.14 0.70 
Hours of TV per week** 0.15 0.12 0.22 
Lodging during flood 0.09 0.13 0.52 
Net household income** 0.00 0.15 0.98 
Market items owned** -0.31 0.19 0.12 
log Subjective SES -0.19 0.29 0.52 
No traditional labor -0.53 0.25 0.04 
Shortfall summary -0.07 0.12 0.57 
Recent illness -1.11 0.34 0.00 
Agreeableness 0.04 0.04 0.40 
Extraversion -0.05 0.05 0.30 
Risk aversion -0.02 0.05 0.65 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.71 
Years of school -0.02 0.04 0.51 
Sex: male -0.20 0.27 0.46 
Times attends church per 
mo. 0.02 0.08 0.83 
Shared name with recips. 0.22 0.26 0.40 
Mean amt. to I-G recips. 0.04 0.10 0.71 
AIC=1345.61. Number of observations=354. Number of participants=118. 
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Supplementary Table 11a. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
all participants, including ratio of recipient to donor ethnic group size 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 0.88 1.28 0.49 
Could trust a little 0.26 0.42 0.54 
Could trust 0.69 0.35 0.05 
Has some money 1.29 0.43 0.00 
Has money 0.42 0.43 0.33 
log ratio recip. to donor grp. size, 
ethnic -0.07 0.07 0.37 
Benefits: Resources 0.19 0.33 0.57 
Parents knew out-group -0.94 0.65 0.15 
No. places lived 0.13 0.09 0.19 
No. places visited* 0.03 0.20 0.90 
Hours of TV per week* 0.35 0.16 0.03 
Lodging during flood 0.22 0.17 0.21 
Net household income* -0.02 0.16 0.90 
Market items owned* -0.13 0.22 0.56 
log Subjective SES -0.66 0.38 0.09 
No traditional labor -0.11 0.35 0.76 
Shortfall summary 0.03 0.14 0.82 
Recent illness -1.14 0.46 0.02 
Agreeableness 0.03 0.05 0.59 
Extraversion 0.02 0.06 0.73 
Risk aversion -0.02 0.05 0.67 
Age** 0.01 0.01 0.59 
Years of school 0.03 0.05 0.57 
Sex: male -0.28 0.42 0.50 
Times attends church per mo. -0.03 0.10 0.74 
Shared name with recips. 0.32 0.30 0.30 
AIC=885.92. Number of observations=216. Number of participants=72.  
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Supplementary Table 11b. Predicted amounts given to out-group members among 
all participants, including ratio of recipient to donor religious group size 
  Estimate S.E. 
p 
value 
(Intercept) 2.38 1.08 0.03 
Could trust a little 0.18 0.32 0.57 
Could trust 0.68 0.28 0.02 
Has some money 0.05 0.37 0.90 
Has money -0.10 0.36 0.79 
log ratio recip. to donor grp. size, 
religious 0.09 0.14 0.51 
Benefits: Resources 1.61 1.05 0.13 
Parents knew out-group -0.68 0.50 0.18 
No. places lived 0.26 0.10 0.01 
No. places visited* -0.01 0.17 0.97 
Hours of TV per week* -0.23 0.15 0.14 
Lodging during flood 0.32 0.14 0.02 
Net household income* -0.04 0.19 0.82 
Market items owned* -0.33 0.23 0.16 
log Subjective SES 0.37 0.35 0.30 
No traditional labor -0.53 0.31 0.09 
Shortfall summary -0.17 0.14 0.22 
Recent illness -0.31 0.36 0.39 
Agreeableness -0.05 0.05 0.35 
Extraversion -0.07 0.07 0.27 
Risk aversion -0.07 0.06 0.25 
Age** 0.02 0.01 0.08 
Years of school -0.03 0.04 0.48 
Sex: male 0.15 0.32 0.63 
Times attends church per mo. 0.06 0.08 0.43 
Shared name with recips. -0.39 0.36 0.28 
AIC=824.83. Number of observations=210. Number of participants=70.   
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Supplementary Figure 1. Participants sorted cards representing local ethnic 
groups, churches, and work cooperatives on a scale from “groups I belong to most” 
to “groups I belong to least”; the yellow scale was oriented in front of the participant 
such that the rectangle for “groups I belong to most” was closest to him or her and 
the rectangle for “groups I belong to least” was furthest away. Participants had to 
sort all the cards on the scale, but could leave as many or as few in each rectangle 
as they wished. The figure below shows sorting in stages as the participant places 
the cards in the rectangles. The number of groups in the card sort was determined 
by the number of locally salient groups: 9 for the Tsimane’, 10 for the Mosetén, and 
12 for the Interculturales. Some are religious organizations (e.g., Catholics are a 
cross, Nazarenes are a Bible), some are ethnic groups (e.g., Tsimane’ are a T, 
Quechua are a Q), and some are work cooperatives (e.g., the dairy cooperative has 
a cow, the pig farming cooperative has a pig). We classified groups placed in the 
two rectangles closest to the participant as in-group, those placed in the two 
rectangles farthest from the participant as out-group, and those in the middle 
rectangle as intermediate. Cow and pig images courtesy of johnny_automatic and 
tuxwrench (https://openclipart.org/detail/388/cow; 
https://openclipart.org/detail/216216/piggy). 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Photos of six candidate recipients, all past participants in 
the experiment, were arrayed on a table for the game. (To maintain participant 
confidentiality, we use cartoons here.) All past participants were eligible as 
recipients in these games, unless they did not wish to participate in this aspect of 
the study. The three men on the left are participants who identify with one ethnic or 
religious group, the three on the right with another. Whether out-group members 
appeared on the left or right was counterbalanced across participants.  
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A3. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: CORRUPTION AND THE OTHER(S): 
SCOPE OF SUPERORDINATE IDENTITY MATTERS FOR CORRUPTION 
PERMISSIBILITY 
 
 
1 Country-Level Controls  
1.1 United Nations Ethnic and Religious Census Data 
 
As a measure of objective, country-level religious and ethnic heterogeneity, we 
employ census data compiled by the United Nations 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/popchar/popchar2.htm). 
Subjective, individual-level perceptions of heterogeneity were not available from 
WVS (see Discussion). 
To capture the diversity of religions in a given country, we used two methods. 
First, we adopt the fractionalization index used by Mauro [1], as well as many 
subsequent authors [e.g. 2,3]. The equation for religious fractionalization is 
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 = 1 −∑𝑠𝑖𝑗
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where sij represents the relative share of group i (i=1, …,N) in country j. A 
fractionalization measure of 0 represents maximal homogeneity, while a measure of 
1 indicates maximal diversity. We calculated religious fractionalization separately 
from ethnic fractionalization as the two generate different predictions about 
government institutions [e.g. ethnic fractionalization predicts less democracy, 
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whereas religious fractionalization may predict more; 2]. Second, polarization, the 
degree to which people in a country are distributed equally across multiple groups, 
predicts levels of conflict [4] and failures of collective action [5], whereas 
fractionalization by itself does not; this difference may be because polarization 
reflects discrimination by the dominant group [e.g. 5]. To capture this additional 
dimension of heterogeneity, we also use the polarization index introduced by 
Montalvo and Reynol-Querol [4]: 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 = 1 −∑(
1
2 − 𝑠𝑖𝑗
1
2
)
2
𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where sij again represents the relative share of group i (i=1, …,N) in country j. A 
polarization value of 0 represents an even distribution of individuals across N>>2 
groups, and a value of 1 represents the extreme case in which half the population is 
in one group and the other half in a second group. We again calculated religious 
and ethnic polarization separately. Although conceptually distinct, the 
fractionalization and polarization indices are not independent of each other, thus we 
do not include both in the same model at the same time. 
 We matched participants’ interview data to religious and ethnic heterogeneity 
information for their country in the year closest to the year of interview. We report 
results for the subset of participants from countries for which both ethnic and 
religious heterogeneity data were available (the "religious-ethnic heterogeneity 
subset"; only 21 of 37 countries reporting religious heterogeneity data also reported 
ethnic heterogeneity) separately from models including all participants from 
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countries with religious data and models including all participants from countries 
with ethnic data.  
 
1.2 World Bank Population Density, Population Size, Gini Index, and World Region 
Classifications 
 
Because both measures of an expanded in-group, primary geographic identity and 
number of group memberships, will capture a greater number of in-group members 
in larger countries, we include country population size as an additional control. 
Indeed, population density is also potentially important, as opportunities for 
exposure and interactions with a larger number of people may be more common in 
more densely living populations. We used both population size and density from the 
World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator) matched to interview year for each 
country. To minimize the effects of extreme values, we binned values of population 
size and density above and below 2 SD. We further logged density to minimize the 
influence of large values, as the distribution of densities was negatively skewed. 
 To control for economic inequality, a predictor of high levels of corruption [6], 
we include the World Bank's calculation of country-level Gini index, reported on a 0-
100 scale. Because Gini data are only occasionally measured in most countries, we 
calculated the average Gini across the five years leading up to the year of the 
interview. To avoid the undue influence of several countries with high inequality, we 
logged Gini in all analyses. 
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 To test the possibility of that shared cultural history causes correlations in 
responses between countries, we also use the World Bank’s classification of 
countries by regions in some models. 
 
1.3 Freedom House's Freedom in the World Political Rights Index 
  
Freedom in the World (FIW), a report published by Freedom House that includes 
indices of political and civil rights, measures the presence of democratic practices in 
a country (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world). Government 
accountability may sway a participant's perspective on corruption permissibility. 
Because more political rights predict less corruption prevalence at the country level 
[7] and because of collinearity between the political rights and civil rights indices (r = 
0.94), we use only the political rights index. Analysts employed by Freedom House 
are responsible for assigning countries a score on the political rights index. These 
scores are based on the following categories: the extent to which citizens in a 
country can (1) vote as they wish in legitimate elections, (2) run for public office, (3) 
freely become members of political parties, and (4) vote for accountable 
representatives. A country can score from 1 to 7, where a country scoring 1 has 
many political rights and a country scoring 7 has almost none. We matched a 
participant's interview year with political rights data from the same year. 
 
1.4 Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 
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Researchers commonly model country-level corruption using Transparency 
International's Corruption Perceptions Index [CPI; e.g. 7,8,9]. Transparency 
International has published the CPI annually since 1995 
(http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi). 
The CPI reflects perceptions of bribery, embezzlement, and kickbacks in the public 
sector of a given country. The score a country receives is an aggregate of 
independent surveys of businesspeople, international experts, and risk analysts. 
This score can range from 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean); we reverse-coded the 
CPI such that corrupt countries received a 10 to better match the scoring system of 
FIW. The CPI addresses only two of the four components of the corruption complex, 
public corruption and embezzlement, but it does provide a control for the rates of 
public corruption at the country level, which can increase or lower perceived 
corruption permissibility, as well as obfuscate corrupt acts committed by an 
individual. 
 We matched participants with CPI data from the year closest to the year of 
their interview. Because the CPI began in 1995, this would result in a fairly wide gap 
for individuals who took the WVS in 1981; however, only 12% of participants in the 
religious-ethnic heterogeneity subsample were interviewed before 1995, and none 
before 1990, limiting the size of the gap. Further, we believe the value of the CPI's 
inclusion outweighs this limitation, given the importance of controlling for country-
level corruption prevalence.  
 
2 Statistical Methods for Country-Level Variables 
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Initial analyses revealed high levels of correlation between the seven country-level 
variables – religious fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization, Gini, population 
density, population size, the political rights index, and the CPI – and consequent 
collinearity problems when all were included in the same model. The same was true 
for religious and ethnic polarization together with the other five variables. To avoid 
collinearity, we performed a principal components analysis on the seven variables – 
first with religious and ethnic fractionalization, then with religious and ethnic 
polarization – for each subset of data. To ensure we summarized at least 80% of the 
variation in these measures, we extracted the first three components for use in our 
models. Considering only data from countries for which both religious and ethnic 
fractionalization data were available, the three components summarize 39%, 27%, 
and 19% of the variation for the geographic identity subset and 65%, 26%, and 6% 
for the group membership subset. 
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S1 Figure. ORs for regional, country, and continent/world identities vs. local identities across models with 
country-level variables. Either fractionalization or polarization were used as measures of religious and ethnic 
heterogeneity. For Ethnic & Religious Fractionalization and Religious & Ethnic Polarization subsamples, n = 20,521; 
Religious Fractionalization and Religious Polarization subsamples, n = 36,997; Ethnic Fractionalization and 
Polarization subsamples, n = 30,597.  
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S1 Table. Odds of finding corruption permissible by primary geographic identity for the religious-ethnic 
heterogeneity subset1,2,3.  
 
Variable 
Odds 
ratio 
Std. 
error 
z 
value p value 
(Intercept) 1.88 0.09 7.20 <0.001 
Regional 1.27 0.05 4.58 <0.001 
Country 0.95 0.04 --1.25 <0.001 
Cont./World 1.10 0.05 1.79 0.07 
Shortfall 1.03 0.01 3.27 <0.01 
Shortfall2 0.98 0.00 -5.26 <0.001 
Education Level 2 0.68 0.04 -9.64 <0.001 
Education Level 3 0.55 0.05 -11.09 <0.001 
Believes in God 0.75 0.05 -5.34 <0.001 
Confid. Police, Govt. 
Srvc. 0.95 0.01 -4.15 <0.001 
Sex: Female 0.87 0.03 -4.26 <0.001 
Age 0.98 0.00 -13.40 <0.001 
Number of Kids 0.94 0.01 -5.00 <0.001 
Country PC14 1.00 0.01 0.20 0.84 
Country PC2 0.92 0.01 -6.69 <0.001 
Country PC3 1.12 0.01 7.53 <0.001 
2
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1The intercept represents participants with regional identities, who had the lowest household resource abundance, 
reported the lowest confidence in police and civil services, did not believe in God, had no children, were 0 years old, 
and male.  
2Models with random country or continent intercepts, religious fractionalization or polarization models, and ethnic 
fractionalization or polarization models show very similar results, and so are not reported. Religious and ethnic 
fractionalization (reported) model n = 20,521.  Religious and ethnic fractionalization AIC = 23,026. Religious and 
ethnic polarization AIC = 23,049. 
3AIC selection criteria suggest that the model including primary geographic identity provides a better fit than the model 
with only controls and the resource shortfall summary measure (weighted AICmarginal = 1; AICnull = 23,053, AICmarginal = 
23,026. 
4The higher the value of the first country-level principal component (PC1), the more a participant’s home country has 
a small but dense population, has a low Gini and low religious fractionalization, few political rights, and high 
corruption. The higher the value for the second (PC2), the more her country has a big, low density population, low 
political rights, and high Gini, corruption, religious and ethnic fractionalization. The higher the value for the third 
principal component (PC3), the bigger her country, the higher its political rights, the lower its ethnic and religious 
fractionalization. 
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S2 Figure. ORs for countries below and above the sample median for several country-level variables. (A) Gini 
coefficient, (B) absence of political rights (i.e. above the median means fewer political rights), (C) perceived corruption 
prevalence, and (D) religious fractionalization. Analyses use the religious & ethnic heterogeneity subsample. 
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S2 Table. Odds of finding corruption permissible by number of group memberships for the religious-ethnic 
heterogeneity subset1,2.  
 
Variable 
Odds 
Ratio 
Std. 
Error 
z 
value p value 
(Intercept) 1.01 0.21 0.03 0.97 
Number of 
Memberships 
1.10 0.02 4.10 <0.001 
Shortfall 1.07 0.02 3.77 <0.001 
Shortfall2 0.98 0.01 -3.64 <0.001 
Education Level 2 0.73 0.08 -3.92 <0.001 
Education Level 3 0.56 0.13 -4.57 <0.001 
Believes in God 0.74 0.16 -1.84 0.07 
Confid. Police, Govt. 
Srvc. 
0.93 0.02 -3.14 <0.01 
Sex: Female 1.02 0.06 0.32 0.75 
Age 0.99 0.00 -3.45 <0.001 
Number of Children 0.95 0.03 -2.19 0.03 
Country PC13 0.81 0.02 -13.01 <0.001 
Country PC2 1.12 0.03 4.65 <0.001 
Country PC3 1.23 0.05 4.20 <0.001 
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1Models with random country or continent intercepts, religious fractionalization or polarization models, and ethnic 
fractionalization or polarization models show very similar results, and so are not reported. Religious and ethnic 
fractionalization (reported) model n = 5785. Religious and ethnic fractionalization AIC = 6222.30. Religious and ethnic 
polarization AIC = 6227.49. 
2AIC selection criteria suggest that the model including primary geographic identity provides a better fit than the model 
with only controls and the resource shortfall summary measure (AICmarginal = 1; AICmarginal = 6222.30, AICnull = 
6235.74). 
3The higher the value of the first country-level principal component (PC1), the more a participant’s home country has 
a small but dense population, has a low Gini and low religious fractionalization, but high ethnic fractionalization, few 
political rights, and high corruption. The higher the value for the second (PC2), the more her country has a big, dense 
population with political rights, but high Gini, corruption, religious and ethnic fractionalization. The higher the value for 
the third principal component (PC3), the bigger her country, the lower its religious but higher its ethnic 
fractionalization, the lower its corruption, the higher its Gini, and the fewer its political rights. 
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S3 Figure. OR with each additional group membership across models with country-level variables. For the 
Religious & Ethnic Fractionalization and Religious & Ethnic Polarization subsets, n = 5734; Religious Fractionalization 
and Religious Polarization subsets, n = 10,874; Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Polarization subsets, n = 8562.  
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S3 Table. Exploratory analysis investigating the relationship between having a regional identity and several 
predictors. These include the participant’s perceptions on whether more emphasis on “family life,” less emphasis on 
“money and material possessions,” and more emphasis on “greater respect for authority” would be good, neutral, or 
bad changes; the first and third hold badness at zero, the second goodness.  
  Geog. only2 Geog. & group3 
Country-level 
vars., geog. only4 
Country-level vars., 
geog. & group5 
Variable 
Odds 
ratio 
p 
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p 
value 
Odds 
ratio 
p 
value 
Odds 
ratio p value 
(Intercept) 0.23 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.19 0.00 
Family Emph: 
Neutral 0.90 0.17 0.99 0.94 0.89 0.46 0.94 0.83 
Family Emph: Good 0.74 0.00 0.73 0.04 0.73 0.02 0.66 0.11 
Profit Motive: 
Neutral 0.94 0.08 0.94 0.32 0.87 0.03 0.94 0.61 
Profit Motive: Bad 0.97 0.25 0.94 0.21 0.81 0.00 0.80 0.04 
Authority: Neutral 0.93 0.10 0.79 0.00 0.89 0.22 0.61 0.01 
Authority: Good 0.92 0.04 0.76 0.00 0.89 0.19 0.62 0.01 
Sex: Female 1.01 0.50 0.99 0.76 1.01 0.81 1.03 0.70 
Age 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.99 0.06 
Number of Kids 1.02 0.01 1.06 0.00 1.02 0.22 1.08 0.03 
1Models are logistic regressions with regional identity=1. All analyses control for country of residence. 2Subset 
including the geographic identity predictor: n=77,376; AIC=59,399. 3Subset including the geographic identity and 
group membership predictors: n=22,729, AIC=17,465. 4Subset including the geographic identity predictor and 
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country-level variables: n=19,923; AIC=14,288. 5Subset including the geographic identity and group membership 
predictors and country-level variables: n=5683, AIC=3900.  
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